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Abstract  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the interaction between people’s financial behaviour 
and the market’s fractal characteristics. In particular, I have been interested in the Hurst 
exponent, a measure of a series’ fractal dimension and autocorrelation.  
In Chapter 2 I show that people exhibit a high level of sensitivity to the Hurst exponent of 
visually presented graphs representing price series. I explain this sensitivity using two types 
of cues: the illuminance of the graphs, and the characteristic of the price change series. I 
further show that people can learn how to identify the Hurst exponents of fractal graphs 
when feedback about the correct values of the Hurst exponent is given. 
In Chapter 3 I investigate the relationship between risk perception and Hurst exponent. I 
show that people assess risk of investment in an asset according to the Hurst exponent of its 
price graph if it is presented along with its price change series. Analysis reveals that buy/sell 
decisions also depend on the Hurst exponent of the graphs. 
In Chapter 4 I study forecasts from financial graphs. I show that to produce forecasts, people 
imitate perceived noise and signals of data series. People’s forecasts depend on certain 
personality traits and dispositions. Similar results were obtained for experts. 
In Chapter 5 I explore the way people integrate visually presented price series with news. I 
find that people’s financial decisions are influenced by news more than the average trend of 
the graphs. In the case of positive trend, there is a correlation between financial forecasts and 
decisions. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I show that the way people perceive fractal time series is correlated 
with the Hurst exponent of the graphs. I use the findings of the thesis to describe a possible 
mechanism which preserves the fractal nature of price series.  
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Chapter 1: Background  
Introduction 
 
“Citigroup runs one of the biggest foreign-exchange operations at Canary Wharf. On a 
typical day in 2003, it is crowded, busy, and self-absorbed. The Citigroup trading room is 
vast, with hundreds of computers, ceilings, track lighting, and 130 currency traders and 
salespeople arrayed along rows of desks, six to a side...But consider the “mistakes” on this 
floor. Seated at one row of desks, a pair of analysts spend their days studying the orders of 
the bank’s own costumers. They are looking at broad patterns they can report back to the 
clients in regular newsletters. Theirs is the sort of market-insider information that, one form 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis says, should not be useful... A few desks below is a math 
Ph.D. from Cambridge. He spends much of each day studying the fast-changing “volatility 
surface” of the option market – an imaginary 3-D graph of how price fluctuations widen and 
narrow... By the Black-Scholes formula, there should be nothing of interest in such a 
surface; it should be flat as a pancake. In fact it is wild, complex shaped. Tracking it and 
predicting its next changes are fundamental ways in which Citigroup’s option traders make 
money” (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004, pages 80-81).  
 
The power that financial markets encapsulate is difficult to apprehend. For instance, the 
daily average turnover in the Foreign Exchange market alone was nearly $4 trillion in 2010. 
This market’s value was higher by 20% from that estimated during the crises of 2007, 
mostly due to online trading, high-frequency traders, and bank investments (King and Rime, 
2010). To reach such an outstanding value, millions of investment decisions have to be made 
each and every day. A large percentage of traders employ judgmental methods (Cheung and 
Chinn, 2001; Taylor and Allen, 1992). Mathematically, the nature of the data used for these 19 
 
decisions is highly controversial; some assume that it is entirely random, whereas others 
believe that it is has statistically self-similar fractal structure. The purpose of this thesis is to 
reveal how people perceive and react to financial time series. In particular, I am interested in 
questions about whether people are sensitive to fractal structure, how they make forecasts 
from financial data, the ways they estimate investment risks, and how they decide whether to 
buy or sell assets. Furthermore, I explore the ways human personality traits and dispositions 
interact with the data. Finally, I discuss the way people may influence price series. 
I begin the introduction chapter by discussing the nature of financial data and fractals. I then 
describe the psychological and financial background of the study. I conclude the 
introduction with a description of the mathematical aspects of the thesis. 20 
 
Part I: The role of fractals in finance 
 
“Numbers are often used as a way of demonstrating objectivity and value neutral 
judgements when in fact, like any other mode of information transfer, they contain within 
them a whole series of judgements, rationalities, expectations and hopes” (Hall, 2006, page 
673). 
 
Stories are at the heart of any human society; since childhood they nurture our understanding 
of causality, thereby endowing us with a certain sense of security and control. In particular, 
narratives are used by financial practitioners to create a sense of conviction, which enables 
functioning under conditions of severe uncertainty (Tuckett, 2012).  But, in the case of 
financial markets, can stories really provide a mean of power acquisition, or are they merely 
cynical illusions? And if one were to believe that stories can yield control, which type of 
narrative should one follow? 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), such a form of control is impossible 
(Hodnett and Heng-Hsing, 2012; Mehrara and Oryoie, 2012). The strong form of the EMH, 
originally developed by Fama in the 1960s (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), states that market 
prices reflect all types of available information about all asset fundamental values. As future 
information cannot be forecasted, neither can future prices. Therefore, one cannot “beat the 
market”. Since the sixties, different versions of the EMH have been formulated. In 
particular, the weak version of the EMH limits the conclusion of the strong form to historical 
price data alone; as inferring future prices from past and present prices is termed Technical 
Analysis, the weak version of the EMH invalidates this type of trading method. Validity of 
the different versions the EMH has been challenged over and over again during the years. In 
fact, the EMH is one of the most tested hypotheses in finance (Yen and Lee, 2008). 21 
 
According to the contradictory evidence that emerged, different investment 
recommendations were developed (see e.g. Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer, 2010). The 
debate over the EMH is far from being settled. It is, therefore, bewildering that most traders 
use financial tools which are based on one of the most important results derived from the 
EMH: the random-walk hypothesis.  
The random walk hypothesis consists of the narrative that the market has no memory: 
changes in prices at any moment are entirely independent of the history of asset prices. 
Wrapped in thick layers of mathematical formulae, this narrative supplied to the masses of 
traders, investors, and other financial practitioners a method to price assets and manage their 
portfolios in a way that was supposed to guarantee (up to some pre-determined level of risk) 
that they would make profits. The random-walk narrative is attractive in its simplicity; it is 
friendly as it lends itself to mathematical analysis; and it is comforting, as it assigns small 
probabilities to financial crises (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004). In addition, it is powerful: 
Black-Scholes formula, described by Berkowitz (2010, page 1) as “one of the most widely 
used option valuation procedures among practitioners”, is based on the random walk 
assumption. Furthermore, a different model based on the random walk hypothesis – the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) - was shown to be used for investment decisions by 
73.5% of the respondents to the survey of Graham and Harvey (2002). But is the random 
walk model correct? 
As with the EMH, validity of the random-walk hypothesis has been tested in numerous 
contexts and geographic location. For instance,  Mehmood, Mehmood and  Mujtaba (2012), 
and Narayan and Smyth (2006) supported the random walk hypothesis,  Umanath (2012) 
and Al-Jafari (2011) rejected it, whereas Righi and Ceretta (2011) and Otto (2010) found 
that its validity depends on a wide range of different factors.  
Fractal models provided an alternative narrative of the nature of the market. Primitive 
versions of fractal formulation of the market had already been suggested at the beginning of 22 
 
the 20
th century. For instance, in the 1930s, Elliot (Frost and Prechter, 1998) defied the 
assumption that the market has no memory by noticing that certain patterns (“waves”) tend 
to appear in it. Each of Elliot’s waves could be decomposed into parts which resembled the 
original wave, hence giving rise to a fractal-like self-similarity. Existence of structure in 
price graphs is impossible according to the random walk hypothesis. However accurate his 
observation was, Elliot did not construct any statistical or mathematical theory that could 
support his views rigorously. On the other hand, in the 1960s, Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot and 
Hudson, 2004) proved that some assets do not obey the Gaussian statistics imposed by the 
random walk hypothesis. Mandelbrot showed that, instead, asset prices exhibited a 
statistically self-similar behaviour.  
More precisely, Mandelbrot argued that financial time series could be modelled as fractional 
Brownian motions (fBm), series whose roughness can be characterised by a constant termed 
the Hurst Exponent (H). For fBm series, the values of the Hurst exponent range between 0 
and 1. Loosely speaking, as the H value of a time series approaches 0, the series seems to be 
noisier, and as H approaches 1 it seems to be more regular. Figure 1.1 presents graphs of 
fBm series with different Hurst exponents.  
 
Figure 1.1 Examples of fBm price series with Hurst coefficients ranging from 0.1 (anti-
persistent) through 0.5 (random walk) to 0.9 (persistent) in 0.1 increments.   
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The Hurst exponent is related to the dimension of the fractal, and it can be shown that it is 
also a measure of a series’ memory: for H > 0.5, the increments of the series are positively 
autocorrelated, whereas for H < 0.5, they are negatively autocorrelated. The case of H = 0.5 
corresponds to a random walk. It has been shown that Hurst exponents of real assets 
typically vary between 0.35 and 0.65, rather than being exactly 0.5 (Sang, Ma, and Wang, 
2001). Therefore, one can consider Mandelbrot’s theory to be a generalisation of the random 
walk hypothesis. Mandelbrot’s model was much more complicated than the random-walk 
theory, and therefore did not lend itself to mathematical handling. Indeed, Mandlebrot and 
Hudson wrote in 2004 (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004) that the fractal theory was not a 
forecasting tool. Financial trading methods relying on fractal assumptions have been 
developed only recently and are, in general, rare. The fractal narrative does not possess the 
properties required to allure most investors: it cannot supply immediate answers, and the 
answers it does give are not reassuring. Instead of pacifying investors by depicting a 
relatively safe world the way the random-walk model does, it presents the market as 
dangerous and unpredictable (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004). In addition, the fractal model 
of the market is still considered to be highly controversial.  
Nevertheless, during the last few years, and especially after the last series of global financial 
crises, a new interest in the model has emerged. Investors and traders started to suspect that 
the tools they use might not be adequate to describe extreme phenomena, such as the 
creation of bubbles and acute price falls, which occurred much more frequently than 
classical theories predicted. This new interest manifested itself through a large body of 
research aiming to answer the question whether the market is fractal or not (e.g. 
Parthasarathy, 2013; Malavoglia, Gaio, Júnior and Lima, 2012; Ling-Yun, 2011; Onali and 
Goddard, 2011; Sun, Rachev and Fabozzi, 2007; In and Kim, 2006). Attempts to predict the 
market based on its fractal properties were made as well (Duchon, Robert, and Vargas, 2012; 
Richards, 2004; Cui and Yang, 2009). Furthermore, new theories and investment strategies, 
combining fractal models with previous formulations, such as the Black-Scholes formula, 24 
 
were developed (Bayraktar and Poor, 2005). Fractal analysis also has applications in 
macroeconomics (see e.g. Blackledge, 2008). Recently, innovative approaches, such as 
multifractals have been developed (Dezsi and Scarlat, 2012; Schmitt, Ma, and Angounou, 
2011). 
For the purpose of this thesis, I adopted the fractal model. On the one hand, it offers a wider 
view on the market than that obtained from the random walk model. On the other, it 
constitutes a practical source of stimulus material for experiments in psychology. 
Demonstration of fractal-related psychological phenomena does not require accuracy to the 
degree that the multifractal model might offer. Furthermore, the Hurst exponent of computer 
generated series is correlated with other measures of graphs sets (provided that the series 
were generated by the same algorithm). Among the variables which are correlated with the 
Hurst exponent of a graph are its local steepness, defined as the average of the absolute 
value of the gradients between successive points in the graph, the graph’s oscillation, 
defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum values of the graph over a 
given interval, and the series’ standard deviation (historical volatility). Examining people’s 
reactions to fractal stimuli can, therefore, yield information about properties other than the 
Hurst exponent, which are of financial interest. Finally, I know of no previous work on 
financial implications of human perception of fractal series. 
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Part II: Studies in psychology and behavioural finance 
 
“Bulls are like the giraffe which is scared by nothing, or like the magician of the Elector of 
Cologne, who in his mirror made the ladies appear much more beautiful than they were in 
reality. They love everything, they praise everything, they exaggerate everything [...] the 
bulls make the public believe that their tricks signify wealth and that crops grow on graves. 
When attacked by serpents, they, like the Indians, regard them as both delicate and a 
delicious meal... The bears, on the contrary, are completely ruled by fear, trepidation, and 
nervousness. Rabbits become elephants, brawls in a tavern become rebellions, faint shadows 
appear to them as signs of chaos. But if there are sheep in Africa that are supposed to serve 
as donkeys and wethers to serve even as horses, what is there miraculous about the 
likelihood that every dwarf will become a giant in the eyes of the bears?” (Joseph de la 
Vega, 1688, pages 162-163). 
 
The understanding that market participants are people who exhibit a wide spectrum of the 
human properties is rooted in ancient times. Nevertheless, it was only close to the end of the 
20
th century that it became evident that traders’ human advantages and drawbacks influence 
the way markets behave. This realisation made certain fields in psychology highly relevant 
to finance. In the following section I review the studies in psychology and behavioural 
finance which form the basis for the financial applications discussed in this thesis. In 
particular, I will discuss studies concerning the perception of fractal time series, risk 
perception, buy/sell decisions, judgmental forecasts, the effects of news on financial 
decisions and forecasts, and mechanisms preserving asset price graph structure.  
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Perception of fractal time series   
 
As emphasised by Batchelor (2013), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Taylor and Allen (1992), 
a large number of traders employ chartist methods, which are based on extrapolation and 
pattern recognition of graphically presented financial time series. It is, therefore, important 
to understand what people actually see in this type of data: are people sensitive to the Hurst 
exponent of fractal time series? If they are, how sensitive are they? Performance of 
numerical algorithms which estimate the Hurst exponent of a series depends on the length of 
the series (Delignières, Ramdani, Lemoine, Torre, Fortes and Ninot, 2006). How is people’s 
sensitivity affected by the length of the given series? What type of fractal data are people 
more sensitive to? Do people treat fractal series as if they were produced as a sum of signal 
and noise series? Can people create mental representations of the Hurst exponent of time 
series? And what meaning do they attribute to them? 
Apart from immediate perceptual implications, answering these questions is an imperative, 
initial stage that must precede any attempt to answer questions of a direct financial 
importance. For instance, as will be described in the following chapters, knowing that people 
are sensitive to price change series (as well as to price series), enabled me to investigate the 
conditions in which investment risk assessments depend on the Hurst exponents of the given 
graphs. Understanding the range of series lengths within which people exhibited high 
sensitivity to the Hurst exponent of given graphs enabled me to choose experimental stimuli 
of reasonable lengths. Knowing the resolution at which people can distinguish between 
Hurst exponent values was essential in order to design the stages of an experiment about 
buy/sell decisions. Also, answering the question about the perception of signal and noise of 
data series inspired the question whether people’s forecasts from fractal graphs could be also 
separated into signal and noise. 
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Historical background: perception of random series  
Perception of time series was already being studied in psychology during the 1950s (e.g. 
Jarvik, 1951). However, it was only in the 1970s that a wider interest in perception of 
randomness in time series emerged. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) showed that participants 
judged sequences of unbiased coin tosses as more random if they contained more 
alternations in the order of appearance of the heads and tails. They explained their results in 
terms of people’s use of the representativeness heuristic. They conjectured that a sequence is 
judged random if it resembles locally the global characterizations of a random sequence. 
Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, (1985) studied beliefs of basketball fans and players. They 
found that, in spite of the fact that the outcomes of a field goal and free throw are largely 
independent of the outcome on the previous attempt, fans believed that a player’s chances of 
hitting a basket are greater following a hit than following a miss. They speculated that the 
reason for this misperception of randomness could be a memory bias or a problem of 
analyzing data. Falk and Konold (1994) suggested that when people are asked to evaluate 
the degree of randomness in binary sequences, they base their estimates on difficulty of 
encoding. More precisely, they used Shannon entropy as a normative measure of the degree 
of randomness in the sequences. They showed that the correlation between the evaluated 
randomness and the entropy of the sequences was much smaller than the correlation between 
evaluated randomness and the time required for participants to memorise the sequences. 
Although these accounts give extremely important insights into randomness perception, 
none of them can be applied directly to explain how people perceive fractal time series. The 
global and local structural similarity account, which Kahneman and Tversky used along 
within their representativeness account, might seem compelling for its self-similar fractal-
like nature. However, it is unlikely that people use it to perform tasks such as discrimination 
between the Hurst exponents in different graphs that are merely statistically self-similar. 
Furthermore, Gigerenzer (1991, page 102) has claimed that Kahneman and Tversky’s 
“heuristics such as representativeness have little to say about how the mind adapts to the 28 
 
structure of a given environment”. In his opinion, “all three heuristics […] are largely 
undefined concepts and can post hoc be used to explain almost everything”. Gilovich et. al’s 
(1985) memory bias account is irrelevant to the explanation of performance in a task in 
which people are presented with graphs. Also, although Falk and Konold’s (1994) 
complexity account is useful for very short sequences that can be memorised, it is not for 
real-life financial time series that consist of hundreds or thousands of elements. Recently, 
however, studies focusing on the perception of fractal patterns have been performed. 
Perception of fractal patterns 
People seem to be predisposed to analysing fractals. For instance, Mitina and Abraham 
(2003) showed that people are sensitive to fractal geometric pictures. In particular, they 
found that the aesthetic attractiveness of the patterns and its fractal dimension were 
correlated. Cutting and Garvin (1987) presented participants with simple geometric fractal-
like patterns, and asked them to evaluate their complexity. They found that the fractal 
dimension and the recursion depth correlated with complexity estimates. Forsythe, Nadal, 
Sheehy, Cela-Conde, and Sawey (2011) showed that the fractal dimension of pictures of the 
natural environment, abstract art, and figurative art by acclaimed artists varied with ratings 
of their beauty. In particular, Spehar, Clifford, Newell, and Taylor (2003) found that 
participants’ preferences among natural images peaked at a value of H = 0.7. Redies, 
Hasenstein, and Denzler (2007) demonstrated that graphic art from the western hemisphere 
exhibited fractal-like statistics, and that these findings were universal beyond culture or era. 
This natural inclination towards fractals might be rooted in the process of evolution, since 
many natural phenomena have a fractal character. For example, woody plants, trees, waves, 
clouds, cracks in materials, snowflakes, mineral patterns, coastlines, galaxies, and retinal 
blood vessels, are fractals (Taylor, Spehar, Van Donkelaar and Hagerhall, 2011). The fractal 
dimensions of images are between 1 and 2, and their Hurst exponents are between 0 and 1.  29 
 
This natural predisposition might be facilitated by physiological mechanisms. Although 
Taylor, Spehar, Van Donkelaar and Hagerhall (2011) did not find a correlation between the 
fractal dimension of Jackson Pollock’s paintings and the fractal dimension of eye-tracking 
patterns of observers, there is evidence for fractal functioning in other parts of the human 
visual system. In 1982, De Valois, Albrecht, and Thorell found that striate cells have a 
narrow spatial bandwidth, covering a wide range of frequencies. Their results support the 
idea that the visual system has multi-scale properties and is, therefore, adaptive for fractal 
environments. More recently, Georgeson, May, Freeman and Hesse (2007) developed a 
multi-scale model for human edge analysis. Taylor (2006) found that skin conduction 
changed as the Hurst exponent of observed images was manipulated. Taylor et al. (2011) 
showed that participants’ EEG responses to images depend on their Hurst exponents.    
Perception of fractal time series  
In The (Mis)behaviour of Markets, Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004, pages 17-19) invited the 
reader to participate in an experiment. Manderbrot and Hudson presented the readers with 
two graphs of real-life price series “of the kind you would find in a brokerage-house report,” 
one graph depicting a computer generated fractal series, and one graph of a random walk 
series. The question they challenged the reader to answer was: “Ignore whether they trend up 
or down. Focus on how they vary from one moment to the next. Which are real? Which are 
fake? What rules were used to draw the fake?” On the following page, they depicted the 
corresponding price change graphs. Mandelbrot and Hudson asserted that the price change 
graphs were easier to distinguish between than price graphs. This experiment suggested that 
people are more sensitive to properties of price change graphs than to properties of price 
graphs.  
Mandelbrot and Hudson did not perform any experiment to validate their views. As far as I 
am aware, people’s ability to distinguish graphical depictions of fractal time series from 
those produced by a random walk has not been the subject of a statistically valid study. 30 
 
There have been three reports of investigations into discrimination of the fractal structure of 
unidimensional spatial graphs or contours (Gilden, Schmuckler and Clayton, 1993; Kumar, 
Zhou and Glaser, 1993; Westheimer, 1991). However, all three papers confined their 
experiments to either trained human observers or to a very small number of participants (two 
or eight), which do not allow generalisation of the results to large populations.  
Kumar, Zhou and Glaser (1993) compared people’s sensitivity to fractal dimension of 
graphs to the performance of five numerical algorithms including the grid-dimension method 
(described on page 1140 of their paper). Kumar et al. noted that trained human observers 
participated in their experiments, but no further descriptions of the nature of the training or 
the observers were mentioned. They showed their participants graphs with different Hurst 
exponents. The task in their experiment was to determine whether the roughness of the target 
graph was higher than that of a reference graph. Kumar et al. took into account also the 
luminance of the screen they used for presentation. The authors found that people usually 
have lower discrimination thresholds than numerical codes. People’s thresholds depended on 
fractal production method. For some of the methods, discrimination threshold was as low as 
0.03 (Hurst exponent of a graph ranges between 0 and 1). 
Westheimer (1991) presented himself and another highly experienced psychophysicist who 
was familiar with fractals with sequences of 256-point unidimensional fractal contours 
drawn from an ensemble of seven equally spaced in terms of their fractal dimension. Their 
task was to decide whether each stimulus “was more ragged, corrugated, jagged or fractured 
than the average of the series” (page 216). Their performance was good: differences in the 
second decimal of the fractal dimension of the stimuli could be distinguished and sensitivity 
increased as H increased from 0.75 through 0.80 to 0.85. 
Gilden et al. (1993) investigated the question of whether people are adapted to the fractal 
characteristics of contours in their observable environment. To investigate this question, 
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up of 256 points, for each of 14 families of stimuli that differed in terms of their fractal 
dimension. Eight participants were trained with feedback so that they understood “the sense 
in which random contours could belong to the same family without appearing identical on a 
point-to-point basis” (page 466). These participants were then presented with simultaneous 
pairs of stimuli and asked to decide whether they had been drawn from the same family. 
Sensitivity rose as H increased up to 0.78 but then dropped again as H was increased further. 
In a follow-up experiment with three participants, they replicated this finding but also found 
that peak sensitivity dropped to H = 0.5 when the vertical extent of the display was doubled 
in size. They conclude that their results show that people are adapted to the fractal 
characteristics of the contours found in their natural environment. 
Though all three studies provided important insights, results from the latter two are not fully 
compatible. Gilden et al (1993) found that sensitivity peaked between H = 0.5 and H = 0.78 
whereas Westheimer (1991) found that it continued to increase between H = 0.75 and H = 
0.85. There could be a number of reasons for this discrepancy: for example, both expertise 
of participants and details of procedure differed. More importantly, both studies were 
statistically underpowered. The effect of series length was not studied and neither was the 
process by which people learn how to discriminate between series with different Hurst 
exponents. 
 Given these contradicting results, I hypothesised that people’s sensitivity to the Hurst 
exponent of graphically presented fBm series depended on the Hurst exponent (Hypothesis 
H1,1). However, a priori it is not possible to propose a directional hypothesis.  
How do people discriminate between graphs with different Hurst exponents? Both Gilden et 
al (1993) and Westheimer (1991) attempted to answer this question. Gilden et al (1993) 
suggested that the discrimination involved the extraction of statistical features of the series. I 
expected assessments of any statistical features of the series to improve as the length of the 
series increases, as information forming the basis for the judgement would increase, too. I, 32 
 
therefore, hypothesised that people’s discriminability of the Hurst exponent of fBm series 
increased with the series length (Hypothesis H1,2). 
In addition, Gilden et al’s (1993) suggested that, although ideal fractals do not have a natural 
decomposition into signal and noise components, people process fractal stimuli as if they do. 
In particular, they suggested that, to assess noise, people extract changes between successive 
series points and then assess the width of the distributions of those changes: “the observer 
that discriminates in terms of the width of the increment distribution is generally more 
sensitive over the domain of fBm families” (Gilden et al, 1993, page 475). However, Gilden 
et al did not provide human evidence supporting this conjecture. If indeed people do use this 
approach, I would expect that presenting participants with fGn sequences would enhance 
their discriminability, because I externally perform one of the (presumably error-prone) 
operations that people otherwise have to perform internally.  I, therefore, hypothesise that 
people exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity to fGn graphs than to fBm graphs (Hypothesis 
H1,3). As the accuracy of the assessment of distribution width should be higher when more 
data is processed, I conjecture that discriminability of the Hurst exponent of fGn sequences 
is higher when the series are longer (Hypothesis H1,4). 
In addition, I expect that change series derived from series with H values less than 0.5 will 
be harder to discriminate than those derived from series with H values greater than 0.5 
(Hypothesis H1,5). This is because difficulty in discriminating widths of distributions in 
change series is what Gilden et al (1993) argue drives the patterns of discrimination in the 
original series.   
In particular, Gilden et al’s (1993) conjecture implies that people use local gradients as a cue 
in discrimination tasks of the Hurst exponents of fBm series. However, another possible cue 
is the graphs’ illuminance. Westheimer (1991, page 215) made the following point in his 
discussion of the cues that people may use to discriminate fractal contours: “By definition, 
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can produce a change in retinal illuminance. For example, a bright line on a dark background 
becomes brighter as its fractal dimension increases and that itself would be a visual clue”. 
In pilot work prior to the series of studies reported in the thesis, I presented participants with 
a screen of nine cells showing series with different H values between 0.1 and 0.9 in 
increments of 0.1. (The display was similar to Figure 1.1. The presented graphs were 
randomised and there was no indication of the Hurst exponents of the graphs.) I asked them 
to identify ways in which these graphs were different. A variety of answers was given in 
response to this question but some participants mentioned that the graphs appeared to vary in 
terms of the “darkness” or “thickness” of the line. As Figure 1.1 suggests, graphs of series 
with lower Hurst exponents can be seen as being darker or thicker than those with higher 
Hurst exponents.  
I conjectured that participants’ perception of graphs’ “thickness” was a result of their 
sensitivity to the local gradients of the graphs, as suggested by Gilden et al. (1993). Graphs 
with low values of Hurst exponents are locally steep and have very frequent change of 
directions. Thickening the line of a graph may mask small fluctuations and affect its 
perceived smoothness. I, therefore, hypothesised that people use graphs’ gradients as a cue 
assisting in discrimination of the Hurst exponents of fBm graphs (Hypothesis H1,6). 
Following Westheimer (1991), I hypothesised that people use graphs’ illuminance as a cue 
assisting in discrimination of the Hurst exponents of fBm graphs (Hypothesis H1,7). 
The experimental paradigms used by Gilden et al (1993) and Westheimer (1991) were 
similar to each other, in the sense that participants were asked to discriminate between the 
Hurst exponents of two  graphs. However, I argue that people can also learn to identify the 
Hurst exponents of given graphs through feedback (Hypothesis H1,8). This is because a large 
body of research supports the hypothesis that feedback facilitated learning of categories. In 
particular, Maddox, Love, Glass and Filoteo (2008) have shown that feedback assisted 
people learn category structures when optimal rules were not verbalised. Finally, following 34 
 
Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004), I hypothesise that people perceive investments in assets 
whose price graphs have lower Hurst exponent values riskier than investments in assets 
whose graphs have higher Hurst exponents (Hypothesis H1,9). 
The study of the way people perceive fractal time series is reported in Chapter 2. 
 
Risk perception and financial decisions 
Risk assessment is one of the most important tasks that financial analysts perform. In 
particular, it is used for portfolio optimisation (Markowitz, 1952; Holton, 2004). A large 
number of techniques designed to help practitioners deal with financial risk have, therefore, 
been developed. For instance, the Black-Scholes formula provides investors with a hedging 
strategy, which should, theoretically, yield a risk-free portfolio (Black and Scholes, 1973). 
However, Haug and Taleb (2011, page 98) claim that investors do not evaluate risk using 
theories of this type: “Option traders do not “buy theories”, particularly speculative general 
equilibrium ones, which they find too risky for them and extremely lacking in standards of 
reliability. A normative theory is, simply, not good for decision-making under uncertainty 
(particularly if it is in chronic disagreement with empirical evidence). People may take 
decisions based on speculative theories, but avoid the fragility of theories in running their 
risks”. Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004, page 231) foresaw Haug and Taleb’s arguments: 
“Real investors know better than economists. They instinctively realize that the market is 
very, very risky, riskier than the standard [normative] models say”.  How do people assess 
risk of investments in assets, based on graphical presentations of their price series?  
Factors affecting Judgmental risk assessment 
In experimental settings in which the experimenter manipulates only properties of time 
series, participants’ risk assessments should depend on the properties of the presented 
graphs. However, a series of studies in behavioural finance has shown that financial risk 35 
 
perception depends on a large number of variables, including: the controllability of an asset 
and how worrying it is (Koonce, McAnally and  Mercer 2005), tension experienced by 
financial leaders (Woollen, 2011), probability of gain, loss and status quo ( Holtgrave and 
Weber, 1993). As a large number factors is involved in risk assessment, I hypothesise that, 
in a pure technical-analysis condition, in which people rate risk of assets based on graphs of 
fBm price series, and with no additional cues,  risk assessments would depend only weakly 
on the Hurst exponent (Hypothesis H2,1).  
However, Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004, pages 169-170) asserted that investors can 
intuitively sense the fact that the fractal nature of financial series makes them more risky 
than orthodox approaches predict: “Instinctively, most people regard a cotton contract as a 
riskier proposition than a Blue Chip stock — despite the fact that, by the standard analysis, 
commodity investments should play a bigger role in the portfolios of the wealthy. Most 
people sense the greater risk, and shun it. Perhaps no great statistical analysis was needed at 
all: This fact of mass psychology, alone, might have been sufficient evidence to suggest 
there is something amiss with the standard financial models”. 
Mandelbrot and Hudson did not specify the cognitive processes underlying people’s risk 
assessments, nor did they study the conditions in which risk perception is correlated with 
fractal parameters of price series. However, as noted before, they suggested that people are 
more sensitive to geometrical properties of fGn price change series than to their 
corresponding fBm price series. They presented the readers sets of price and price change 
graphs, and wrote: “All fairly similar, many readers will say [about the price graphs]. 
Indeed, stripped of legends, axis labels, and other clues to context, most price “fever charts,” 
as they are called in the financial press, look much the same. But pictures can deceive better 
than words. For the truth, look at the next set of charts. These show, rather than the prices 
themselves, the change in price from moment to moment. Now, a pattern emerges, and the 
eye is smarter than we normally give it credit for - especially at perceiving how things 
change” (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004, pages 17-18). In addition, in different contexts, risk 36 
 
perception has been found to be highly susceptible to the means by which the information is 
conveyed (Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber, 2005; Gaissmaier, Wegwarth, Skopec, 
Müller, Broschinski and Politi, 2012; Stone, Yates, Parker and Andrew, 1997; Raghubir and 
Das, 2010). For instance, Stone, Yates, Parker and Andrew (1997) showed that different 
display formats of low probability risk information (numerical format, bars, stick figures, 
and people’s faces sketches) affected risk-related behaviour.  Given Mandelbrot and 
Hudson’s views on judgmental risk perception and the latter’s dependence on 
communication means, I hypothesise that providing people with cues about the Hurst 
exponents of the given series would affect their risk judgement. More precisely, I expect 
that, when both price series (fBm) and its corresponding price change series (fGn) are 
presented, risk assessments are negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of price series 
(Hypothesis H2,2).  In fact, many financial data providers enable participants to display price 
change series in addition to price series. For instance, the website of Yahoo! Finance 
(http://finance.yahoo.com) enables investors to see graphs of price change (using the option 
“Rate of Change (ROC) indicator”). Situations in which traders are exposed to both fBm and 
fGn series are, therefore, prevalent. 
Another important factor affecting risk perception is that of individual differences. Indeed, 
nationality (Weber and Hsee, 1998), gender (Walia and Kiran, 2012), testosterone level 
(Stenstrom and Saad, 2011), financial literacy (Sachse, Jungermann, and Belting, 2012), and 
life history (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton and  Robertson 2011) have been shown to have a 
significant effects on risk perception. I was especially interested in the effect of the Big Five 
personality traits on risk assessment. The Big Five personality traits comprise emotional 
stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. 
Emotional stability has been shown to have a significant effect on risk perception (Sjöberg, 
2003). Furthermore, Jakes and Hemsley (1986) found that people who have high scores on 
the Psychoticism (‘P’) and Neuroticism (‘N’) on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(EPQ) perceived a larger number of meaningful objects (but not a larger number of simple 37 
 
geometrical shapes) in random dot stimuli than those low on ‘N’ and ‘P’. This implies that 
people with higher Neuroticism scores attributed more meaning to the patterns that they 
found.  Neuroticism ratings on the EPQ are strongly, negatively correlated with the Big 
Five’s emotional stability (Van der Linden, Tsaousis, and Petrides, 2012). I, therefore, 
conjectured that, in the context of risk assessment tasks, people with lower emotional 
stability would be more likely to attribute the meaning of risk to patterns found in fractal 
graphs. More precisely, risk ratings of people lower on emotional stability should be 
correlated with the Hurst exponent of the presented graphs more strongly (Hypothesis H2,3).   
Risk perception depends on graphical mathematical properties other than the Hurst 
exponents of the series as well.  Particularly important is the standard deviation of the series, 
as it represents the historical volatility of the asset. Historical volatility is used as a volatility 
measure in many classical financial theories (Amilon, 2003; Kala and Pandey, 2012). 
However, the dependence of risk assessment on the standard deviation of the series is not 
well-understood. Klos, Weber and Weber (2005) found that risk assessment is only weakly 
correlated with estimates of standard deviation of price series. On the other hand, Sachse et 
al. (2012) and Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber (2005) found a high correlation between 
risk and volatility. These inconsistencies might be partially explained by other differences in 
the stimulus materials used in these studies.  Another important factor is the graphs’ mean 
run length (the number of successive points in which prices move in the same direction). 
Risk judgements have been shown to be correlated with the run lengths of price graphs 
(Raghubir and Das, 2010). Finally, Duxbury and Summers (2004) found that traders are 
more loss averse than variance averse. However, none of these authors examined the relative 
importance of these variables to risk estimation when price change graphs are presented in 
addition to price graphs. 
I performed a systematic examination of mathematical factors which could affect risk 
perception. To do so, apart from the Hurst exponent, the standard deviation of the series, and 
its mean run-length, I studied the effects of the graph’s oscillation (the difference between its 38 
 
maximum and minimum values), the difference between the values of the last and first 
points of the series, the absolute value of the difference between the values of the last and 
first points of the series, and the difference between the first point of the series and its 
minimum.  
Oscillation and the absolute value of the difference between the values of the last and first 
points of the series could serve as proxy measures of the graphs’ volatility. In line with 
Sachse et al. (2012) I hypothesised that these variables, as well as the standard deviation and 
the mean run length, are positively correlated with risk assessments (Hypothesis H2,4,a). 
The difference between the values of the last and first points of the series and the difference 
between the first series point and its minimum could also be proxy measures for the amount 
of money which can be lost. I, therefore, hypothesised that they would be negatively 
correlated with risk assessments (Hypothesis H2,4,b). 
Risk assessment is likely to be correlated with the standard deviation of the series. When 
fBm graphs are produced by a single algorithm, their Hurst exponent is correlated with their 
standard deviation. However, Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004) and Haug and Taleb (2011) 
asserted that people do not assess risk according to normative measures such as the standard 
deviation of the series, and that they are sensitive to the occurrence of rare event. The 
probability of rare events is assessed more accurately by the Hurst exponent of the series 
than by its standard deviation. I, therefore, hypothesise that the effect of the Hurst exponent 
on risk assessment will be stronger than that of the standard deviation (Hypothesis H2,5). 
Factors affecting financial decisions 
Nosić and Weber (2010) and Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2013) argued that historical 
volatility (standard deviation) affects financial decisions. Raghubir and Das (2010) showed 
that the mean run length affects risk perception. Following these studies, I hypothesised that 
the standard deviation of an asset’s price series and its mean run length would affect buy/sell 
decisions (Hypothesis H2,6). 39 
 
As the Hurst exponent is correlated with the standard deviation, I expected that buy/sell 
choices would be affected by the Hurst exponent. More precisely, I hypothesised that the 
lower the Hurst exponent of an asset is, the higher people’s tendency to sell it would be, and 
the higher the Hurst exponent of an asset is, the higher people’s tendency to buy it would be 
(Hypothesis H2,7).  
 
Judgmental forecasting from fractal time series: The effects of task instructions, 
personality traits, sense of power, and expertise on noise imitation 
Forecasting is as fundamental a task for financial analysts as risk assessment is. In fact, 
forecasting and risk assessment are often inseparable. For instance, some banks issue risk 
statements along with their macroeconomic forecasts (Knuppel and Schultefrankenfeld, 
2011), and some algorithmic methods of evaluating risk involve forecasting (Liu and Hung, 
2010). It has been shown that commonly used judgmental forecasting methods rely not only 
on the heuristics specified by technical analysis but also on intuition (Batchelor and Kwan, 
2007). Here I explore the human aspect of forecasting from fractal graphs. In particular, I 
will focus on the phenomenon of noise imitation.  
Literature about judgmental forecasting and noise imitation 
The research of judgmental forecasting is rooted in studies about the similarity between 
properties of binary time series and forecasts. For instance, Edwards (1961) demonstrated 
positive recency in participants’ forecasts. Modern studies of judgmental forecasting have 
typically either used artificial time series generated by adding random noise to a signal or 
used real series assumed to be decomposable into signal and noise (Lawrence, Goodwin, 
O’Connor and Önkal, 2006). High levels of performance have been taken to reflect 
forecasters’ ability to separate signal from noise and to forecast on the basis of the signal 
alone (Harvey, 1988). This work has revealed that forecasters are subject to a number of 
systematic biases. These include tendencies to overestimate sequential dependence (Bolger 40 
 
and Harvey, 1993; Reimers and Harvey, 2011), and to make higher forecasts for desirable 
outcomes (Eggleton, 1982; Harvey and Bolger, 1996; Harvey and Reimers, 2013; Lawrence 
and Makridakis, 1989). People also tend to include rather than exclude the noise component 
of the data series in their forecasts (Harvey, 1995; Harvey, Ewart and West, 1997). Noise 
level of the prediction has been found to be correlated with the noise level of the data 
(Harvey, 1995). Bolger and Harvey (1993) hypothesised that people imitated noise in order 
to make their forecasts representative of the data series. The results of Harvey et al (1997) 
supported this explanation.  
The tendency to imitate noise in forecasts has been found to be difficult to control. For 
instance, Harvey, Ewart, and West (1997, page 126) provided participants in one of their 
experiments with highly detailed explanation about the nature of the task: “Put six crosses 
on the graph to show us your forecasts. Obviously you cannot be certain where these future 
points will be but try to ensure that your forecasts show the most likely positions for them. 
For example, if you feel that a particular point could lie within a range of values, put your 
cross in the centre of that range if you feel that this is the most likely position for the true 
point within the range. Your aim is to maximise the probability that your forecasts will be 
correct. Your six crosses need to be placed on the six vertical lines to the right of the last 
data point”. Nevertheless, participants in this experiment imitated noise. Harvey, Ewart, and 
West (1997) did not use fractal series as their experimental stimuli. I do not know of any 
study which examined the way people make forecasts from fractal series. Do people imitate 
noise of fractal time series? Do task instructions, high levels of certain personality traits, 
sense of power, or expertise act to reduce it? The experiments reported in Chapter 4 were 
designed to answer these questions. 
Decomposition of series into signal and noise 
Not all time series comprise linear combinations of signal components and noise. As 
mentioned above, fractals do not have a natural decomposition into signal and noise 41 
 
components. This is because they typically have a degree of self-similarity. For instance, 
exact self-similar fractals are geometric shapes in which exactly the same structure appears 
independently of the observed scale. Fractional Brownian motions (fBm) are statistically 
self-similar fractals, and therefore exhibit self-similarity in a weaker way than exact fractals. 
FBm series are, therefore, sometimes referred to also as coloured noise (Stoyanov, 
Gunzburger, and Burkardt, 2011). However, due to their statistical self-similarity, seemingly 
small fluctuations of fBm series carry statistical information about the global structure of the 
series. It is important to note that, in spite of this, for practical reasons, methods for the 
decomposition of fractals into signal and noise components have been developed in a few 
studies (Azami, Bozorgtabar, and Shiroie, 2011; Wornell and Qppenheim, 1992).  
Gilden, Schmuckler and Clayton (1993) proposed that people treat fractal patterns as if they 
had a natural decomposition into signal and noise components. In Chapter 2 I provide 
evidence supporting this view. I, therefore, expected people to make forecasts from fractal 
series in a way that is similar to that they use to make forecasts from series that can be 
decomposed into signal and noise. That is, I expected people to extrapolate from them in a 
way that suggests that they imitate the ‘noise’ component of the data series. Furthermore, 
consistently with Harvey (1995), I hypothesise that the noise level in a sequence of forecasts 
is negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of the time series (Hypothesis H3,1). 
Task instructions 
In judgmental forecasting papers, the number of required forecasts has typically been 
predetermined. For instance, in one of their experiments, Harvey, Ewart, and West (1997) 
asked participants to provide six forecasts for each graph.  
It is possible that asking participants to provide a fixed number of forecasts, which is larger 
than one, could affect noise imitation .Consider, for instance, a task in which they are 
instructed to add five forecast points at pre-determined places (dates) to a given graph. 
People might add noise to their forecasts because a straight line is determined merely by two 42 
 
points: participants might think that had the experimenter thought that the correct answer is a 
straight line, the experimenter would not have asked them to give five prediction points but 
merely two. On the other hand, asking participants to provide a pre-determined number of 
forecast points prevents them also from adding many more points to the given graph. I, 
therefore, argue that, in order to evaluate the scale of the phenomenon correctly, instructions 
should not include a pre-determined number of forecasts.  
Harvey, Ewart, and West (1997) manipulated the number of required forecasts in their study. 
Participants were asked to provide either one or six forecast points. They found that the 
number of required forecast points did not affect forecast accuracy. They suggested that this 
implied that people added noise to their forecast independently of the number of the required 
points. To explain their conclusion, they argued that “Patterns cannot be expressed when 
single forecasts are made […] [in this case] there are no patterns to mask”. However, I argue 
that, in fact, participants could consider the pattern formed by their single forecast point and 
the last data point a signal. Indeed, there are many examples in Gestalt in which people 
appear to see patterns where there are none. For instance, the gambler’s fallacy was 
explained using the Gestalt approach by Roney and Trick (2003) and by Du, Zhang, Zeng, 
Gui, Luo, and Ruan (2008). In addition, it was found that judgmental forecasts depended on 
the format of the presentation (Harvey and Bolger, 1996).Therefore, participants in Harvey, 
Ewart, and West’s (1997) study might have referred in their one-point forecasts to the 
straight line between their forecast point and the last point of the data. I argue that presenting 
a line between forecast points produced by the participants could reduce uncertainty about 
this effect.  
I do not know of any other study in which the effect of the number of forecast points on 
noise forecast has been examined. However, if noise imitation is a bias arising from the 
number of forecast points, I would expect large numbers of forecast points to be associated 
with noisy forecasts. More precisely, I hypothesise that added noise is correlated with the 
number of points participants choose to add to the graphs (Hypothesis H3,2) 43 
 
 
 
Personality traits 
There have been a number of recent reports that traders’ financial performance depends on 
personality variables (Frijns, Koellen, and Lehnert, 2008; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2011; Fenton-
O’Creevy, Lins, Vohra, Richards, Davies and Schaaff, 2012; Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane, 
Nicholson and Willman, 2011; Peterson, Murtha, Harbour, Friesen, 2011; Robin and 
Strážnicka, 2012). However, to date, there appears to be just one study relating judgmental 
forecasts from time series to personality traits.  
Eroglu and Croxton (2010) examined the effects of personality on judgmental forecasts of 
daily sales in a fast-food restaurant chain. They assessed personality in terms of the ‘Big 
Five’ traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
emotional stability) that have been found to explain much between-individuals variance in a 
wide variety of tasks (Lang, John, Lüdtke, Schupp, and Wagner, 2011).  Eroglu and Croxton 
found that use of anchoring heuristics (which appears to underlie the trend-damping and 
overestimation of sequential dependence effects outlined above) increased with 
conscientiousness but decreased with extraversion. Anchoring is one of the three cognitive 
heuristics identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) as forming the basis of a wide variety 
of human judgments. 
Harvey (1995) argued that people’s tendency to imitate noise as well as signal when 
extrapolating from past data arises because they use another of the heuristics identified by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Specifically, forecasters use the representativeness heuristic: 
this heuristic is based on the reasonable assumption that outputs of the same system are more 
likely to be similar than outputs of different systems. Hence, when forecasting, people 
attempt to ensure that the sequence of forecasts that they produce closely represents (looks 
like) the data series.  If the conclusions that Eroglu and Croxton (2010) draw from their 44 
 
findings apply generally to cognitive heuristics (rather than applying only to the anchoring 
heuristic), I expect imitation of ‘noise’ also to increase with conscientiousness but to 
decrease with extraversion (Hypothesis H3,3).  
Sense of power 
Another factor known to influence people’s judgement is their current disposition (i.e. way 
of approaching issues that are more temporary and context-dependent than personality 
traits). Here I focussed on the effects of sense of power on noise imitation. Power is usually 
defined in psychology as control over resources or decision processes (Anderson, John, and 
Keltner, 2012). Anderson et al (2012) added to this definition the ability to influence other 
people.  
No studies appear to have explored the effect of sense of power on financial forecasting. 
However, Hassoun (2005) studied traders’ emotions and dispositions and found evidence 
that traders often use expressions describing high or low sense of power. As an example, 
consider the following quote from a trader in Hassoun’s (2005, page 105-106) study: 
“One day I bought 5600 contracts in one hour. For the same client. He’s THE client, you use 
the formal with him... I once sold 4000 contracts with him, another time 4800; once I bought 
3000. But [that one] was the biggest [trade] I’ve done... You’ve got everybody watching 
you, they can’t believe their eyes. And it was unbelievable - you’d’ve thought we were on 
the Notionnel. In the space of a minute he’s going, ‘Buy200’, ‘You got it!’, ‘Buy 300’, ‘I’ll 
give ya 200!’.The NIPs were staring at us, it showed up on the CAC —we were creatures 
from outer space, there’s no other word for it... Keep in mind that the CAC [Futures] record 
is 73 000 contracts in one day. Once,at the Sirap, we did 43 000 contracts on the CAC in a 
single day. We were way over 50% [of pit volume] -  we were the kings of the universe! 
There was nobody but us. You couldn’t do a trade without going to see the Sirap—
impossible!  I was all over the place. In all the commentaries it was ‘Sirap, Sirap’ all day 
long.” 45 
 
Hassoun concluded that sense of power is an especially important disposition on the trading 
floor. The question here is whether it affects forecasts? 
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, and Liljenquist (2008) studied the effects of sense of 
power on people’s performance. They found two main effects. Firstly, they found that 
people with a high sense of power tend to be more creative and less influenced by 
environmental cues if they were irrelevant. Secondly, they found that powerful people are 
influenced by situation cues more if they are perceived to facilitate goals. In the special case 
of forecasting from fractal time series, these two effects might have opposite influences. If 
one is to accept the first account, and if noise imitation is considered a type of non-creative 
conformity with data, I would expect people with a high sense of power to imitate noise less 
than others. However, if the second argument can be applied to forecasts, and if noise is 
considered a situational cue facilitating forecasts, then powerful people might imitate noise 
more than powerless people. I, therefore, expected that sense of power would affect noise 
imitation (Hypothesis H3,4). However, a-priori, I cannot  say which of these two competing 
effects would be the dominant one.  
Expert forecasts 
In different contexts, it has been shown that financial experts exhibit similar behaviour to 
that of lay people (Zaleskiewicz, 2011; Muradoǧlu and Önkal, 1994). I, therefore, 
hypothesised that experts would exhibit similar biases to those exhibited by lay people. In 
particular, I hypothesised that, when asked to produce judgmental forecasts from graphically 
presented price series, experts would imitate the perceived noise component of the given 
graph (Hypothesis H3,5).  
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The effects of news valence, price trend and individual differences on financial 
behaviour 
Modern behavioural theories developed to simulate markets typically employ models of 
agents that exhibit some aspects of human behaviour. By so doing, they provide insight into 
phenomena that are not explained by classical theories. However, the assumptions 
underlying agents’ behaviour do not always reflect results of psychological studies. There 
are a number of examples of this. 
 Harras and Sornette (2011) constructed a market model, in which agents choose at each 
time step whether to trade or not. Traders in their model use information from three sources: 
private information, public information, and the expected decisions of other traders. 
However, their model does not take into account news valence, even though I know that the 
importance that people attribute to information depends on its valence (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).  
Pfajfar (2013) constructed a model with two agent types: a rational group and a bounded 
rational group. Agents’ forecasts were limited to just two options, perfect foresight or the 
naive predictor (for whom the forecast was the same as the last data point). However, 
numerous psychological studies have shown that people exhibit various forecasting biases, 
including trend damping and adding noise to forecasts (Harvey and Reimers, 2013; Harvey, 
1995): human forecasts are rarely perfect or naive.  
Anufriev and Panchenko (2009) modeled a market with fundamentalists and trend-following 
agents, assuming that all agents were risk averse. However, psychological studies have 
shown that some people are risk seeking rather than risk averse (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-
O'Creevy, Willman, 2005; Cheung and Mikels, 2011).  
To some extent, these mismatches reflect the simplifications necessary to ensure that 
mathematical manipulation of the equations within the models is tractable (De Grauwe, 
2010). Inappropriate assumptions may also reflect lack of communication between those 47 
 
working within behavioral finance and psychology. However, financial modelers could also 
legitimately point out that the psychological literature typically supplies disconnected 
principles for human behavior that are not always easy to apply to trading environments. My 
first aim was to provide data that is more specifically relevant to the concerns of those 
developing agent-based simulations of market behavior.   
I focus on three main topics: the way people incorporate news and graphically presented 
price series into their financial decisions, the time they take to make those decisions, and the 
effect of individual differences on their decisions. All three topics are addressed, explicitly 
or implicitly, in behavioural models of the market. Related assumptions are also present in 
classical models. For example, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) requires that news is 
incorporated into asset prices immediately and in an unbiased manner (Malkiel and Fama, 
1970). Incorporation of news should, therefore, be independent of individual differences 
(Findlay and Williams, 2000 - 2001). My second aim is to test these assumptions and 
develop an account of trading that can accommodate the findings. 
The effect of news on financial decisions 
Different versions of the EMH define the scope of the information to be included in prices. 
This information varies from the previous price series (the weak version) through all 
publicly available information (the semi-strong version) to all information (the strong 
version). The semi-strong and strong versions of the EMH therefore assert that news cannot 
be used by investors in order to make profit (Findlay and Williams, 2000 - 2001). 
Nevertheless, a large number of studies have demonstrated that news has a large effect on 
investment decisions and price series (Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2012; Engelberg and Parsons, 
2011; Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, and Pathak, 2010; Barber and Odean, 2008; Reeves and 
Sawicki, 2007; Tetlock, 2007).  
How do people respond to news? Chapter 5 reports studies designed to address this issue. 
Caginalp, Porter and Hao (2010) have produced evidence implying that people underreact to 
news when valuing asset prices. However, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argued on the basis 48 
 
of their analysis of winner and loser portfolios that they over-react to news. Moreover, 
Tuckett (2012) has shown that investors construct narratives in order to give their world 
meaning and to enable them to function under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Narratives 
were shown to be essential; for instance, Taffler and Tuckett (2012) interviewed 134 fund 
managers. Fund managers were asked to tell about their successes and failures. Taffler and 
Tuckett showed that fund managers’ narratives reflected a meta-narrative, which is a core 
belief about the way the market functions. Narratives served as a tool to preserve the meta-
narrative intact, even in face of a contradicting reality.  Thus, I argue that people may 
attribute high importance to news because news items are the narratives of the financial 
world: they describe, or at least give the illusion, of causality, whereas price graphs that 
appear largely random may not offer the same degree of psychological comfort. I therefore 
hypothesize that people will choose to base their trading strategy on news more than they do 
on price graphs (Hypothesis H4,1). 
Andreassen (1990) used experiments to study the conditions under which overreaction to 
news occurred, and, in particular, the effect of contradiction between news items and stock 
price trends on financial decisions. He presented his participants with 60 experimental trials, 
each consisting of a display of the current price of a stock, the price change from the 
previous trial, and a news item about the stock. Participants were instructed to “buy shares 
for less than you sell them” and “sell them before they do down”. There were three 
experimental conditions. In the first condition, participants saw no news; in the second, they 
saw ‘normal’ news; in the third, they saw ‘reversed news’. ‘Normal’ news items were 
positive when price trend was positive and negative when price trend was negative. The 
valence of ‘reversed’ news was opposite to the sign of the price series trend. Trends in the 
series were manipulated as well. The main dependent variable was participants’ ‘tracking’, 
measured by the correlation between the number of shares held at the end of each trial and 
the concurrent price. Andreassen (1990) found that tracking was the highest in the reverse-
news and no news conditions, and weakest in the normal news condition. That is, buy/sell 49 
 
decisions depended on prices more when news valence contradicted the trend of the price 
series than when prices movements were in agreement with news valence. 
Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) performed a large-scale survey to examine the views that 
foreign exchange traders hold on news available to market participants. In line with the 
results of Andreassen (1990), they found that news items that were consistent with market 
expectations were considered less important than those that were inconsistent with them. 
Hence, I hypothesize that participants will track prices more and show more active trading 
(buying or selling rather than holding their assets) in non-contradicting conditions than in 
contradicting ones (Hypothesis H4,2).  
Andreassen (1990) did not examine the effect of each of the four possible combinations of 
news valence and price trend separately. Considering only contradicting versus non-
contradicting results masks any effects of news valence. However, it is known that people 
react to good and bad news in an asymmetric way. For instance, Galati and Ho (2003) found 
that people sometimes ignore good news but react to bad news. Hence, on the basis of their 
results, I hypothesized that people will sell more assets when the news is bad than they will 
buy when it is good (Hypothesis H4,3). 
The timing of financial decisions 
The second assumption of the EMH deals with trading latencies of market participants. 
Trading latency is a measure for the time required for an investor to make a buy or sell 
decision. Nearly all behavioral models have to make some assumptions about agents’ trading 
latencies. For instance, Kuzmina (2010) assumed that all market participants submit their 
trades simultaneously. In addition to modeling considerations, investment timing affects 
market behavior. Indeed, Odean (1998) showed that traders tend to sell winning assets too 
early and hold losing assets too long.  
The psychological basis for the timing of financial decisions has not been subject to 
intensive investigation. However, Lee and Andrade (2011) found that participants in whom 50 
 
they had induced a sense of fear tended to sell stock earlier than participants in a control 
condition. They chose to manipulate fear because it is increased by risk and uncertainty. 
Their results therefore imply that financial risk and uncertainty reduces trading latency.  
In our task, trading latency was defined as the number of data points that participants saw 
before they made a buy/sell decision. In those cases in which participants chose to hold their 
shares until the end of the series, trading latency was defined as the maximum number of 
series points
1. On the basis of Lee and Andrade’s (2011) findings, I hypothesized that 
trading latency would be shorter when uncertainty is higher, that is, when there is an 
inconsistency between news valence and price trends (Hypothesis H4,4). Also, if I am correct 
in hypothesizing that people rely more on news than on price trend data when making 
financial decisions, then I would expect that the effect of news on trading latencies will be 
stronger than that of the price trend, and that trading latency will be shorter when news is 
bad (Hypothesis H4,5).   
Individual differences: Effects of culture 
The trader rationality assumption of the EMH requires homogeneous trader groups. 
However, this assumption does not hold (Lo, Repin and Steenbarger, 2005). Ackert, Church, 
and Zhang (2002) conducted experimental markets in the US, Canada, and China in order to 
examine the effect of imperfect private information on information dissemination. In their 
markets, traders were given information about period-end dividend. The researchers 
manipulated the accuracy level of the information given to traders. They defined degree of 
information dissemination as the movement in transaction price towards the price given to 
well-informed agents. They found that degree of information dissemination depended on the 
accuracy of the given information and on participants’ nationality.  When accuracy of 
information was 90%, news dissemination was greater in the USA and Canada than in 
                                                           
1 The graphs that participants saw showed asset price as a function of time. Hence, trading latency 
represented the date on which participants made their financial decision in the virtual trading task 
rather than the actual duration of each trial. 51 
 
China. However, when information accuracy was 75%, it was higher in China than in 
Canada and similar to that observed in the USA.   
Inaccurate or misleading information can be represented by a mismatch between news items 
and price graph trend. In line with the findings of Ackert et al (2002), I hypothesize that 
participants from Western culture will react to news more than participants from Eastern 
countries in consistent conditions (good news with positive price trend or bad news with 
negative trend) but that participants from Eastern Asian countries will react to news more 
than participants from Western countries in inconsistent conditions (good news with 
negative trend or bad news with positive trend) (Hypothesis H4,6).  
Nisbett (2003) has carried out a program of work that indicates that people in Eastern 
cultures think more holistically and less analytically than those in Western ones. They make 
greater attempts to pull all available evidence into a single holistic framework. 
Consequently, I expect them to require more time to produce a narrative that meets their 
adequacy criteria. If trading requires development of such narratives, they should exhibit 
longer trading latencies (Hypothesis H4,7a) that would, in turn, result in higher degrees of 
dispersion in their returns (Hypothesis H4,7b).  
 Individual differences: Effects of personality 
Only Durand, Newby and Sanghani (2008) and Durand, Newby, Peggs and Siekierka (2013) 
have systematically studied how trading decisions are affected by the big five personality 
traits (McCrae and Costa, 1987; Norman, 1963). Based on results from their investor survey, 
Durand et al (2008) argued that people with different personalities are attracted to different 
types of security: for example, those who were more extraverted had a greater preference for 
innovation. Based on results from their trading experiment, Durand et al (2013) went on to 
argue that personality influences not only what people trade in but also how they trade. For 
example, people more open to experience developed more diversified portfolios.  52 
 
The trading task used here was simpler than the one used by Durand et al (2013). 
Participants were not required to form portfolios of investments. They merely had to decide 
whether to sell, hold, or buy a series of 12 assets. I ask whether personality influences 
performance even in this basic trading task. From a sense-making perspective, I expected 
that it would do so.  
It is known that people more open to experience have shorter reaction times in a variety of 
(non-financial) tasks (Fiori and Antonakis, 2012). This is probably because those who are 
more open to experience have a greater need for cognition (Sadowski and Cogburn, 1997). 
People with higher need for cognition put more cognitive effort into tasks and hence process 
the information they are given more selectively and effectively (Cacioppo, Petty and Morris, 
1983).  This implies that people more open to experience will put more effort into making 
sense of trading-related information and succeed in doing so sooner. As a result, they will 
have shorter trading latencies (Hypothesis H4,8). Faster trading may, in turn, influence share 
buying and resulting returns, as buy/sell decisions may be made in different market 
conditions. 
News relevance 
In their survey, Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) found that foreign exchange traders 
attributed high relevance to news items which were perceived as being able to influence the 
market. Thus, in the trading task, I expected a positive correlation between views about the 
extent to which an event would affect prices and final share number (Hypothesis H4,9).  
The effects of news and graphs trend on forecasts and financial decisions 
Despite a large literature on judgmental forecasting (Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor and 
Önkal, 2006), Harvey’s (2010) study appears to be the only one that has established a 
connection between financial forecasts and decisions – and those were managerial rather 
than financial decisions. Andreassen (1990) merely conjectured that forecasts mediate 
between data and decisions. I hypothesise that forecasts mediate between data and decisions. 53 
 
In other words, they are affected by news and graph trends. Hence, the difference between a 
participant’s forecast and the last data point should depend on the news valence and the 
direction of the trend in the price data (Hypothesis H4,10). Furthermore, there should be a 
positive correlation between that difference and final share number (Hypothesis H4,11).  
 
Mechanisms preserving asset price graph structure 
Economic systems are extremely complex: they involve millions of traders and investors, 
and are non-deterministic (Matilla-García and Marín, 2010). Nevertheless, the theoretical 
justification for many forecasting methods and financial models is that certain parameters of 
the system are constant. For example, in the context of forecasts, Hyndman and 
Athanasopoulos (2013, Section 1.1) wrote: “What is normally assumed is that the way the 
environment is changing will continue into the future. That is, that a highly volatile environ-
ment will continue to be highly volatile; a business with fluctuating sales will continue to 
have fluctuating sales; and an economy that has gone through booms and busts will continue 
to go through booms and busts”.  Similar assumptions on the stability of the variance were 
made by Black and Scholes in the context of option pricing (“The variance rate of the return 
on the stock is constant”, Black and Scholes (1973). page 640). 
What mechanisms enable financial markets to maintain stability of certain parameters, at 
least for periods long enough to make forecasts and financial modelling feasible?  
I suggest that traders' behaviour depends on the way that they perceive financial time series 
and make forecasts from them. Their perception of, forecasting from, and trading on these 
series may be one of the mechanisms which stabilises markets. I examine people’s 
perception through the way they employ two frequently used data presentation techniques: 
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I investigated these ideas using fractal time series, as certain fractal properties of time series 
have been shown to remain stable in financial data over long periods of time (Parthasarathy, 
2013; Malavoglia, Gaio, Júnior and Lima, 2012; Sun, Rachev and Fabozzi, 2007; In and 
Kim, 2006). Furthermore, as explained before, among the variables which are correlated 
with the Hurst exponent in graphically presented series (provided that they were generated 
by the same algorithm) are local steepness, defined as the average of the absolute value of 
the gradients of the graph, oscillation, defined as the difference between the maximum and 
minimum values of the graph over a given interval, and the standard deviation, which 
corresponds to historical volatility. Knowledge of the way people respond to these properties 
of fractal stimuli is likely to have financial implications.  
Models and theories about stability of market parameters: the effects of time-scaling 
Referring to the question of why markets sustain stable fractal qualities for long durations, 
Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004, page 239) wrote: “In the case of cotton, I found all the price 
variations followed the same statistical properties for days over a few decades and for 
months over eighty years. All of the lines were equally wiggly. Why would this be? First, I 
surmise, economics differs from physics in having no intrinsic time scales. The chart of a 
day’s activity looks like that of a month because, from the narrow viewpoint of the 
probability of losses or gains, a day really is like a month. Yes, some time-scales have some 
meaning: Companies report their financial results quarterly and annually. A trading day has 
its own internal rhythm [...] These differences are nothing like the immutable, fundamental 
differences in time scale that arise in physics. There is, in finance, no barrier like that 
between the subatomic laws of quantum physics and the macroscopic laws of mechanics”.  
Mandelbrot and Hudson’s account is compelling. However, it does not provide an insight 
into the human factors which accumulate to produce the market’s behaviour. I do not know 
of any psychological study examining this question.  55 
 
It has been recognised for some time that market participants are heterogeneous (e.g., 
Müller, Dacorogna, Davé, Pictet, Olsen, and Ward, 1993). However, Peters (1994, pages 44-
46) went further  in suggesting that people’s varying perspectives  and the manner in which 
they perceive price series  are sources of both the liquidity and the fractal behaviour of the 
market: “Markets remain stable when many investors participate and have many different 
investment horizons. When a five-minute trader experiences a six-sigma event, an investor 
with a longer investment horizon must step in and stabilize the market. The investor will do 
so because, within his or her investment horizon, the five-minute trader’s six-sigma event is 
not unusual. For this reason, investors must share the same risk levels (once an adjustment is 
made for the scale of the investment horizon), and the shared risk explains why the 
frequency distribution of returns looks the same at different investment horizons... The 
fractal statistical structure exists because it is a stable structure”.  Some of Peters’ 
predictions have been verified (Kristoufek, 2012).  
Inspired by these ideas, Corsi (2009) constructed a model that takes into account the 
different volatility components that result from the actions of short, medium, and long term 
traders. He wrote (page 178): “Typically, a financial market is composed of participants 
having a large spectrum of trading frequency. At one end of the spectrum we have dealers, 
market makers, and intraday speculators, with very high intraday frequency as a trading 
horizon. At the other end, there are institutional investors, such as insurance companies and 
pension funds who trade much less frequently and possibly for larger amounts. The main 
idea is that agents with different time horizons perceive, react to, and cause different types of 
volatility components”. Corsi’s (2009) model produced financial return series that exhibited 
fractal properties such as self-similarity, long memory, and fat tail distributions. In addition, 
Corsi claimed that short-term traders use both short and long term considerations to make 
their decisions whereas long term traders take account of only long term volatility 
considerations.  56 
 
These authors did not examine human behaviour: they did not test their assumptions and 
models. Within psychology, the effect of forecast horizon on forecasts has been investigated 
(Bolger and Harvey, 1993; Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989) but no studies have been 
reported on the effects of forecast horizon on people’s choice of the length of series they 
wish to display as a basis for their forecasts. Here I allow people to vary temporal scaling 
between small scale (presentation of asset prices of long period of time over an interval on 
the x-axis of a certain length) and large scale (presentation of asset prices of short period of 
time over an interval of the same length on the x-axis). 
The effects of forecast horizon on chosen time scaling, properties of scaled graphs, and 
forecasts 
Many financial data services (e.g. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com) enable traders 
to scale presented price graphs. (For instance, Yahoo! Finance allows the viewers to scale 
graphs by either setting their time-domain or by continuously dragging the mouse on the 
graphs). Following the Heterogeneous Market approach of Peters (1995), Müller et al. 
(1993), and Corsi (2009), I hypothesise that people will exhibit a large degree of variation in 
their choice of temporal scaling (Hypothesis H5,1a) and that this variability will be greater for 
more distant  trading horizons  (Hypothesis H5,1b).   
The resolution of financial data is high, but finite. Therefore, scaling-down (that is, 
zooming-in along the x-axis and presenting data representing a shorter period of time over 
the same actual interval length) typically decreases the local gradients of the graphs. In 
addition, the maximal values of a subset are smaller or equal to those of any including set, 
and its minimal values are larger or equal to those of any including set. Therefore, the 
oscillations of scaled-down graphs are smaller or equal to those of the original graphs. 
Examples of the effect of scaling-down of graphs with low and high Hurst exponents are 
presented in Figure 1.2. Because of these effects, I hypothesise that the effect of forecast 
horizon on chosen time scales suggested in Hypothesis H5,1b would result in a corresponding 57 
 
effect on the geometrical properties of the presented graphs. That is, I suggest that there 
should be a positive correlation between forecast horizon and the local steepness and 
oscillation of the time-scaled data graphs (Hypothesis H5,2).  
Although the effect of scaling the vertical axis of a graph (Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992) 
has been studied by researchers of judgmental forecasting, scaling of the horizontal time axis 
has not. However, Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003) found a strong correlation between 
analysts’ forecast dispersion and future return volatility. If forecast horizon affects market’s 
volatility through financial forecasts, I expect dispersion of participants’ forecasts to be 
positively correlated with the required forecast horizon (Hypothesis H5,3). 
The above hypotheses address Corsi’s (2009) model and thus also the formation of fractal 
price series. However, I still need to consider what processes stabilise the geometric 
properties of the resultant time series.  
The effects of the Hurst exponent on chosen time scaling, properties of scaled graphs, 
forecasts, and financial decisions  
Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004) emphasised that the way that investors perceive geometric 
properties of price graphs is likely to affect their risk perception. In line with this, Manzan 
and Westerhoff (2005) found that inclusion of agents’ reactions to volatility in a market 
model resulted in realistic estimates of exchange rates.  
These studies lead me to expect that people react to the geometric structure of the price 
series in addition to trading horizons. As mentioned before, scaling a graph changes the 
visual properties of the graph, and, in particular, the perceived noise level (see Figure 1.1 
and Figure 1.2). In light of Gilden et al’s (1993) findings, I anticipate that people will prefer 
to make forecasts from graphs with lower perceived noise levels because it is easier to 
decompose the data series into perceived signal and noise components. Thus I expect that 
chosen time scaling factors will be smaller for graphs that have smaller Hurst exponents.  58 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Example of fBm series with H=0.3 (left panels) and 0.7 (right panels). Graphs in 
the first row show data referring to 30000 days, graphs in the second row show data 
referring to 6000 days, and graphs in the third row show data referring to 1000 days.  All 
graphs are plotted on intervals of the same length along the x-axis.   59 
 
That is, people prefer presentation of data corresponding to shorter periods of time when 
dealing with graphs with smaller Hurst exponents. (Hypothesis H5,4).  
In contrast to Manzan and Westerhoff (2005) and Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004), I focus on 
the way people’s geometric perception acts to preserve the structure of price graphs. Gilden 
et al’s (1993) argument may lead one to conjecture that the attempt to reduce graphs’ noise 
by scaling graphs could result in graphs which have the same perceived noise level, 
independently of their original Hurst exponents. However, equating the local steepness of 
graph with low Hurst exponent to that of graphs with high Hurst exponents requires a very 
large change of scale. For example, see figure 1.2; scaling a graph with H = 0.3 presented on 
the interval [0, 30000] to the interval [0, 6000] yields a graph which still looks locally 
steeper than a graph with H = 0.7, presented on the interval [0, 30000]. In order to equate the 
local steepness of the graph with H = 0.7 to that of the graph with H = 0.3, time-scaling ratio 
of more than 5 is required. In a different context, it was found that people do not match 
perfectly their performance with data (e.g., when making forecasts from trended data, they 
damp the trend (Harvey and Reimers, 2013)). Therefore, I hypothesise that people will not 
equate properties of scaled graphs of data with low Hurst exponents to that of data with high 
Hurst exponents. Consequently, the time scales that people choose result in a negative 
correlation between the local steepness and oscillation of the time-scaled graph and the 
Hurst exponent of the original data (Hypothesis H5,5a  and in a positive correlation between 
the local steepness and oscillation of the time-scaled graphs and of the original graphs 
(Hypothesis H5,5b). Furthermore, as forecast quality depends on the noise level of the data 
and people try to imitate properties of data in their forecasts (see Chapter 4), I hypothesise 
that the dispersion of people’s forecasts will be negatively correlated with the Hurst 
exponents of the original graphs and positively correlated with the local steepness and 
oscillation of the data graphs (Hypothesis H5,6).  
Finally, I expect that people’s trading behaviour to depend on their forecasts (Hypothesis 
H5,7). 60 
 
Notice that, along with the results of Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003), the process 
described in Hypotheses H5,4, H5,5, H5,6, and H5,7 provides a mechanism that preserves the 
properties of price series. The suggested process is shown in Figure 1.3. Indeed, I assume 
that at any given moment, people examine financial series which exhibit certain geometrical 
properties, such as local gradients and oscillations. I argue that people actively choose the 
way they perceive such graphs through their choices of scales. In line with previous 
literature (Corsi, 2009), I suggest that people’s scaling choices are highly variable. However, 
I hypothesise that their scaling means are correlated with the geometrical properties of the 
data. I suggest that these scaling choices result in scaled graphs, which have properties that 
are correlated with those of the original graphs. People, then, make forecasts from the scaled 
graphs. I further suggest that the dispersions of these forecasts depend on the properties of 
the data. That is, I hypothesise that forecasts from data that are characterised by larger local 
gradients and oscillations, will exhibit larger dispersion. According to Athanassakos and 
Kalimipalli (2003), large forecast dispersion is associated with larger future return volatility, 
which is, in turn, correlated with larger local gradients and oscillations of price series. The 
latter relies on a connection between forecasts and financial decisions. Hence, actions based 
on data with large local gradients and oscillations will result in future asset price series, 
which have the same properties. 
Moving average filter models 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) constructed a market model, which included agents acting 
as fundamentalists and chartists. Chartists in their model computed moving averages of past 
exchange rate changes and used the results of these calculations to produce forecasts. 
Indeed, moving average filters are a commonly offered option in financial data analysis 
programmes (e.g. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/) and are highly popular among 
traders (Glezakos and Mylonas, 2003). De Grauwe and Grimaldi managed to demonstrate 
evolution of fat-tailed distributions. Their findings indicate that the way people use moving 
average filters might have a role also in preservation of price series properties. 61 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Illustration of the mechanism which preserves geometrical properties of price 
graphs. The left column illustrates graphs with low local steepness and oscillation, and the 
right column presents graphs with high local steepness and oscillation. People observe data 
characterised by different properties (panels on the first row). They choose smaller scaling 
factors and time periods to present graphs with higher local steepness and oscillation. 
However, the scaled graphs still preserve properties of the original graphs (panels on the 
second row). Next, people make forecasts from the graphs (forecasts are marked with starts). 
Correspondingly, forecast dispersions are higher for the steeper graphs (panels on the third 
row). This process results in price graphs with properties that are correlated with those of the 
original data.   62 
 
However, I do not know any study on the effect of moving average filters on forecasts. 
Furthermore, De Grauwe and Grimaldi chose geometrically declining weights for the filters 
used by their agents, though people may use different filters in different situations. I was 
interested in two factors which could affect individual choices of sizes of moving average 
filter. The first factor was the geometrical properties of the price series. The second factor 
was the required forecast density. Stock market investors are required many times to make 
forecasts for multiple time horizons (Pesaran, Pick, and Timmermann, 2011).  
The effect of the Hurst exponent on the window size of a moving average filter and financial 
forecasts 
In line with the Heterogeneous Market Hypothesis of Müller et al. (1993) I, firstly, 
hypothesise that, when people are presented with fractal price graphs and are given an 
opportunity to vary the width of a moving average filter applied on the graph, the variance of 
the choices of averaging windows is substantial (Hypothesis H5,8a).   
Application of a moving average filter acts to smooth graphs, and, in fact, is considered a 
method of noise elimination. Therefore, as in the case of graph scaling, I follow Gilden et al 
(1993) and hypothesize that the Hurst exponent affects the choice of filter size. More 
specifically, I hypothesise that chosen smoothing factors are smaller when Hurst exponents 
are smaller (Hypothesis H5,8b). (That is, people zoom-in more when graphs with low H 
values are presented than when graphs with high H values are presented), 
As before, I suggest that chosen smoothing factors result in graphs whose properties are 
correlated with those of the original graphs. That is, there is a negative correlation between 
the Hurst exponent of the original data and the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothed graphs (Hypothesis H5,9a), and that there is a positive correlation between the local 
steepness and oscillation of the smoothed data graphs and the original ones (hypothesis 
H5,9b).   63 
 
People imitate noise of data series (Harvey, 1995). I suggest that when people are asked to 
make a sequence of forecasts from fractal graphs, the local steepness and oscillation of the 
forecast sequence are positively correlated with the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothened graphs, respectively, and negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of the 
data graphs (Hypothesis H5,10). Hence, volatile price series result in noisy forecasts, which, 
in turn, may increase market’s volatility. 
The effect of forecast density on the window size of a moving average filter and financial 
forecasts 
Though the judgmental forecasting literature includes many studies on multi-period 
forecasts (Harvey, 1995; Harvey and Reimers, 2013), I know of no research examining the 
effects of forecast density on the forecasts. I hypothesise that people use the required 
forecast dates as a forecast cue and, hence, try to match the resolution of the data to that of 
the required forecast grid. More precisely, I hypothesise that chosen smoothing factors are 
smaller when forecast densities are larger (Hypothesis H5,11), and that there is a positive 
correlation between the local steepness and oscillation of the smoothed data graphs and the 
required density of forecasts (Hypothesis H5,12). As data which is perceived to be noisier 
would result in noisier forecasts, I conjecture that local steepness and oscillation of the 
forecasts is positively correlated with the required density of the forecast (Hypothesis H5,13). 
In Chapter 6, I report the effects of scaling, forecast horizons, size of moving filter 
averaging, and the density of the required forecast on forecasts. I examine the question 
whether the way people perceive data and make forecasts from it could be one of the 
mechanisms that preserve the structure of financial time series. Moreover, I examine the 
correlation between forecasts and financial decisions. 
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Part III: Mathematical aspects 
 
“Unfortunately, the world has not been designed for the convenience of mathematicians” 
(Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004, page 41). 
In the following section, I present the formal definition of fBm and fGn series. In addition, I 
discuss different aspects of work with fractal graphs in the psychology laboratory: the 
advantages and disadvantages of computer-generated and real-life series as experimental 
stimuli; the method I employed in order to generate fractal graphs; methods for Hurst 
exponent analysis; criteria for the choice of financial time series; notes about the way I 
presented fractal graphs in the experiments; and the effects of normalisation of fractal 
graphs. 
Definition of fBm and fGn series 
Fractional Brownian motion, with a Hurst exponent, H, is a series which satisfies the 
condition that the variance of the differences between outputs      at times t1 and t2 is 
proportional to the difference between those times to the power 2H: 
(1)                                 , where 0 < H < 1 
(Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). For a random walk, the differences (X (t2) – X (t1)) have a 
Gaussian distribution and satisfy (1) with H = 0.5. When H is above 0.5, series are termed 
persistent: outputs change their direction less frequently than they do in a random walk. 
When H is below 0.5, series are called and anti-persistent: outputs reverse their direction 
more frequently than they do in a random walk.  
An important property of fBm series is that they are statistically self-similar with respect to 
H: in other words,                   and 
 
                       have the same distribution 65 
 
functions for any    and r > 0.  It can be shown that the fractal dimension (D) of an fBm 
series with Hurst exponent H is given by D = 2 - H (see Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). 
The Hurst exponent values of many financial series lie in the interval             (Sang, Ma 
and Wang, 2001). Figure 1.1 shows fBm series with nine different H exponents from 0.1 
(anti-persistent) through 0.5 (random walk) to 0.9 (persistent). 
If       is an fBm series, then the increment process,                         is termed the 
fractional Gaussian noise (fGn series). Figure 1.4 presents fGn graphs with different Hurst 
exponent values. Figure 1.5 presents fBm series with H = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and their 
corresponding fGn series. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Examples of price change series with Hurst coefficients ranging from 0.1 (anti-
persistent) through 0.5 (random walk) to 0.9 (persistent) in 0.1 increments. 
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Figure 1.5 FBm series with H = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 (left column) and their corresponding fGn 
series (right column). 
 
Fractal series as experimental stimuli 
Advantages and disadvantages of computer-generated and real-life fractal series as 
experimental stimuli 
Fractal time series can be categorised according to their source: computer-generated graphs 
(artificial fractals), and real-life asset price graphs. Fractal generation programmes allow 
accurate control of the Hurst exponent in artificial series (Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). In 
addition, a large number of graphs with a wide range of Hurst exponents (e.g. 
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             can be produced in short periods of time. Therefore, fractal generation 
programmes can be used to produce convenient experimental stimuli. Furthermore, the ease 
of production of experimental stimuli contributes to the robustness of the statistical analysis 
of the results.  
On the other hand, the ecological validity of computer-generated series is lower than that of 
real-life asset price series. The Hurst exponents of real-life assets usually satisfy 
             ,and therefore, an attempt to strengthen statistical analysis by using artificial 
series reflecting a wide range of Hurst exponent (             might result in a lower 
external validity. Moreover, it is difficult to construct reliable measures for accuracy of 
prediction from artificial graphs (Armstrong and Fildes, 1995). Quality of forecasts from 
real asset price graphs can be assessed by comparing the participant’s predictions to the 
historical evolution of prices.  
However, the methods that are available for evaluating the Hurst exponents of real fractal 
series are inaccurate (Delignières, Ramdani, Lemoine, Torre, Fortes and Ninot, 2006). In 
addition, it is difficult to find real series that meet accepted stability criteria (Sang, Ma and 
Wang, 2001).  
I, therefore, decided to employ both computer-generated and real asset time series in the 
experiments. Computer-generated series were employed whenever stimuli with accurately 
known values of Hurst exponents were required. I used real asset price graphs for the 
evaluation of the quality of participants’ forecasts. 
Generation of fractal time series 
All computer-generated time series used as experimental stimuli in the studies were fBm 
series. They were generated in Matlab using the spectral method described by Saupe 
(Peitgen and Saupe, 1988).  68 
 
According to Saupe, a discrete approximation of fBm process with     
   
   can be 
generated by the random function 
                                       
   
   
           
    
      
where 
                                           
                               
  
    
        is a function that generates uniformly distributed numbers between 0 and 1, and 
         is a function that generates normally distributed numbers with mean m. I chose 
for the experimental series          for the calculation of each series point        The 
spectral algorithm that I used generated periodic functions, with period length     I 
calculated                    points for each series.  
Using real asset price graphs in experiments 
Analysis of Hurst exponents Many numerical methods have been developed in order to 
evaluate the Hurst exponent of a given time series. Commonly used methods are rescaled 
range analysis (R/S), power spectral density analysis (PSD), detrended fluctuation analysis 
(DFA), maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), dispersional analysis (Disp), and scaled 
windowed variance methods (SWV) (see Delignieres et al, 2006, for a comprehensive 
review of these methods).  
In 2003, Katsev and L’Heureux showed that accuracy of estimation of the Hurst exponent by 
numerical codes depends greatly on the length of the series. They concluded  (page 1085) 
“...that the uncertainty in the Hurst exponent values measured from short data sets (less than 
500 points) is usually too large for most practical purposes”. Delignieres et al (2006) studied 
the dependence of the accuracy of Hurst evaluation methods on the length of a given series. 69 
 
They generated fBm and fGn sequences using the algorithm suggested by Davies and Harte 
(1987) and then systematically evaluated the errors of the calculated Hurst exponent and 
other parameters found by different methods. Delignieres et al recommended using different 
evaluation methods for each range of Hurst exponents. (Clearly, for practical applications, in 
which the value of   is a priori unknown, one should estimate its value using any of these 
methods, and then refine the estimation by using the method which is relevant to the series’ 
Hurst exponent range.) However, they found that the variance of these methods is 
considerable for relatively short series. The variances obtained when applying these 
recommended algorithms to 100 series of different lengths, are given in Table 1.1. It is 
especially important to note that no single method has been recommended for evaluation of 
Hurst exponent of both fBm and fGn series (Caccia, Percival, Cannon, Raymond and 
Bassingthwaigthe, 1997). Cannon, Percival, Caccia, Raymond and Bassingthwaighte (1997, 
page 606) wrote: “To have a 0.95 probability of distinguishing between two signals with true 
H differing by 0.1 (by numerical codes), more than     (32768) points are needed.”   
Following Delignieres et. al (2006), I used the ldSWV (Scaled Windowed Variance) method 
to calculate the Hurst exponent of real asset time series. I realised the algorithm described by 
Cannon et al. (1997) in Matlab. As can be seen in Table 1.1, estimation error could exceed 
0.1.  
Choice of real-life series 
I used financial time series downloaded from “Yahoo! Finance” (http://finance.yahoo.com/). 
I calculated the Hurst exponents of a large number (N > 100) of financial time series over a 
large range of periods before choosing the stimulus time series. The Hurst exponent was 
evaluated using the ldSWV algorithm (Cannon et al., 1997). Most of the examined time 
series were characterised by frequent stock splits and variable Hurst exponents.  
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Table 1.1 The standard deviation of different methods of evaluation of the Hurst exponent of 
time series for different series lengths (from Delignieres et al., 2006) 
Standard deviation 
Method 
 
Series Lengths 
128 elements  512 elements  1024 elements 
SWV (fBm)  0.03-0.17  0.03-0.16  0.02-0.11 
DFA (fGn,        )  0.03-0.12  0.03-0.1  0.02-0.075 
R/S analysis (fGn,        )  0.1-0.12  0.06-0.1  0.06-0.075 
MLE (fGn,        )  0.07-0.04  0.04-0.02  - 
 
 
 
Stock split is an adjustment of the price of an asset which occurs when there is an increase in 
the number of shares. The price is adjusted in a way that guarantees that the value of the 
company (number of shares time share price) remains constant. The effect of a stock split is 
a sharp discontinuity in prices. Although it was possible to adjust the graphs by multiplying 
the value by the split ratio, I preferred to present the participants actual price sequences. 
Large variations in Hurst coefficients were also found to be common. Mandelbrot found that 
the cotton price maintained a Hurst coefficient which was close to constant value over a 
period of 100 years (Mandelbrot, 2004). However, Sang et al (2001, page 270) demonstrated 
that Hurst coefficients of Boeing and IBM changed significantly every few years. For 
instance, they found that for IBM, H was 0.37 between 1977 and 1982 but was 0.67 between 
1974 and 1976. Sang et al used R/S analysis, which is considered inaccurate (Delignieres et 71 
 
al. 2006). However, my calculations using the ldSWV algorithm also revealed a high 
instability in the values of H.  
I divided the Hurst exponent range into three sets: Low, Medium, and High Hurst sets. The 
Low H set was         , the Medium H set was               , and the High H set was H 
> 0.57. 
The chosen data consisted of the close prices of financial time series which satisfied all of 
the following conditions: 
i.  The time series had at least 2500 consecutive work days without a stock split. 
ii.  The Hurst exponent of the series, as calculated by ldSWV algorithm for the first 
1000, 1500, 2000, and 2500 elements of the series, belonged to one of the H-sets 
described above (Low, Medium, and High Hurst set). 
iii.  I denote by H(n) the value of Hurst coefficient as calculated by ld-SWV 
algorithm over a period of n days. During these 2500 days, the value of 
calculated H did not change substantially, that is: 
        
                       
                       
where 
     
 
                                . 
The chosen time series reflect wide sections of the market and include, for example, General 
Electric Co. (GE), Walt Disney Co., Ford, The Children's Place Retail Stores, EUR/USD, 
FTSE 100, NASDAQ Composite, and Dow Jones Industrial Average. The sampled period of 
times were also diverse, with starting dates between 1928 (Dow Jones Industrial Average) 
and 2001 (Ford). The results of the financial time series analysis are given in Table 1.2.  
Presentation of the series I performed both laboratory and online experiments. I did not 
control for the number of pixels with which participants saw the graphs in online 
experiments. On the other hand, in laboratory experiments, I controlled the ratio of the    72 
 
Table 1.2 The results of Hurst exponent analysis of real financial time series. The 
classification criterion was    < 0.055. 
  Series 
number 
Time series  H(1000)  H(1500)  H(2000)  H(2500)     
H (2500) 
< 0.485 
1  Merck  0.4520  0.4542  0.4588  0.4312    0.0097 
2  Caterpillar  0.4486  0.4180  0.4382  0.4320    0.0144 
3  EI DuPont de Nemours 
& Co. 
0.4620  0.4477  0.4549  0.4462    0.0093 
4  PG  0.4286  0.4591  0.4591  0.4782    0.0220 
5  General Electric Co. 
(GE) 
0.4482  0.4679  0.4520  0.4846    0.0214 
6  Barrick Gold 
Corporation (ABX) 
0.4466  0.4692  0.4601  0.4605    0.0101 
Mean    0.4477    0.4527    0.4539    0.4554   
Max    0.4620    0.4692    0.4601    0.4846   
Std    0.0109    0.0188    0.0083    0.0229   
H (2500) 
<  0.556 
 
1  Ford  0.5171  0.5227  0.5481  0.5364    0.0170 
2  Walt Disney Co.  0.5393  0.5392  0.5517  0.5477    0.0072 
3  Juniper Networks, Inc.  0.5406  0.5252  0.5471  0.5510    0.0100 
4  IBM International 
Business Machines 
0.5195  0.5344  0.5552  0.5360    0.0189 73 
 
Corp. 
5  The Children's Place 
Retail Stores 
0.5097  0.5095  0.5497  0.5347    0.0238 
6  EUR/USD  0.5115  0.5236  0.5052  0.5001    0.0135 
Mean    0.5229  0.5258   0.5428   0.5343   
Min    0.5097   0.5095    0.5052    0.5001   
Max    0.5406    0.5392    0.5552    0.5510   
Std    0.0137    0.0103    0.0187    0.0181   
H (2500) 
> 0.57  
1  FTSE 100  0.6293  0.6361  0.6092  0.5876    0.0205 
2  NASDAQ Composite  0.6135  0.6163  0.6566  0.6954    0.0499 
3  Russell 2000  0.7417  0.6988  0.6621  0.6536   0.0526 
4  Dow Jones Industrial 
Average 
0.6061  0.5753  0.5673  0.5720    0.0259 
5  Composite Index 
(^JKSE) 
0.5830  0.5839  0.5931  0.6055    0.0141 
6  Value Line Arithmetic 
Index,RTH 
0.6432  0.6300  0.6275  0.6250    0.0118 
Mean      0.6361    0.6234    0.6193    0.6232   
Min      0.5830    0.5753    0.5673    0.5720   
Std      0.0556    0.0443    0.0368    0.0455   
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number of elements series per pixel with which each graph was presented. The programmes 
of the laboratory experiments were written in Matlab.  
It is important to note that, in some of the experiments, I used a whole period of the 
produced series. This set the difference between the first and last data point to zero. In other 
experiments, I presented only a part of a period (half a period or a quarter of a period). That 
enabled me to study the effect of the difference between the first and last data points on the 
examined variables. 
The effect of normalisation of fractals on their Hurst exponents 
The oscillation (difference between maximum and minimum values) of fBm series is 
confounded with their Hurst exponent. In some experiments, I wanted to examine the 
hypothesis that participants react to the Hurst exponents of the presented graphs rather than 
to their oscillations. For this reason, in those experiments, I normalised fBm series in a way 
that ensured that all graphs had the same oscillation. Below, I explain why normalisation had 
only a minor effect on the results of certain experimental procedures. 
Normalisation and assumptions. In order to normalise a non-constant series       defined 
on         to an interval          I multiplied it by the factor  
          
       
   
         
           
         
     
  
I denote the normalised series by                      I normalised data series to the interval 
[1, 10], and therefore I multiplied them by  
   
 
                                   . 
For example, for H = 0.9 I obtained an average value of        and for H = 0.1,          . 
In order to simplify the following calculation, I assume in this section that 75 
 
                  β    
For infinite series, one can derive β from relation (3) by the limit  
     β      
   
         
           
  
The Hurst exponent can then be calculated as     
β  
    
The Hurst exponent of truncated, normalised series. Clearly, for practical reasons, one 
cannot generate fractals with infinitely many elements (     ). Therefore, estimate of the 
Hurst exponent of truncated, normalised series cannot be performed using the limit process 
given in equation (4).  In particular, for finite series, the expression  
         
          depends on k. I 
estimate the β       of a truncated, normalised series by its value for k = N. 
To estimate the effect of normalisation by a factor   on a truncated series generated by 
summing N elements in equation (1), I denote:  
(5)               
and   
(6)                β  
   . 
Then, by equation ( 3),  
                   
β
 
            
Similarly, by equation 6,  
                     
β  
 
 
            
By equations (5), (7) and (8), 76 
 
                                
   
β  
 
 
                     
β
 
            
or,  
      β  
    β    
      
           
  
Notice that, if       , then       
       
               hence  
   
   
β  
 
  β  
Therefore, normalisation of accurate (infinite) series does not change their β or their Hurst 
exponents. However, for finite values of  , 
 β  
    β     
      
           
  
and 
β  
    β     
      
           
  
Therefore, normalisation distorts the Hurst exponent of finite series.  
 
Implications of time series normalisation on the experiments In a few of the experiments, all 
fBm series were normalised to the same interval [1, 10]. As each series had different 
extremum values, each series was multiplied by a different constant. For example, as noted 
above, I normalised fBm series with H = 0.9 by a factor        This normalisation distorted 
the Hurst exponent by approximately  
       
                 . I normalised series with H = 0.1 by 
a factor of 1.13. That distorted the Hurst exponent by  
           
                  . 77 
 
However, in experiments with normalised series, participants were asked to compare target 
graphs of similar Hurst exponents. The variance in normalisation constants for a given value 
of the Hurst exponent was small (the maximal difference was less than 0.2).  Therefore the 
normalisation process had a negligible effect on the evaluation of participants’ performance 
at a given Hurst exponent value. For example, for the extreme case of H=0.9, 
         
            
       
                          . 
For fGn series, the quotient of amplitudes of series corresponding to H = 0.1 and H = 0.9 is 
much higher than for fBm series, and can reach 100. Normalisation by a factor of order 100 
would have resulted in a distortion of Hurst exponent by 
         
                  for H = 0.9. 
Furthermore, variance of normalisation constants for a given value of Hurst exponent is 
much higher for fGn series than for fBm series. For these reasons, I did not normalise fGn 
series in any of the experiments. 
   78 
 
Part IV: General experimental remarks 
 
Choice of incentives across experiments 
 
A small number of principles guided my choice of incentives across experiments. I list these 
principles below. 
1.  Participants who were students at UCL were paid UCL’s standard fees for 
participants in experiments (£1 per 10 minutes and at least £2).  
2.  Whenever I felt that additional incentive is required to motivate participants to make 
efforts, a prize for performance was advertised along with the standard fee. 
3.  As, theoretically, the number of participants in online experiments is unlimited, 
incentives offered in online experiments did not consist of a flat fee. Instead, I 
advertised a prize draw. The prize consisted of N/10 USB sticks, where N was the 
number of participants required for the experiment. The advertisement stated clearly 
that N/10 USB sticks will be given to N/10 participants chosen randomly from the 
first N participants. 
Outlier removal criteria 
 
Similarly, a small number of principles guided the choice of outlier removal procedure. 
These principles are listed below. 
1.  As a default, any measurements more than two standard deviations larger or smaller 
than the groups’ mean were removed. 
2.  In a few cases, application of the two standard deviation criterion resulted in a very 
large number of removed measurements. Such cases may indicate a non-linear 
relation between variables. To avoid removal of a large number of measurements, a 
few authors applied a natural logarithm on the results (Lin, Murphy and Shoben, 
1997). Application of a natural logarithm on our results did not reduce sufficiently 79 
 
outlier number when the two-standard deviation criterion was used. Therefore, 
instead of applying a natural logarithm on the results, I applied a stricter criterion, 
namely, used three or four standard deviations to define the outlier region. 
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Chapter 2: Perception of fractal time series 
 
This chapter explores the way people perceive graphically presented fractal time series. The 
study consisted of five experiments. It characterises people’s sensitivity to fBm and fGn 
graphs. I examined the cues they used when performing identification tasks. Finally, I 
investigated people’s ability to learn to identify the Hurst exponent, and the financial 
meaning they attributed to it. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the following hypotheses: 
 H1,1 : people’s sensitivity to the Hurst exponent of graphically presented fBm series depends 
on the Hurst exponent. 
H1,2: discriminability of the Hurst exponent of fBm series increases with the series length.  
To achieve this, I presented participants with fractal task graphs. I manipulated the Hurst 
exponents of the series and their lengths (number of presented elements). In addition, I 
provided participants with example graphs which depicted graphs with different Hurst 
exponents. A measure, M, linearly dependant on the Hurst exponent of each example graph, 
was indicated. Participants were asked to estimate the M value of each of the task graphs 
using the example set. 
Method 
Participants Thirty-two undergraduates (17 men and 15 women) acted as participants. Their 
average age was 22.7 years. They were paid a fee of £6.00 per hour. 81 
 
Stimulus materials I generated six sets of target graphs and four sets of example graphs, each 
with 33 different H values ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.125. I then divided this range 
into four sub-ranges: 0.1 ≤ H ≤ .275; 0.3 ≤ H ≤ 0.475; 0.5 ≤ H ≤ 0.675; 0.7 ≤ H ≤ 0.9. (I shall 
refer to these as sub-ranges H1, H2, H3 and H4, respectively.) Finally, to provide target graphs 
for each participant, I randomly sampled two H values from each sub-range for each of six 
series lengths.  This gave a total set of 48 different target series for each participant (two 
graphs x six lengths x four H sub-ranges). The same four example graphs for each of the 33 
different values of the H exponent were available to all participants. 
Series with 6284 points were generated with the spectral algorithm described by Saupe 
(Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). Details of this procedure are provided in the Chapter 1. Segments 
of the generated series were presented in lengths of 100, 250, 500, 750, 1000, and 1250 
elements as the target series. Example graphs always included 1250 points. The graphs’ 
point density was set to one point per pixel. Thus, I was able to specify the quality of the 
visual image and ensure it was the same for all participants. In order to avoid confounding of 
results with amplitude effects, vertical ranges of all graphs were normalised to the interval 
[1, 10]. This may have distorted the Hurst exponent of a given series significantly but it is 
unlikely to have distorted the difference between the H exponents of two different series, 
which had originally the same H value, by more than 0.01 (see Chapter 1, Part III). 
Design During the familiarisation task, participants were presented with three randomly 
ordered graphs and shown how to use the graphical user interface. The experimental task 
followed immediately afterwards.  
Procedure Participants were told that graphs differed in terms of a property, M, that could 
vary between zero and 100 (M was the H exponent multiplied by 100.) They had to inspect 
each of the target graphs carefully in order to estimate its M value. To assist them, they had 
access to a set of 132 example graphs that could be displayed one at a time by clicking on 
the appropriate button in the display. Figure 2.1 shows the graphic user interface. To select 82 
 
examples for display, participants first scrolled down to the M value of their choice and then 
clicked on as many examples as they wished to see. 
Participants were told that they could view the example graphs at any time by clicking on 
the appropriate button and that there was no limit to the number of times they could view 
any example. They were instructed as follows: ‘Please search the example list for graphs 
which resemble the target graph. Your estimation should be based on the “M” value of the 
graph groups that most resemble the target graph. Please estimate the “M” value of each of 
the graphs as a number between 0 and 100.’ They were also told that the “M” values of the 
target graph were not necessarily the same as the M values that appeared in the example 
table and that target graphs could have M values such as 23 or 97. Finally, they were alerted 
to the fact that the lengths of target graphs would vary and sometimes be short compared 
with the lengths of example graphs. 
Results 
Participants’ estimates of the M value of target series were transformed into H estimates by 
dividing them by 100. One participant whose mean absolute error was more than two 
standard deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the group was excluded 
from the analysis. I extracted both absolute and signed error scores for each combination of 
variables (Table 2.1). Signed error measures bias whereas absolute error is influenced both 
by bias and by response variability. As response variability can be interpreted as a reflection 
of task difficulty, absolute error is of primary interest here. However, I also analysed signed 
error as this can lead to additional insights into factors influencing discrimination. Mean 
values of both types of error score were low: for absolute error, 0.055; for signed error, 
0.023 83 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Experiment 1: Graphical user interface  84 
 
Table 2.1 Experiment 1: Average values for absolute error (first panel) and signed error 
(second panel) for each combination of four ranges of Hurst coefficients, six different series 
lengths, and first and second instances. Standard deviations are denoted by parentheses. 
 
Absolute 
error 
                                                          Series length  
  H -  
range 
Instance  100  250  500  750  1000  1250  Mean  Mean 
 
 
 
1 
1  0.071  0.046  0.057  0.040  0.054  0.063  0.055   
0.059 
(0.060) 
  (0.070)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.058)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
2  0.070  0.067  0.088  0.061  0.044  0.046  0.063 
    (0.062)  (0.051)  (0.112)  (0.051)  (0.042)  (0.051)  (0.067)   
 
2 
1   0.067  0.052  0.082  0.048  0.069  0.058  0.063   
0.061 
(0.054) 
  (0.043)  (0.072)  (0.067)  (0.047)  (0.065)  (0.050)  (0.058) 
2  0.061  0.067  0.057  0.051  0.066  0.054  0.059 
    (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.050)   
 
3 
1  0.062  0.050  0.079  0.043  0.061  0.055  0.058   
0.051 
(0.050) 
  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.043)   (0.083)  (0.052)  (0.055) 
2  0.040  0.040  0.065  0.035  0.049  0.037  0.044 
    (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.064)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.043)   
 
4 
1  0.057  0.044  0.042  0.048  0.048  0.062  0.050   
0.050 
(0.046) 
  (0.057)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.034)   (0.052)  (0.043) 
2  0.061  0.048  0.055  0.044  0.042  0.047  0.049 
    (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.049)   
  Mean  0.061  0.052  0.066   0.046  0.054  0.053      0.055 
    (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.053)  (0.047)    (0.053) 
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Signed 
error 
                                                          Series length  
  H -  
range 
Instance  100  250  500  750  1000  1250  Mean  Mean 
   
1 
1  0.039  0.036  0.051  0.033  0.046  0.060  0.044   
0.048 
(0.069) 
  (0.093)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.065)  ( 0.055)  (0.062) 
2  0.067  0.062  0.069  0.050  0.035  0.033  0.053 
     (0.066)  (0.057)  (0.125)  (0.063)  (0.051)  (0.060)  (0.075)   
 
2 
1  0.033  0.042  0.061  -0.007  0.002  0.037  0.028   
0.030 
(0.076) 
  (0.073)  (0.078)  (0.087)   (0.067)  (0.095)  (0.068)  (0.081) 
2      
 0.039 
     
0.056 
     
0.011 
    
 0.014 
     
0.041 
     
0.030 
    
 0.032 
    (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.069)  (0.061)  (0.071)   
 
3 
1  0.019  0.007  0.057  -0.014  0.020  0.029  0.020   
0.013 
(0.070) 
  (0.077)  (0.067)   (0.074)  (0.060)  (0.101)   (0.070)  (0.078) 
2  0.027  -0.017  0.015  0.004  0.022  -0.008  0.007 
     (0.044)   (0.050)  (0.091)  (0.051)  (0.063)  (0.050)  (0.062)   
 
4 
1  -0.035  0.015  0.002  -0.018  0.019  0.025  0.002   
0.000 
(0.068) 
  ( 0.074)  (0.055)  (0.056)   (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.078)  (0.066) 
2  -0.027  0.0185  0.007  -0.007  0.018  -0.013  -0.001 
    (0.103)  (0.055)  (0.068)  (0.060)  (0.052)   (0.060)  (0.069)   
  Mean  0.020  0.027  0.034  0.007  0.025  0.024       0.023 
    (0.082)  (0.064)  (0.084)  (0.065)  (0.071)  (0.066)    (0.073) 86 
 
Absolute error scores I carried out a three-way repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on absolute error scores using three within-participant variables:  the four H sub-
ranges, the six series lengths, and the first and second instances of each combination of H 
sub-range and series length (Table 2.1). Here and elsewhere, I report effects with 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections when Mauchly’s test showed that the sphericity assumption 
was violated. There was a significant main effect of target H value (F (2.22, 66.50) = 3.59; p 
= .03; η
2 = .11). Orthogonal contrasts showed that errors for H below 0.5 were significantly 
higher than those for errors for H above 0.5 (t (371) = 3.56; p < .001) but failed to show that 
errors for H between 0.5 and 0.675 were greater than those for H above 0.7 (t (371) = 0.44; 
NS).  
There was also an effect of series length (F (3.46, 103.65) = 4.24; p = .005; η
2 = .12). 
Orthogonal contrasts showed that errors for shorter series (500 points or fewer) were higher 
than errors for longer ones (t (317) = 3.16; p < .001). However, the error depended weakly 
on series length: for series with 1250 elements, the mean error was 0.05 (std: 0.08), whereas 
for series length of 100 elements, the mean error was 0.06 (std: 0.06). 
Signed error scores Signed error scores show that, overall, participants tended to 
overestimate the H values of the series. A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA on these 
scores, using the same variables as before, showed a main effect of target H value (F (2.34, 
70.19) = 27.42; p < .001; η
2 = .48). As Table 2.1 shows, estimates were too high when H 
was very low (H ≤ 0.275).  
There was also a main effect of series length (F (3.60, 108.13) = 3.30; p = .02; η
2 = .10) and 
an interaction between it and H value (F (8.78, 263.26) = 2.92; p < .01; η
2 = .09).  Whereas 
estimates for very low values of H remained too high as series length increased, estimates 
for other values of H became increasingly accurate. This improvement in accuracy with 
longer series can be partly attributed to practice: an interaction between series length and 
instance showed that, while the average decrease in mean overestimation of H values over 87 
 
the session was small (.003), the decrease for the longest series (.027) was much higher (F 
(3.68, 110.24) = 4.54; p < .01; η
2 = .13). 
Discussion 
Participants were more sensitive to differences in series with H > 0.5 than series with H < 
0.5. This pattern of results replicates the one that Gilden et al (1993) reported for visuo-
spatial contours in a new context (visual representation of time series).  However, as H 
values increased within the range [0.5, 1], there was no evidence that sensitivity either 
dropped off (Gilden et al, 1993) or increased further (Westheimer, 1991). 
Sensitivity improved as the number of displayed points increased beyond 500. This implies 
that discrimination depended on extraction of some statistical feature from the series just as 
Gilden et al (1993) suggest. With more data points, values of that feature became a more 
reliable guide to discrimination. However, for a given series length, it was a less reliable 
guide for series that were negatively autocorrelated (H < 0.5) than for those that were 
positively autocorrelated (H > 0.5). I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H1,1 and Hypothesis 
H1,2. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H1,3: people exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity to fGn graphs than to fBm 
graphs.  
Hypothesis H1,4: discriminability of the Hurst exponent of fGn sequences is higher when the 
series is longer. 
Hypothesis H1,5: change series derived from series with H values less than 0.5 are harder to 
discriminate than those derived from series with H values greater than 0.5.  88 
 
The details of the task were similar to those of Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2, I 
presented participants with series of price changes, rather than series of prices themselves.  
Method 
Participants Thirty undergraduates (10 men and 20 women) acted as participants. Their 
average age was 24.6 years. They were paid a fee of £6.00 per hour. 
Stimulus materials The target and example series were produced from series used in 
Experiment 1 by calculating the difference between successive values. The graphical user 
interface in this experiment was identical to the one used before (Figure 2.1) except that the 
vertical axes of graphs were labelled ‘Price change (K£)’ rather than ‘Price (K£)’. As I was 
interested in testing Gilden et al’s (1993) claim that the width of the distribution of 
increments (i.e. price changes) is the primary cue that participants use to discriminate H 
values, I did not normalise series in this experiment.   
Design and procedure Both design and procedure were identical to those used for 
Experiment 1. 
Results 
As before, participants’ estimates of the M value of target series were transformed into H 
estimates by dividing them by 100. One participant whose mean absolute error was more 
than two standard deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the group was 
excluded from the analysis. Again, I extracted both absolute error scores (mean = 0.037) and 
signed error scores (mean = 0.005) for each combination of variables (Table 2.2).  
Absolute error scores To analyse absolute error scores, I carried out a three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA using the same three within-participant variables as before. Although the 
overall effect of H level was not significant, orthogonal contrasts showed that error for series 
with H less than 0.5  was significantly lower than that for series with H higher than 0.5 (t 
(347) = 2.73 ; p < .01). There was also a main effect of series length (F (3.87, 108.45) = 89 
 
2.94; p = .03; η
2 = .10): orthogonal contrasts showed that, as for Experiment 1, error scores 
for shorter series (500 points or fewer) were higher than those for longer ones (t (247) = 
3.18; p  < .01). 
Table 2.2 Experiment 2: Average values for absolute error (first panel) and signed error 
(second panel) for each combination of four ranges of Hurst coefficients, six different series 
lengths, and first and second instances. Standard deviations are denoted by parentheses. 
 
Absolute 
error 
 
 
                                                          Series length  
H  
range 
Instance  100  250  500  750  1000  1250  Mean  Mean 
1  1  0.031  0.024  0.041  0.029  0.040  0.029  0.032   
0.034 
(0.035) 
  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
2  0.041  0.033  0.041  0.050  0.024  0.021  0.035 
    (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.047)  (0.027)   (0.023)  (0.036)   
2  1  0.030  0.041  0.043  0.035  0.032  0.022   0.034   
0.032 
(0.032) 
   (0.030)  (0.036)   (0.040)   (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.032) 
2  0.040  0.020  0.028  0.025  0.035  0.030  0.030 
    (0.037)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.031)   
3  1  0.050  0.039  0.050  0.048  0.022  0.027  0.039   
0.041 
(0.057) 
  (0.089)  (0.086)  (0.050)  (0.037)  (0.022)  (0.049)  (0.061) 
2  0.040  0.036  0.061  0.035  0.024   0.054  0.042 
    (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.068)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.087)  (0.053)   
4  1  0.050  0.035  0.037  0.034  0.040  0.032  0.038   
0.037 
(0.034) 
  (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.027)   (0.034)   (0.031)  (0.033) 
2  0.032  0.041  0.034  0.030  0.039   0.038  0.036 
    (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.034)   (0.023)   (0.040)   (0.045)  (0.035)   
  Mean  0.039  0.034  0.042  0.036  0.032  0.032        0.036 
    (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.045)    (0.041) 
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Signed 
error 
 
 
                                                          Series length  
H  
range 
Instance  100  250  500  750  1000  1250  Mean  Mean 
1  1   0.016  0.017  0.023  0.017  0.016  0.017  0.018   
0.022 
(0.044) 
  (0.041)  (0.034)  ( 0.051)  (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
2  0.037  0.027  0.035  0.047  0.005  0.002  0.025 
    (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.044)   
2  1  0.008  0.022  -0.005  -0.002  0.004  0.007  0.006   
0.001 
(0.045) 
  (0.042)  (0.050)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.033)  (0.046) 
2   
 -0.009 
   
0.001 
     
0.003 
 
-0.003 
     
0.011 
 
-0.023 
  
-0.003 
    (0.054)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.038)  (0.043)   
3  1  0.002  -0.001  0.028  -0.031  0.005  0.008  0.002   
-0.005 
(0.070) 
  (0.103)  (0.095)  (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.031)  (0.055)  (0.073) 
2  -0.002  0.002  -0.015  -0.019  -0.002  -0.032  -0.011 
    (0.057)  (0.052)  (0.091)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.098)  (0.067)   
4  1  -0.028  0.003  0.006  0.003  0.019  0.008  0.0019   
0.002 
(0.050) 
  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.050) 
2  -0.006  0.032  -0.013  0.001  0.013  -0.015  0.002 
    (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.038)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.050)   
  Mean  0.002  0.013  0.008  0.002  0.009  -0.004        0.049 
    (0.061)  (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.055)    (0.054) 
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Signed error scores Signed error scores show that, overall, participants had a slight tendency 
to overestimate H values of series. A repeated measures ANOVA on these scores, using the 
same three variables as before, showed a significant effect of target H value (F (2.90, 61.55) 
= 12.51; p < .001; η
2 = .31): on average, participants overestimated H values below 0.5 by 
0.01. An interaction between length and instance arose because this effect increased over the 
session – presumably as participants learned more about the range over which H values 
varied (F (2.50, 69.99) = 3.42; p = .03; η
2 = .11). An interaction between H value and series 
length arose because the relatively high level of overestimation for the lowest H value 
obtained when series had fewer than 1000 points was much reduced for series when they had 
more than 1000 points, whereas signed error scores for series with higher H values was 
comparatively unaffected by series length (F (7.26, 203.31) = 2.63; p = .01; η
2 = .09). 
Finally, as in Experiment 1, an interaction between series length and instance showed that, 
while the average decrease in mean overestimation of H values over the session was small 
(0.002), the decrease for the longest series (0.027) was much higher (F (3.58, 100.16) = 
3.96; p < .01; η
2 = .12). 
Cross-experiment comparison In Experiment 1, mean absolute error score was .06 whereas 
here it was .04. This difference was significant (F (1, 28) = 39.83; p < .001; η
2 = .59). 
 In Experiment 1, people were better at discriminating H values above 0.5 than at 
discriminating H values below 0.5. In this experiment, I changed the stimuli by presenting 
series of price changes or increments rather the price series themselves. However, the target 
H values were exactly the same as before. This change had a clear effect on the pattern of 
discriminability: people were now poorer rather than better at discriminating H values 
above 0.5 than at discriminating H values below 0.5. To confirm the significance of this 
change, I carried out a four-way ANOVA using the same three within-participant variables 
as before but now also including Experiment as a between-participant variable. This showed 
a significant cross-over interaction between Experiment and target H value (F (2.64, 73.97) 
= 4.25; p = .01; η
2 = .13). This effect is shown in Figure 2.2.   92 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Bar graph showing mean absolute errors for H < .5 (shaded) and H > .5 
(unshaded) for raw price series from Experiment 1 (left) and price change series from 
Experiment 2 (right).  
 
Discussion 
As expected, discriminability of H values was better for price change series than for raw 
price series. This is consistent with Gilden et al’s (1993) view that people extract 
information about the increments between successive points in order to discriminate fractal 
stimuli. By performing the increment extraction task for the participants, I removed one 
possible source of error. This made it easier for people to assess the amplitude of the 
apparent noise in the series and thereby discriminate series with different H values. I, 
therefore, accepted Hypothesis H1,3. Furthermore, accuracy increased with series length. I 
accepted Hypothesis H1,4. 
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In contrast to the previous experiment, discriminability was better with negatively 
autocorrelated series (H < 0.5) than with positively autocorrelated ones. This is the opposite 
from what is implied by Gilden et al’s (1993) argument. If extraction of price change 
information to use for discrimination between H values leads to better performance with 
positively autocorrelated series, then being presented with price change information to use 
for discrimination between H values should also lead better performance with positively 
autocorrelated series. I, therefore rejected Hypothesis H1,5. 
What could explain this unexpected reversal in the pattern of results? One possibility is that 
it is much harder to extract price change information from raw price series that are 
negatively autocorrelated. This seems unlikely: the individual price changes appear much 
larger and easier to identify in Figure 1.1 for lower H values. On the other hand, price 
change series in Figure 1.2 appear more distinct for lower H values: the difference in 
distribution widths is much larger between H = 0.1 and H = 0.2 than between H = 0.8 and H 
= 0.9. Thus it is possible that participants used distribution widths to discriminate between H 
values for price change series but used some other feature to discriminate between H values 
for raw price series. In the following experiments, I explored these other perception cues 
could be.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to explore the effect of darkness, or brightness, of a fractal graph 
as a cue guiding the discrimination of Hurst exponents of fBm graphs. In particular, I was 
interested in Hypothesis H1,7 : people use graphs’ illuminance as a cue assisting in 
discrimination of the Hurst exponents of fBm graphs. 
In order to examine this, I manipulated the darkness of the example graphs that participants 
saw. This would be expected to change retinal illuminance without affecting the Hurst 
exponent of the graphs. Target graphs were always presented in the way that they had been 
in previous experiments but example graphs varied in terms of their darkness. Four 94 
 
randomly ordered blocks of trials contained example graphs that were 1) darker than target 
graphs, 2) of the same darkness as target graphs, 3) somewhat lighter than target graphs, 4) 
considerably lighter than target graphs. 
In line with Westheimer’s (1991) argument, I expected absolute error to be higher when 
target and example graphs had different levels of darkness. However, my primary focus here 
is on signed error. If H values are discriminated on the basis of retinal illuminance, I would 
expect that using different levels of darkness for target and example graphs would bias H 
estimates. For example, making example graphs darker would make their H values appear to 
be smaller. As a result, a target correctly matched to an example graph with an H value of, 
say, 0.4 when target and example graphs are equally dark would be matched to an example 
graph with an H value that is greater than 0.4 when example graphs are darker than target 
graphs. Consequently, signed error would become more positive. Conversely, the same 
target graph would be matched to an example graph with an H value that is less than 0.4 
when example graphs are less dark than target graphs. Consequently, signed error would 
become more negative. 
Method 
Participants Thirty-three undergraduates (13 men and 20 women) with an average age of 
25.5 years acted as participants. They were paid a flat fee of £3.00. In addition, they were 
(truthfully) told that the two individuals with the best results would receive an additional 
£10. 
Stimulus materials The series were generated in the same way as they were in Experiment 1. 
Selection of H values for target and example graphs was also carried out in the same way as 
it was in that experiment. All target graphs were presented with a brightness of 0.2 on a grey 
scale that ranged from zero (black) to one (white). Example graphs were presented with a 
brightness of 0, 0.2, 0.4, or 0.6 on the same scale. Both target and example graphs had a 
constant thickness of one pixel. Figure 2.3 shows a typical task screen from the experiment.  95 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Graphical user interface for Experiment 3 
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Design After task familiarisation, which, as in previous experiments, involved practice with 
three graphs, participants were presented with 32 target graphs. These were divided into four 
blocks of eight graphs. In each of these blocks, example graphs had a different level of 
darkness. Order of presentation of blocks was determined randomly for each participant. 
Within each of the blocks, participants were presented with two instances of target graphs 
that had H values drawn from each of the four ranges of H values used in previous 
experiments. Ordering of trials within blocks was random. 
Procedure  Procedure was the same as in previous experiments except that, after 
familiarisation but before the experimental trials, participants were warned that example 
graphs would sometimes be presented with lines having a different darkness from those of 
the target graphs. They were explicitly told that “any such difference is not relevant to your 
task. Please ignore it and make your decision solely on the basis of the M values of the 
graphs.” 
Results 
Participants’ estimates of the M value of target series were again transformed  into H 
estimates by dividing them by 100. As before, participants whose mean absolute error scores 
were more than two standard deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the 
group were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the size of the sample to 29 
participants. I extracted both absolute error scores (mean = 0.045) and signed error scores 
(mean = 0.007) for each combination of variables in each condition (Table 2.3).  
Absolute error scores To analyse absolute error scores, a three-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed using the same three within-participant variables as before. There 
was a main effect of the darkness of the example graphs (F (3, 84) = 6.34; p = .001; η
2 = .19) 
and tests of linear contrasts showed that it arose because absolute error was lower when 
target and example graphs had the same darkness than when they did not (t (231) = 4.28; p < 
.001).  97 
 
In this experiment, the main effect of target H value that was obtained in previous 
experiments failed to attain significance. The absolute error scores for the highest target H 
value were inexplicably elevated for the middle two darkness levels: as a result, there was an 
interaction between target H level and darkness level (F (5.07, 141.95) = 2.47; p = .04; η
2 = 
.08). 
Table 2.3 Experiment 3: Average values for absolute error (first panel) and signed error 
(second panel) for each combination of Hurst coefficient range, darkness level, and instance 
for the darkness condition. Standard deviations sre denoted by parentheses. 
Absolute 
error 
 
 
H  
range 
 
Instance 
 
0 (black) 
 
0.2 
 
0.4 
 
0.6 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
1  1  0.053  0.036  0.045  0.063  0.049    
0.047 
(0.043) 
  (0.051)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.063)  (0.047) 
2  0.045  0.035  0.050  0.048  0.044 
    (0.040)  (0.027)   (0.037)   (0.044)  (0.038)   
2  1  0.064  0.041  0.050  0.054  0.052   
0.049 
(0.045) 
  (0.059)  (0.046)   (0.044)   (0.051)  (0.050) 
2  0.052  0.023  0.041  0.062  0.045 
    (0.044)  (0.024)  (0.031)   (0.047)  (0.040)   
3  1  0.037  0.035  0.055  0.053  0.045   
0.043 
(0.041) 
  (0.048)  (0.038)  (0.049)   (0.040)  (0.045) 
2  0.040  0.033  0.040  0.050  0.041 
  (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.038)   
4  1  0.032  0.039  0.040  0.033  0.036   
0.040 
(0.036) 
  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.033) 
2  0.038  0.047  0.060  0.035  0.045 
  (0.032)   (0.037)  (0.048)   (0.031)  (0.038)   
  Mean  0.045  0.036  0.048  0.050  0.045   
    (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.045)  0.040   
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Signed 
error 
 
 
H  
range 
 
Instance 
 
0 (black) 
 
0.2 
 
0.4 
 
0.6 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
1  1  0.028  0.012  0.022  0.039  0.025   
0.025 
(0.058) 
  (0.068)  (0.046)   (0.053)  (0.080)  (0.063) 
2  0.033  0.017  0.024  0.024  0.025 
    (0.051)   (0.041)  (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.053)   
2  1  0.053  -0.003  -0.003  0.008  0.014   
0.014 
(0.065) 
  (0.069)   (0.063)   (0.067)  (0.075)  (0.072) 
2  0.041  0.001  0.007  0.007  0.014 
    (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.052)  (0.078)  (0.058)   
3  1  0.015  -0.019  -0.038  -0.020  -0.016   
-0.008 
(0.059) 
  (0.059)   (0.048)   (0.064)   (0.064)  (0.061) 
2  0.029  -0.005  -0.009  -0.016  -0.000 
  (0.047)   (0.048)   (0.051)   (0.065)  (0.056)   
4  1  0.015  0.016  -0.019  -0.012  0.000   
-0.004 
(0.054) 
  (0.046)  (0.047)   (0.054)   (0.040)  (0.05) 
2  0.008  -0.021  -0.018  -0.001  -0.008 
  (0.049)   (0.056)   (0.075)   (0.048)  (0.059)   
  Mean  0.028  -0.000  -0.004  0.004    0.007 
    (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.062)  (0.067)    (0.059) 
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Signed error scores Signed error scores were analysed in a similar manner. A main effect of 
target H value (F (2.32, 64.85) = 12.09; p < .001; η
2 = .30) arose because range effects 
(Parducci, 1965) led to a  response contraction bias (Poulton, 1989). 
There was also a main effect of the darkness of the example graphs (F (3, 84) = 12.80; p < 
.001; η
2 = .31). Tests of linear contrasts showed that it arose solely because overestimation 
of H values was greater when example graphs were darker than when they had the same 
characteristics as target graphs (t (231) = 5.73; p < .001). Thus, as predicted, signed error 
became more positive when example graphs were made darker than target graphs. However, 
in contrast to the predictions, there was no evidence that signed error became more negative 
when example graphs were made less dark than target graphs. 
Finally, there was a marginally significant interaction between H value and darkness of 
example graphs (F (9, 252) = 2.20; p = .04; η
2 = .07). This arose because the degree of 
overestimation that was obtained when example graphs were darker than target graphs was 
somewhat less for the highest and lowest ranges of H values than for the middle two. 
Figure 2.4 shows main effects of darkness of example graphs on absolute error scores (upper 
panel) and signed error scores (lower panel). 
Discussion 
Predictions focussed on signed error scores. Making example graphs darker than target 
graphs made signed error more positive in a manner consistent with Westheimer’s (1991) 
argument that retinal illuminance can be used to discriminate between the H coefficients of 
different fractal contours. This result implies that retinal illuminance provides an important 
cue for discriminating between visual representations of fBm time series varying in terms of 
their Hurst coefficients. I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H1,7. 
 100 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Experiment 3: Main effects of darkness of exemplar graph lines on absolute error 
scores (upper panel) and signed error scores (lower panel). 
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In contrast to what was expected, making example graphs brighter than target graphs did not 
make signed error more negative. It is clear that, at some level, the differences between the 
target graph shade of grey (0.2) and the other two shades of grey used for the example 
graphs (0.4, 0.6) had a  psychological impact because they affected absolute error.  So why 
did they not produce the expected effect on signed error? Perhaps the differences in retinal 
illuminance associated with them were insufficient to bias estimates of the Hurst exponent. 
In contrast, the difference in retinal illuminance between the black example graph and the 
darkest grey used for the target graphs was sufficient to have such an effect. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was designed to examine Hypothesis H1,6: the gradients of fractal graphs serve 
as a cue that assists discrimination of the Hurst exponents of the graphs. 
I investigated the effect of smoothness on discriminability by manipulating the graphs’ 
thickness. This masked fine fluctuations in the series by smoothing out differences between 
successive points.  Therefore, making example graphs thicker should result in their 
perceived gradients being smaller. That, in turn, should cause their H values to seem too 
high. As a result, a target correctly matched to an example graph with an H value of, say, 0.4 
when target and example graphs are depicted using lines that are equally thick would be 
matched to an example graph with an H value less than 0.4 when lines used to depict 
example graphs are thicker than those used to depict the target graph. Consequently, signed 
error should become more negative. Conversely, the same target graph would be matched to 
an example graph with an H value that is greater than 0.4 when example graphs are depicted 
using lines that are thinner than those used to depict the target graph. Consequently, signed 
error should become more positive. 
Of course, making the lines of example graphs thicker would also have the same effect as 
making them darker: it would change their retinal illuminance. However, this effect  is just 
the opposite of the one predicted by smoothing: if retinal illuminance is important, making 102 
 
example graphs thicker should increase rather than decrease the H value of the example 
graph that is matched to the target graph. Obtaining the pattern of results predicted by retinal 
illuminance would not show that people do not use series autocorrelation as a cue: it would 
merely show that, under the experimental conditions, it is a relatively unimportant cue 
compared to retinal illuminance. On the other hand, obtaining the pattern of results predicted 
by use of series autocorrelation as a cue would show that it is relatively important compared 
to retinal illuminance.  
Method 
Participants Thirty-five undergraduates (16 men and 19 women) with an average age of 
26.8 years acted as participants. They were paid a flat fee of £3.00. In addition, they were 
(truthfully) told that the two individuals with the best results would receive an additional 
£10. 
Stimulus materials The series were generated in the same way as they were in Experiment 1. 
Selection of H values for target and example graphs was also carried out in the same way as 
it was in that experiment. All target graphs were presented with a thickness of two pixels and 
example graphs were presented with a thickness of one, two, three, or four pixels. Both 
target and example graphs had a constant brightness of 0 (black) on the scale of brightness 
used in Experiment 3. Figure 2.5 shows a typical task screen from the experiment. 
Design Design was identical to that used for Experiment 3 except that the four blocks of 
trials varied in terms of the thickness of the lines used to depict the example graphs rather 
than in terms of the brightness of those lines. 
Procedure Procedure was the same as in previous experiments, except that participants were 
warned that example graphs would sometimes be presented with lines having a different 
thickness from those of the target graphs. They were told that “any such difference is not 
relevant to your task. Please ignore it and make your decision solely on the basis of the M 
values of the graphs.” 103 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Graphical user interface for Experiment 4 104 
 
Results 
Participants’ estimates of the M value of target series were again transformed into H 
estimates by dividing them by 100. As before, participants whose mean absolute error scores 
were more than two standard deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the 
group were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the size of the sample to 30 
participants. Both absolute error scores (mean = .067) and signed error scores (mean = .009) 
for each combination of variables in each condition were extracted (Table 2.4).  
Absolute error scores A three-way repeated measures ANOVA using the same three within-
participant variables as before showed that there was a main effect of the thickness of the 
example graphs (F (3, 84) = 8.15; p < .001; η
2 = .23). Tests of linear contrasts showed that it 
arose because absolute error was lower when target and example graphs had the same 
thickness than when they did not (t (239) = 5.86; p < .001). 
There was also a main effect of target H value (F (2.29, 64.13) = 10.32; p < .001; η
2 = .27). 
As in Experiment 1, absolute error was lower for positively autocorrelated series (H > 0.5) 
than for negatively autocorrelated ones (t (239) = 2.99; p < .05).  
Signed error scores A main effect of target H value (F (3, 84) = 11.04; p < .001; η
2 = .28) 
arose because range effects (Parducci, 1965) led to a response contraction bias (Poulton, 
1989). 
There was a main effect of the thickness of the example graphs (F (3, 84) = 13.93; p < .001; 
η
2 = .33). Tests of linear contrasts showed that it arose solely because overestimation of H 
values was greater when example graphs were not as thick as target graphs than when 
example and target graphs were of the same thickness (t (239) = 6.39; p < .001). Thus, as 
predicted by the argument that people use series autocorrelation as a cue, signed error 
became more positive when example graphs were made less thick than target graphs. 
However, contrary to predictions, signed error did not become more negative when example 
graphs were made thicker than target graphs. 105 
 
Figure 2.6 shows main effects of line thickness of example graphs on absolute error scores 
(upper panel) and signed error scores (lower panel). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Experiment 4: Main effects of thickness of exemplar graph lines on absolute error 
scores (upper panel) and signed error scores (lower panel) 
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Table 2.4 Experiment 4: Average values for absolute error (first panel) and signed error 
(second panel) for each combination of Hurst coefficient range, thickness level, and instance 
for the thickness condition. Standard deviations are denoted by parentheses. 
 
Absolute 
error 
H  
range 
 
Instance 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
1  1  0.073  0.051    0.071  0.050   0.061   
0.064 
(0.057) 
  ( 0.063)  (0.056)  (0.057)   (0.052)  (0.057) 
2  0.098  0.043  0.061  0.065  0.067 
    (0.073)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.059)   
2  1  0.117  0.054  0.086  0.075  0.083   
0.081 
(0.080) 
  (0.078)  (0.053)  (0.084)  ( 0.091)   (0.080) 
2  0.107  0.054  0.073  0.080  0.079 
    (0.096)  (0.036)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.071)   
3  1  0.076  0.048  0.080  0.093  0.074   
0.072 
(0.066) 
  (0.060)  (0.040)  (0.059)   (0.090)  (0.066)   
2  0.078  0.055  0.072  0.074  0.070 
    ( 0.072)  (0.054)   (0.081)  (0.062)  (0.068)   
4  1  0.051  0.046  0.072  0.053  0.055   
0.051 
(0.054) 
  (0.038)  (0.054)   (0.061)   (0.059)  (0.054) 
2  0.043  0.052  0.043  0.046  0.046 
    (0.054)  (0.061)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.048)   
  Mean  0.080 
(0.072) 
0.050 
(0.050) 
0.070 
(0.064) 
0.067 
(0.067) 
0.067 
(0.063) 
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Signed 
error 
H  
range 
 
Instance 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
1  1  0.058  0.024  0.039   0.032  0.038   
0.040 
(0.077) 
  (0.078)  (0.072)  (0.082)    (0.065)   (0.075) 
2  0.071  0.023  0.033  0.038  0.041 
    (0.100)  (0.059)  (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.079)   
2  1  0.070  0.001  -0.011  0.007  0.017   
0.013 
(0.110) 
  (0.120)  (0.076)  (0.120)   (0.119)  (0.114) 
2  0.047  0.013  -0.017  -0.007  0.009 
    (0.14)  (0.065)  (0.099)  (0.104)  (0.106)   
3  1  0.044  -0.008  -0.052  -0.055  -0.018   
-0.005 
(0.098) 
  (0.087)  (0.062)  (0.086)  (0.118)  (0.098) 
2  0.053  0.010    -0.003  -0.026  0.008 
    ( 0.092)  (0.077)  (0.109)  (0.094)  (0.097)   
4  1  0.018  -0.024  -0.047  -0.034  -0.022   
-0.013 
(0.071) 
  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.083)  (0.072)  (0.074) 
2  0.020  -0.022  -0.008  -0.003  -0.003 
    (0.067)  (0.077)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.066)   
  Mean  0.047 
(0.097) 
0.002 
(0.071) 
-0.008 
(0.094) 
-0.006 
(0.095) 
  0.009 
(0.089) 
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Discussion 
Absolute error scores showed an analogous pattern to the one found in the previous 
experiment. They were higher when the thickness of the example graphs was different from 
the thickness of the target graphs. This pattern is again what was expected on the basis of 
previous work (Egeth, 1966; Ballesteros, 1996; Watanabe, 1988; Williams, 1974) and is 
likely, at least in part, to reflect the fact that the absolute size of the biases revealed by the 
analysis of signed error (discussed next) was greater when example and target graphs were 
of different thicknesses.  
Analysis of signed error showed that making the example graphs thinner than the target 
graphs produced a bias in the direction to be expected if this manipulation reduced the 
gradients of the series by masking differences between successive points. This bias was in 
the opposite direction to that expected on the basis of changes in retinal illuminance.  Thus I 
accepted Hypothesis H1,6. 
However, making example graphs thicker than target graphs did not have either the effect 
predicted by masking of gradients or the opposite effect by changes in retinal illuminance. 
One possibility is that participants used both cues and that their effects on signed error 
cancelled one another out. 
Taken together, results of Experiments 3 and 4 imply that people use more than one cue to 
discriminate between graphs of fBm series. The present experiment implies that people are 
sensitive to the Hurst exponent of time series. The previous experiment showed that they 
also use retinal illuminance to discriminate between such series. However, when these two 
cues were pitted against one another in the way that they were in the present experiment, the 
effects of the gradient cue may dominate those of the retinal illuminance cue (example 
graphs thinner than target graphs) or the effects of the two cues may cancel each other out 
(example graphs thicker than target graphs). 109 
 
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was designed to explore the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis H1,8: people can learn to identify the Hurst exponents of given graphs. 
Hypothesis H,1,9: people perceive investments in assets that have price graphs with a low 
Hurst exponent to be riskier than investments in assets that have price graphs with a high 
Hurst exponent. 
Participants were presented with a sequence of 96 time series. They were asked to identify a 
measure that was linearly dependent on the Hurst exponent of each graph. In order to 
facilitate learning during the learning stages, they were given feedback that included the 
correct value of this measure. Each learning stage was followed by a test, in which no 
feedback was given. In contrast to Experiments 1 - 4, no example graphs were presented to 
the participants: learning was based only on feedback. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were asked to answer a questionnaire that included a question about the risk 
level of investment in an asset that had a price series with a Hurst exponent higher or lower 
than 0.5. 
Method 
Participants  Thirty-five undergraduates (13 men and 22 women) acted as participants. Their 
average age was 22.9 years. They were paid a fee of £3.00. In addition, two prizes of £10.00 
each were awarded to the two participants whose average error was smallest. The prize was 
advertised in the advertisement for the experiment and was mentioned in the instructions.  
Stimulus materials I generated six sets of fBm graphs each with 32 different H values 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.875 in steps of 0.025. This range was then divided into eight sub-
ranges: 0.1 ≤ H ≤ 0.175; 0.2 ≤ H ≤ 0.275;...; 0.8 ≤ H ≤ 0.875.  110 
 
Design Each participant was presented with 96 graphs, which were separated into two main 
stages, each comprising 48 graphs. Each stage included 5 learning sub-stages and a test 
stage, each consisting of eight graphs. At each sub-stage, graphs were randomly chosen from 
the six possible sets in each H-range. Presentation order of graphs in each sub-stage was 
random. All graphs were presented using a Matlab code. The graphs were not normalised. 
The task window of the programme is shown in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7 The task window of Experiment 5   111 
 
Presentation of each graph in the learning sub-stages was followed by immediate feedback. 
Feedback referred to a variable denoted by “M”, defined by M = 3 * ((H - 0.1) / 0.025 + 1) - 
1.  This transformation was chosen in order to ensure that all M values were integers. In 
addition, the range of M was 2 to 95 and, therefore, close to the natural range of percentages. 
Furthermore, M (0.5) = 50, which enabled natural formulation of questions about the 
differences between the risk level of investment in assets whose price series have M < 50 or 
M > 50. 
During the test sub-stages no feedback was given. 
Procedure Participants were asked to look at each graph of the 96 presented graphs, estimate 
its M value by choosing a value from a given list of values between 2 and 95, and save their 
selection. After completing this task, participants were asked to complete question list.  
The experiment instructions were: 
“In the following task, you will be presented with a sequence of 96 graphs. The graphs 
differ by a property called “M”. M values of presented graphs will range between 1 and 96. 
You will be asked:  
1.  to look at the graphs carefully,  
2.  to estimate the value of the “M” property of the graphs as a number between 1 and 
96.  
3.  to enter your estimation  and then save it. […] 
In order to complete the task, the experiment includes learning stages, in which you will get 
feedback on your estimates. The feedback includes the M value. […]  
Initially, you will not have any idea of the correct M value. So you need to use the feedback 
that you will get after each graph to understand what is meant by the M value so that you can 
make better estimates in the future.” 112 
 
The questions participants were asked are listed in Appendix A. 
Results 
Participants whose mean absolute error scores were more than two standard deviations 
greater than that of the average for the rest of the group were excluded from the analysis. 
This reduced the size of the sample to 33 participants. Absolute error scores and signed error 
scores for each participant at each of the experiment stages were extracted. The answers to 
the questionnaire were also analysed. 
Absolute error scores Over all, the mean value of participants absolute error was 0.079 (min 
= 0.051, max = 0.122, std = 0.022). A two-way repeated measures ANOVA using the 
variables experiment stage and experiment sub-stage showed that there was a main effect of 
the stage of the experiment (F (1, 32) = 34.26; p <.001) and sub-stage (F (4, 128) = 26.71; p 
<.001). There was also a significant interaction effect between stage and sub-stage (F (4, 
128) = 17.19; p <.001). 
Paired-t-tests revealed significant differences between participants’ errors in sub-stages 1 
and 5 of the first test stage (t (32) = 6.56; p < 0.001), sub-stage 1 of the first stage and test 1 
(t (32) = 8.02; p < 0.001) and sub-stage 1 of stage 2 and test 2 (t (32) = 2.97; p = .006). 
There were no significant differences between sub-stages 1 and 5 of stage 2, indicating that 
there was no significant improvement of performance during the second stage (t (32) = 1.18, 
p = .25). There were no significant differences between performance in the fifth sub-stage 
and test stage in any of the experimental stages. This indicates that feedback did not affect 
results as an incentive. Dependence of mean absolute error on trial number is shown in 
Figure 2.8. As participants’ errors do not seem to converge to zero, a regression with respect 
to the model Mean error = ae
bt + error yielded a relatively small R
2 value (a = 0.11; b= - 
0.008; p < .01; R
2 = .41). Translating the mean error by subtracting from it its minimum 
value did not improve R
2 significantly. However, regression with respect to the model Mean 
error = a + b / t + error yielded a = 0.06; b = 0.28; p < .01; R
2 = .85. Therefore, although 113 
 
learning error is usually modelled by an exponent (Castro, Kalish, Nowak, Qian, Rogers and 
Zhu, 2008), in this case, a model for the mean error, which predicts that the error is inverse-
proportional to the time, fits the results better than an exponential model. 
Signed error scores Apart from sub-stage 1 of stage 1, all mean signed errors were 
insignificantly different than 0.   
Table 2.5 shows participants’ mean errors and signed errors in all sub-stages of stages 1 and 
2 and the test stages.  
   
 
Figure 2.8 Absolute error versus trial number in Experiment 5. Exponential regression line is 
presented in the upper panel, and the regression line of the model Mean absolute 
error=a/trial number+b+e is presented in the lower panel. 
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Table 2.5  Absolute and signed errors in Experiment 5.  
Measure  Sub-
stage 
1  2  3  4  5  Test 
Error  Stage1  0.170  
(0.074) 
0.095 
(0.053) 
0.085 
(0.047) 
0.080 
(0.049) 
0.072 
(0.036) 
0.065 
(0.027) 
Stage 2  0.072  
(0.025) 
0.061 
(0.023) 
0.066 
(0.026) 
0.061 
(0.025) 
0.065 
(0.035) 
0.059 
(0.023) 
Signed 
error 
Stage 1  -0.280 
(0.067) 
0.011 
(0.056) 
0.015 
(0.046)  
0.012 
(0.043) 
0.003 
(0.050) 
-0.011 
(0.046) 
Stage 2  -0.001 
(0.043) 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.037) 
0.004 
(0.039) 
0.008 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
 
 
Analysis of answers to the questionnaire Answers to questions revealed that, on average, 
participants did not consider graphs with H < 0.5 more difficult to identify than graphs with 
H > 0.5 (16/33 = 49% of the participants chose the former and 17/33 = 51% chose the latter). 
However, the vast majority of the participants (28/33 = 85%) identified assets with Hurst 
exponents that were smaller than 0.5 as riskier to invest in. Accordingly, most participants 
answered that they would prefer investing money in assets whose Hurst exponent was higher 
than H = 0.5 (25/33 = 76%). Interestingly, many of those who said that they would prefer 
investing in assets with H > 0.5 rationalised their preference by using arguments such as: 
“Price is stable”, “Greater stability and predictability”, “Less fluctuation, lower risk”, “If I 
make a loss, it would be a small loss”, and “Safer”, whereas participants who preferred 
investing in assets with H < 0.5 used arguments as: “More chances that the asset will go up. 
Buy low and sell high”, “Price changes frequently and I will get a good deal”. Therefore, 
answers reflected mainly personal risk-taking preferences rather than any difference in the 115 
 
perception of risk level of the assets. Indeed, the features that participants in both groups 
typically used to distinguish graphs with high and low Hurst exponents were: “Degree of 
fluctuations”, “Smoothness”, “Overall height of the graphs”, “Overall trend”, and  “Shape”. 
Discussion 
Experiment 5 showed that, given merely feedback, people can learn to identify the Hurst 
exponent of time series with some accuracy. Furthermore, they do not exhibit any significant 
bias, and their standard deviation is small. Importantly, people attribute to different H-ranges 
(H < 0.5, H > 0.5) a financial meaning: assets that had price graphs with a Hurst exponent 
lower than 0.5 are considered riskier to invest in than those with a Hurst exponent higher 
than 0.5. These results affected participants’ investment preferences. I accepted Hypotheses 
H1,8 and H1,9. 
Conclusions 
The study of randomness of binary sequences has many psychological and educational 
applications. For instance, Falk and Konold (1997, page 301) wrote: “Judging a situation as 
more or less random is often the key to important cognitions and behaviours. Perceiving a 
situation as nonchance calls for explanations […] Lawful environments encourage a coping 
orientation […] In contrast, there seems to be no point in patterning our behaviour in a 
random environment.” However, in real-life, people have to deal many times with time 
series describing threatening events: for instance, traders have to react to price swings 
(Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004). The threat encapsulated in financial series is termed ‘risk’ 
rather than ‘randomness’. 
Price series are rich in detail and can behave very unpredictably. To be able to understand 
their behaviour, graphical representations are used. Previous studies on human perception of 
fractal time series have suggested that people use the gradients and illuminance of series to 
assess the Hurst exponent of graphically presented time series. The experiments reported 116 
 
here confirmed these suggestions: using these cues enabled people to reach a high level of 
accuracy in the discrimination and identification of the Hurst exponent of different series. 
However, the results indicated that biases arise from the use of these same cues: the darkness 
and the thickness of the lines with which the graph is presented may affect perception of the 
Hurst exponent. The results also show that people can learn to identify the Hurst exponent of 
graphs and suggest that, in financial contexts, the meaning that they attribute to it is related 
to risk. 
Limitations 
The conditions of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were not identical: in Experiment 1, I 
normalised all presented graphs, whereas in Experiment 2, I did not. The main consideration 
for normalising fBm series in Experiment 1 was to eliminate amplitude cues. The main 
consideration against normalising fGn series in Experiment 2 was to avoid a large distortion 
of their Hurst exponents (normalisation of fGn series with H in the domain [0.1, 0.9] to the 
same interval results in larger distortions in the Hurst exponent than the distortion caused to 
the Hurst exponents of fBm series by normalisation). However, that difference suggests 
caution if I am to generalise the results of the comparison between participants’ 
performances in Experiment 1 and 2 beyond the conditions of the experiments.  
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Chapter 3: Risk perception and financial decisions 
 
This chapter explores the way people assess risk and make financial decisions when 
presented with graphs of financial time series. The study described in this chapter consisted 
of a series of four experiments.  
Experiment 5 in Chapter 2 revealed that participants related the Hurst exponent of the time 
series with risk of investment in the corresponding asset. However, that experiment gave 
only a rough estimate for the dependence of risk assessment on the Hurst exponent. The 
research reported in this chapter was designed to develop greater understanding of the way 
people assess the risk of investments, based on their price graphs. 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to explore the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H2,1: when no additional cues are presented, risk perception of investment in 
assets, based on their price graphs, depends weakly on the Hurst exponent of the price series. 
Hypothesis H2,2: when both price series (fBm) and its corresponding price change series 
(fGn) are presented, risk assessments are negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of 
price series. 
Hypothesis H2,3: risk ratings of people who are low on emotional stability are correlated with 
the Hurst exponent of the presented graphs stronger than those of people who are high on 
emotional stability. 
To examine these hypotheses, I presented participants with pairs of graphs of computer-
generated fractal series. I manipulated graph presentation format. In one condition, 118 
 
participants were presented with fBm series, whereas in the second condition, they were 
presented with fBm series as well as their corresponding fGn series. They were told that the 
fBm graphs represented asset prices. FGn series were presented as the corresponding price 
change series. The difference in the Hurst exponents between the graphs in each pair was 
manipulated. Participants were asked to compare risk or randomness levels of graphs. They 
completed a personality questionnaire at the end of the experiment.  
Method 
Design All the experiments in this study were performed on the internet. Online experiments 
are recommended as they reduce experimenter effects and volunteer bias while increasing 
access to demographically and culturally diverse participant groups (Reips, 2002). In 
addition, they have similar internal and external validity as those of laboratory or field 
experiments (Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011).  
Two sets of 50 fBm graph pairs were randomly chosen for each participant.  In Condition 
fBm, only fBm graphs were presented. In Condition fBm&fGn, fBm graphs were presented 
along with their corresponding fGn graphs. The graphs were presented using a graphic user 
interface program written in Matlab. Figure 3.1 shows a typical task windows from 
Condition fBm and from Condition fBm&fGn.  
Participants were asked to discriminate between the risk levels of investments in asset pairs 
in one of the graph sets (risk-discrimination task)  and to discriminate between the 
randomness levels of the behavior of each of the graphs in pairs in the other set 
(randomness-discrimination task). The order of the tasks was randomly chosen for each 
participant. The randomness task served as a control, verifying whether participants could 
discriminate between graphs with different Hurst exponents. 
The Hurst exponents of the graphs in each pair were different. I denote the differences 
between the Hurst exponents of the graphs in each pair by   . Each set of fifty graph pairs 
included 15 pairs with         , 15 pairs with          , and 20 pairs with           .  119 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Task windows from Experiment 1: Risk rating task in fBm condition (upper 
panel) and randomness rating task in fBm&fGn condition (lower panel). 120 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I showed that most people can distinguish between the Hurst exponents of 
graphs when          and          , but that, when             accuracy is lower. The 
order of presentation of the graphs in each pair on the screen was randomized. 
These manipulations resulted in a two (fBm or fBm&fGn condition) by two (risk or 
randomness discrimination task) by three (                       design. 
Participants I was interested in answers of both experts and non-experts. Muradoglu and 
Harvey (2012) and Barber and Odean (2008) noted that a large number of lay people have 
started to trade online over the past few years because of increased access to internet trading 
sites. 
Experiment 1 was advertised on financial analyst and economist groups on LinkedIn. A 
prize draw was announced in order to encourage participation. The prize consisted of three 
memory sticks.  
Over a period of one month, 77 people participated in Condition fBm. The answers of 41 
people who completed all tasks (21 men and 20 women, average age: 45.3) were included in 
the analysis. All participants but one had academic degrees or were students. Twelve 
participants had a PhD, nine had an MSc, 14 had a BSc/BA, and five were students.  
Over a period of one month, 81 people participated in Condition fBm&fGn. 47 people (16 
women, 31 men, average age: 46.1) completed all tasks. Apart from three of them, all 
participants had academic degrees or were students. Four participants had a PhD, 19 had an 
MSc, and 21 had a BA/BSc.  
Participants included people from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, India, Philippines, 
Canada, USA, Argentina, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, France, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Greece, Israel, Poland, and Ukraine. 121 
 
Participants were asked whether they were financial analysts. In the fBm condition, seven 
participants answered positively. In the fBm&fGn condition, ten answered positively. 
Materials Stimuli consisted of 54 (9 x 6) fBm graphs with Hurst coefficients H = 0.1, 0.2, 
0.3, ...,0.9, 54 (9 x 6) fBm graphs with Hurst coefficients H = 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, ...,0.75, 54 (9 x 
6) fBm graphs with Hurst coefficients H = 0.4, 0.425, 0.45, ...,0.6, and their corresponding 
fGn graphs. 
All fBm series and their corresponding fGn series were produced in Matlab as described in 
Chapter 1, Part III. To avoid confounding of results with the difference between the first and 
last data points, all graphs depicted one period of the produced fractals. Therefore, the first 
and last point in each of the graphs was identical. Similarly, to avoid confounding of results 
with the graphs’ ranges, I normalised all graphs to have the same range (the interval [1, 10]). 
Normalisation of graph pairs for which the Hurst exponent differs by not more than 0.1 
changes only slightly the differences between their Hurst exponents (see Chapter 1, Part III). 
Each series consisted of 6284 points. The graphs were saved in jpg format. These jpg images 
were presented over a third of a 15-inch computer screen with 1366 x 768 pixels. I, 
therefore, estimate that the number of points that participants could see was 500. However, 
as shown in Chapter 2, participants’ sensitivity to Hurst exponents depends only weakly on 
the length of the given series over a wide range of series lengths.   
Participants’ personalities were assessed using the TIPI instrument, a ten-item standardised 
personality questionnaire (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann, 2003). The TIPI evaluates 
personality along the dimensions of the Big Five traits. 
Procedure The experiment consisted of three tasks. In Task A, participants were presented 
with 50 pairs of graphs. They were asked to determine which of the graphs presented in each 
pair represented an asset in which it was riskier to invest. Task B was similar to Task A, 
except that participants were asked to determine which of the two graphs represented an 122 
 
asset which behaved more randomly. After completing tasks A and B, participants were 
asked to fill in the TIPI questionnaire. 
Results 
Primary dependent variables were the percentage of each participant’s answers, in which 
they designated as riskier the asset with a lower Hurst exponent (RiskLowHPerc) and the 
percentage of their answers, in which they designated as behaving more randomly the asset 
with a lower Hurst exponent (RandLowHPerc). A high value of RiskLowHPerc (close to 1) 
indicated that participants assessed the assets’ risk according to the Hurst exponents of the 
corresponding graphs, whereas medium values (close to 0.5) indicated that the dependence 
of risk assessments on the Hurst exponent was close to chance level. Similar indications are 
applicable for RandLowHPerc.  
Inclusion criteria For each condition separately, I performed a regression between 
RiskLowHPerc and RandLowHPerc for          and the results of participants’ self 
assessment in the TIPI questionnaire (taking into account all the personality traits in the Big 
Five decomposition). In the fBm condition, the Cook’s distance (Cook, 1977) of one of the 
participants was more than two standard deviations larger than the group’s mean. I, therefore 
discarded the results of this participant and used the answers of N = 40 participants for the 
analysis of the results of the fBm condition. 
In the fBm&fGn group, the Cook’s distance of one of the participants was more than two 
standard deviations larger from the group’s mean. In addition, the percentages of choices of 
graphs with low H or low standard deviation of four people were more than two standard 
deviations larger than the group’s mean. I, therefore discarded the results of five participants 
from this group, and used the answers of N = 42 participants for the analysis. 
Dependence of participant performance on the experimental condition, task type and on    
Table 3.1 presents the percentage of participants’ answers, in which participants chose the 
graph with the lower Hurst exponent (RiskLowHPerc and RandLowHPerc averaged over all 123 
 
participants in each group). In the fBm condition, the correspondence between participants’ 
answers to the risk comparison task and Hurst exponent was close to chance level in all 
stages. T-tests showed that in the fBm condition, none of the RiskLowHPerc values was 
significantly different from change level (0.5). However, RandLowHPerc were significantly 
different than 0.5 (for        : t (39) = 8.62; p < .01, for         : t (39) = 6.70; p < .01, 
and for          : t (39) = 4.91; p < .01). The latter served as an indication that participants 
were sensitive to changes in the Hurst exponents of the graphs. 
Table 3.1 The percentage of participants’ answers, in which participants chose the asset with 
the low Hurst exponent (RiskLowHPerc and RandLowHPerc) in Experiment 1. 
Condition  Task      Mean  Std 
FBm  Risk 
comparison 
0.1  0.55  0.21 
0.05  0.54  0.19 
0.025  0.51  0.17 
Randomness 
comparison 
0.1  0.76  0.19 
0.05  0.67  0.16 
0.025  0.59  0.12 
Fbm&fGn  Risk 
comparison 
0.1  0.82  0.21 
0.05  0.70  0.20 
0.025  0.61  0.12 
Randomness 
comparison 
0.1  0.87  0.14 
0.05  0.77  0.16 
0.025  0.65  0.14 
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In the fBm&fGn condition, higher levels of RandLowHPerc were obtained (for  
        , the increase was 11%). These values were significantly different than 0.5 (for 
       : t (41) = 17.86; p < .01, for         : t (41) = 10.53; p < .01, and for          : t 
(41)= 7.23; p < .01). However, the differences in risk assessments between fBm and 
fBm&fGn conditions were higher (for  
        , the increase was of nearly 30% from 55% (std: 0.21) to 82% (std: 0.21)).  All 
RiskLowHPerc values in the fBm&fGn condition were significantly different from 0.5 (for 
       : t (41) = 9.96; p < .01, for         : t (41) = 6.66; p < .01, and for          : t 
(41) = 5.91; p < .01).  
Analysis of sensitivity and biases I performed a signal detection analysis on participants’ 
choices
2. The different categories of the analysis were defined as follows: 
1.  A ‘hit’ - a case in which the participant chose the first graph and the Hurst exponent 
of that graph was smaller than that of the second graph. 
2.  A ‘miss’ - a case in which the participant chose the second graph, and the Hurst 
exponent of the first graph was smaller than that of the second graph. 
3.  A ‘False alarm’ - a case in which the participant chose the first graph, and the Hurst 
exponent of that graph was larger than that of the second graph. 
4.  A ‘correct rejection’ - a case in which the participant chose the second graph, and 
the Hurst exponent of the first graph was larger than that of the second graph. 
For each participant, I calculated d’ (sensitivity) and   (bias) (Macmillan and Creelman, 
2005). To avoid a case in which d’ is infinite (perfect accuracy), I converted proportions of 0 
and 1 to 1/(2N) and 1-1/(2N) (as suggested in Macmillan and Creelman, 2005, page 8). 
d' is usually referred to as a sensitivity measure. In the current setting, it can be regarded as 
reflecting a participant’s understanding of the notions of risk and randomness. For instance, 
                                                           
2 An ANOVA on RiskLowHPerc and RandLowHPerc led to similar conclusions to those of the signal 
detection analysis. 125 
 
participant with hit-rate of 1 and false-alarm rate of 0 at the randomness rating task is 
considered perfectly sensitive (see Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). However, such results 
reveal also that participant’s definition of randomness coincides with the way that it has 
been defined here in terms of the Hurst exponent. d' was, therefore, of primary interest here.  
  was also analysed as it is a bias measure for decision criteria. 
Descriptive statistics for d’ and     are presented in Table 3.2. As can be seen in the table, all 
d’ values were significantly different than 0, apart from those of the risk assessment in the 
fBm condition. The analysis failed to find differences between most   values and 1.  A 
three-way ANOVA using the same variables as before on d’  revealed that d’ was larger in 
the fBm&fGn condition than in the fBm condition (F (1, 39) = 41.80; p < .01; partial η
2 = 
.52), when participants assessed randomness (F (1, 39) = 23.11; p < .01; partial η
2 = .37), and 
when    was larger (F (2, 78) = 64.48; p < .01, partial η
2 = .62). These results support 
Hypotheses H2,1 and H2,2: the analysis failed to show any effect of the Hurst exponent on risk 
assessment in the fBm condition. However, there was a significant effect of the Hurst 
exponent on risk assessment when price change graphs were presented alongside the 
corresponding price series. 
The effect of the interaction of Condition and Task type on d’ was significant (F (1, 39) = 
5.83; p = .02, partial η
2 = .13). Tests of simple effects showed that d’ was higher in the 
randomness task than in the risk task in the fBm condition (F (1, 39) = 25.06; p < .01; partial 
η
2 = .39) and in the fBm&fGn condition (F (1, 39) = 6.51; p = .02; partial η
2 = .14). In 
addition, d’ was larger in the fBm condition in the randomness task (F (1, 39) = 33.81; p < 
.01; partial η
2 = .46) and in the risk rating task (F (1, 39) = 21.65; p < .01; partial η
2 = .36). 
A significant interaction between Condition and    was found (F (2, 78) = 8.49; p < .01, 
partial η
2 = .18). Tests of simple effects showed that d’ was larger when    was larger in the 
fBm condition (F (2, 38) = 13.77; p < .01; partial η
2 = .42) and in the fBm&fGn condition (F 
(2, 38) = 47.41; p < .01; partial η
2 = .71). In addition, d’ was larger in the fBm condition 126 
 
when    = 0.1 (F (1, 39) = 44.63; p < .01; partial η
2 = .54), when    = 0.05 (F (1, 39) = 
24.66; p < .01; partial η
2 = .39), and when    = 0.025 (F (1, 39) = 15.17; p < .01; partial η
2 = 
.28).  
Table 3.2 Mean values of  d’ and β in conditions fBm (first panel) and fBm&fGn (second 
panel) in Experiment 1.  
Condition  Task      d'    Β   
Mean  Std  t-test 
comparing 
d’ to 1 
Mean  Std  t-test 
comparing 
Β to 1 
FBm 
(N=40) 
Risk  0.1  0.29  1.24  t (39) = 
1.49;  
p = .15 
1.08  0.42  t (39) = 
1.15;  
p =.26 
0.05  0.22  1.12  t (39) = 
1.25;  
p = .22 
1.07  0.51  t (39) = 
0.81; 
 p = .42 
0.025  0.08  0.97  t (39) = 
0.51; 
p = .62 
1.10  0.41  t (39) = 
1.47;  
p =.15 
Randomness  0.1  1.53  1.15  t (39) = 
8.43; 
p < .01 
0.96  0.32  t (39) =  
-0.79;  
p =.43 
0.05  0.91  0.90  t (39) = 
6.38; 
p < .01 
1.24  0.68  t (39) = 
2.21;  
p = .03 
0.025  0.49  0.68  t (39) = 
4.56; 
p < .01 
1.25  0.81  t (39) = 
1.96; 
p =.06 
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Condition  Task      d'    Β   
Mean  Std  t-test 
comparing 
d’ to 1 
Mean  Std  t-test 
comparing 
Β to 1 
Fbm&fGn 
(N=42) 
Risk  0.1  1.88  1.18  t (41) = 
10.37; 
p < .01 
1.24  0.48  t (41) = 
3.18;  
p = .003 
0.05  1.16  1.16  t (41) = 
6.47; 
p < .01 
1.11  0.49  t (41) = 
1.47;  
p = .15 
0.025  0.63  0.75  t (41) = 
5.47; 
p < .01 
1.19  0.54  t (41) = 
2.30;  
p = .03 
Randomness  0.1  2.18  0.83  t (41) = 
17.12; 
p < .01 
1.18  0.67  t (41) = 
1.73;  
p = .09 
0.05  1.55  0.94  t (41 ) = 
10.63; 
p < .01 
1.25  0.62  t (41) = 
2.56;  
p = .01 
0.025  0.88  0.78  t (41) = 
7.30; 
p < .01 
1.11  0.41  t (41) = 
1.75;  
p = .09 
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There was also a significant interaction between Task and    (F (2, 78) = 3.31; p = .042, 
partial η
2 = .08). Tests of simple effects showed that d’ was larger when    was larger in the 
risk task (F (2, 38) = 20.03; p < .01; partial η
2 = .51) and in the randomness task (F (2, 38) = 
40.44; p < .01; partial η
2 = .68). Percentage of low-H choices was higher in the randomness 
task when    = 0.1 (F (1, 39) = 23.48; p < .01; partial η
2 = .38), when    = 0.05 (F (1, 39) = 
11.60; p = .02; partial η
2 = .23), and when    = 0.025 (F (1, 39) = 6.86; p = .012; partial η
2 = 
.15). 
A three-way ANOVA on   using the same variables as before failed to find any significant 
effect of Condition, Task type, or H difference on   . 
Correlation between individual characteristics and risk/randomness judgment There were 
statistically significant correlations between participants’ performance at different   -levels 
of the risk and randomness comparison task. Correlation results are presented in Table 3.3. 
These correlations suggest that individual differences (e.g., personality traits) might affect 
risk and randomness ratings.  
I calculated the correlations between personality trait ratings, RandLowHPerc, and 
RiskLowHPerc.  For the fBm condition, when     was 0.05, RandLowHPerc increased with 
self-rating of Agreeableness (r = .34; p = .03). Agreeableness was also correlated with 
RiskLowHPerc when     was 0.1 (r = .39; p = .01). Correlations of performance with 
agreeableness may indicate more agreeable participants tended to cooperate more with the 
task requirements (as they perceived them). 
 Risk assessment depended also on emotional stability: investment risks judged by 
participants with lower emotional stability showed greater dependence on the Hurst 
exponent (for RiskLowHPerc in the fBm condition, when     was 0.1, r = -.32; p = .046, 
and when     was 0.05, r = -.31; p = .050). The traits agreeableness and emotional stability 
were not significantly correlated. The results are presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.    129 
 
Table 3.3  Correlations between percentage of H-correlated answers in the fBm condition 
(first panel) and fBm&fGn condition (second panel) of Experiment 1. Statistically 
significant correlations are marked with a star.  
 
fBm 
condition 
      Task       
    Risk      Randomness   
Task      0.1  0.05  0.025  0.1  0.05  0.025 
Risk  0.1  1  r = .58*,  
         
r = .64*,  
          
r = .20,  
        
r = .35*, 
          
r = .07,  
        
0.05    1  r =.56*,  
         
r =.19, 
        
r = .29,  
        
r = .04,  
        
0.025      1  r = .18,  
        
r = .42* 
        , 
r = -.010,  
        
Randomness  0.1        1  r = .46*,  
         
r = .31,  
        
0.05          1  r = .22,  
        
0.025   
 
        1 
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Fbm&fGn 
condition 
      Task       
    Risk      Randomness   
Task      0.1  0.05  0.025  0.1  0.05  0.025 
Risk  0.1  1  r = .56*,  
  < .001 
r = .19,  
  = .23 
r = .18,  
  = .25 
r = .23, 
  = .15  
r = .22,  
  = .17 
0.05    1  r = .60*,  
  < .001 
r = .11,  
  = .47 
r = .13,  
  = .42 
r = .35*,  
  = .02 
0.025      1  r = .08,  
  = .61 
r = .18 
  = .26, 
r = .36*,  
  = .02 
Randomness  0.1        1  r = .69*,  
  < .001 
r = .24,  
  = .12 
0.05          1  r = .31*,  
  = .04 
0.025            1 
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Figure 3.2 Percentage of choices of graphs with low Hurst exponent at the risk comparison 
task in the fBm condition in Experiment 1 against   , presented for participant sections 
with different self-ratings of agreeableness (first  row) and emotional stability (second row). 
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Figure 3.3 Percentage of choices of graphs with low Hurst exponent at the randomness 
comparison task in the fBm condition in Experiment 1 against   , presented for participant 
sections with different self-ratings of agreeableness (first  row) and emotional stability 
(second row). 
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Although risk discrimination in the fBm condition did not depend on the Hurst exponent of 
the graphs, in nearly 60% of the trials participants with low emotional stability designated 
the asset with the lower Hurst exponent as riskier to invest in (Figure 3.2). 
The results for d’ were similar: with a large   , d’ for the risk task was significantly 
correlated with agreeableness (r = .37; p = .02) and emotional stability (r = -.32; p = .04). 
With a medium   , the correlation between d’ for the risk task agreeableness was r = .33; p 
= .04) and with self rating of emotional stability was r = -.33; p = .04. Agreeableness was 
also correlated with d’ for the randomness task with medium    (r = .34; p = .03) and with   
of the randomness task at stage 3 (r = .32; p = .047). No other correlations between d’ or   
and personality traits were found for the fBm condition. Results supported Hypothesis H2,3, 
according to which risk ratings of people who are low on emotional stability are correlated 
with the Hurst exponent of the presented graphs more strongly than those of people who are 
high on emotional stability. 
In the fBm&fGn condition, people who rated their extraversion lower had higher values of 
RiskLowHPerc for all    values (for    = 0.05, r = -.50; p = .001, for    = .05, r = -.48; p 
= .001, and for   =0.025, r = -.33; p = .04). No other correlations were found between 
personality traits ratings, RandLowHPerc, and RiskLowHPerc. 
The correlation between d’ and extraversion was significant for the risk task (for stage 1: r = 
-.50; p < .01, for stage 2: r = -.48; p < .01, for stage 3: r = -.34; p = .03). For the same task, 
the correlation between   and extraversion at stage 1 was r = -.46; p < .01. No other 
correlations were found between personality traits and the d’ or   at the risk or randomness 
tasks. 
One-way ANOVAs on the variables RiskLowHPerc, RandLowHPerc, d’, and β, with respect 
to expertise failed to find differences in risk or randomness assessments of experts and non-
experts of participants in the fBm condition. However, in the fBm&fGn condition, experts 
had higher values of  RandLowHPerc(fGn,3) (F (1, 40) = 8.21; p < .01) and d’ (F (1, 40) = 134 
 
8.70; p = .005). This finding suggests that, although experts were more sensitive to 
differences in the Hurst exponents of the graphs, they did not use this information in their 
risk assessment differently than non-experts did.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that, given no further cues, risk assessment of assets for which prices 
were represented by fractal graphs did not depend on the Hurst exponent of those graphs in 
most of the participants. This supports Hypothesis H2,1. Furthermore, the experiment 
revealed that this lack of  dependence was not a result of inability of discriminating Hurst 
exponent of the given graphs: 76% (std: 0.19) of participants’ randomness ratings were 
correlated with the Hurst exponents of each graph pair at the first stage of the experiment. 
This percentage is far above chance level.  
However, when price change graphs were presented with the corresponding price graphs, 
82% (std: 0.21) of participants’ answers designated assets with the lower Hurst exponent as 
the riskier investments. Beyond emphasising the fragility of notions of human risk 
perception, this result suggests that people indeed have the ability to relate to fractal 
properties when assessing risk. In particular, it supports Hypothesis H2,2. 
Experiment 1 also demonstrated that personality traits influence risk assessment. When price 
change information was not explicit, emotional stability and agreeableness affected risk 
perception. Emotional stability did not affect randomness judgements. This result 
corresponds to that of Jakes and Hemsley (1986), who showed that people high in 
neuroticism tend to attribute meanings to complex patterns they find in presented stimuli. 
Furthermore, Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, and Lorentz, (2008) showed that, in non-financial 
contexts, people low in emotional stability and high in agreeableness tend to search for 
meaning more than others. Therefore, these results suggest that the search for meaning 
guided participants to interpret the Hurst exponent as a risk measure. On the other hand, 
when price change information was explicit, and provided participants with a clear cue for 135 
 
the meaning of the task, risk discrimination was no longer affected by emotional stability. 
Instead, it was affected by extraversion, a personality trait related to risk-propensity 
(Nicholson, Soane, Fenton‐O'Creevy, and Willman, 2005). 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate of the results obtained in Experiment 1 for 
Hypothesis H2,2 and to examine the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H2,4,a: the series Hurst exponent, standard deviation, mean run length, oscillation, 
and absolute value of the difference between the values of the last and first points of the 
series are correlated with risk assessments. 
Hypothesis H2,4,b: the difference between the values of the last and first points of the series 
and the difference between the first series point and its minimum are negatively correlated 
with risk assessments.  
Hypothesis H2,5: the effect of the Hurst exponent on risk assessment is stronger than that of 
the standard deviation. 
To test these hypotheses, I presented participants on each trial with a single price graph and 
its corresponding price change graph. Participants were asked to rate the risk level of 
investment in the described asset rather than to compare risk levels as in Experiment 1. 
Method  
Design Participants were asked to assess the risk level of investment in a single asset at each 
trial. Price graphs were presented with their corresponding price change graphs.  
For each participant, two sets of nine graphs with H = 0.1, 0.2,..., 0.9 were randomly chosen 
from six sets of fBm graphs, resulting in a set of 18 graphs. This manipulation resulted in a 
two (graph instance) by nine (H values) design.  136 
 
Participants Forty-two people (29 men and 13 women, average age: 35.8 years) acted as 
participants. They were recruited through professional groups of financial analysts and 
economists on LinkedIn, and the departmental participant pool. All participants were offered 
participation in a prize draw of four USB sticks, and information about the experiment. 
Students from UCL were offered, in addition, 0.25 academic credit points. 
Participants were asked whether they were financial analysts. Thirteen participants gave a 
positive answer to this question. 
Materials I generated six sets of target graphs each with nine different H values ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1, using the spectral algorithm described by Saupe (Peitgen and 
Saupe, 1988). Each of the series had 6284 points consisting of one period. The target graphs 
consisted of a quarter of a period (1571 points). Hence, the differences between the values of 
the first and last presented points were random. No scaling was performed on the stimulus 
series. For each of these graphs, a corresponding fGn series was calculated as in Experiment 
1. The task window is presented in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The task window of Experiment 2. 137 
 
Procedure  
Each participant was presented with 18 computer-generated graphs and their corresponding 
change series. Participants were told that these graphs represent prices and price daily 
changes. Participants were asked to look at each of the graphs carefully and to assess the risk 
level of investment in the given asset as a number between 0 and 100, where 0 meant: "not 
risky at all" and 100 meant "extremely risky". 
Results  
Primary dependent variables were participants’ risk assessments and the following seven 
variables: Hurst exponent, standard deviation, the series mean run length, the series 
oscillation, the difference between the values of the last and first points of the series, the 
absolute value of the difference between the values of the last and first points of the series, 
and the difference between the first series point and its minimum. I was interested in the 
standard deviation as it is a basic measure for risk according to normative theories 
(Hendricks, 1996). The effect of mean run length on risk assessment was studied by 
Raghubir and Das (2010). Oscillation and the absolute value of the difference between the 
values of the last and first points of the series are measures for the size of the changes in the 
series.  The difference between the values of the last and first points of the series indicates 
the general direction of the trend. The difference between the first series point and the 
minimum of the series may indicate how much money can be lost. Notations of these 
variables are given in Table 3.4.  
Correlations between risk assessments and the seven series variables may indicate the 
importance participants attributed to the latter as risk indicators. 
Inclusion criteria I performed a regression between the mean risk assessment of each 
participant and participants’ responses to the TIPI questionnaire (taking into account all the 
personality traits in the Big Five decomposition). The Cook’s distance (Cook, 1977) of two  
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Table 3.4 Variable notation 
Notation  Description 
H  The Hurst exponent 
STD  The standard deviation  
MeanRun  The mean run length of the series. Run length is the number of consecutive 
elements in the series, in which the series does not change its direction. 
Osc  The series oscillation (the difference between its maximum and minimum 
values) 
Diff  The difference between the values of the last and first points of the series 
AbsDiff  The absolute value of the difference between the values of the last and first 
points of the series 
FirstMinDiff  The difference between the first series point and its minimum 
 
 
of the participants was more than two standard deviations larger than the group’s mean. I, 
therefore, excluded their results from the analysis.  
In addition, for each participant, I calculated the correlation between risk assessment and the 
Hurst exponents of the graphs, and between risk assessment and the standard deviations of 
the graphs. Participants whose mean scores of both correlations were smaller by more than 
two standard deviations than those of the average for the group were excluded from the 
analysis. This resulted in the exclusion of two additional participants from the analysis, 
reducing the size of the sample to 38 participants. 139 
 
The effect of the Hurst exponent on risk assessments I performed a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA on participants’ risk assessments, using Hurst exponent (0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9) 
and Instance (first or second presentation) as within-participant variables. The Hurst 
exponent violated Mauchly’s test of sphericity and hence I report the results of a Huynh-
Feldt test. Risk assessment was higher when the Hurst exponent was smaller (F (5.38, 
199.21) = 32.44; p < .01; partial η
2 = .47). No other effect was significant.  
I was particularly interested in participants’ risk assessments for the range              , as 
the Hurst exponent of most real assets is included in this range. The difference in risk 
estimates between graphs with H = [0.3, 0.4] and graphs with H = [0.6, 0.7] was statistically 
significant (t (159) = 8.70;  p < .01) and so were the differences in risk estimates between 
graphs with H = [0.1, 0.3] and graphs with H = [0.4, 0.6] (t (239) = 0.15;  p < .01 ), and 
between graphs with H = [0.4, 0.6] and graphs with H = [0.7, 0.9] (t (239) = 6.00;  p < .01 ). 
Figure 3.5 presents these results. 
Experiment 2, therefore, provided additional support for Hypothesis H2,2. 
Correlations between graph variables and risk assessment The correlations between 
participants’ risk assessments and the variables are presented in Table 3.4. Correlations 
between risk estimates and these variables are given in Table 3.5 (first row). The 
correlations between risk assessments and H, Std, Osc and FirstMinDiff were the highest 
(their absolute values were in the range [0.46, 0.49];         ).  Participants judged a series 
to be riskier when its Hurst exponent was smaller. 
The similarity of the correlations between risk estimates and H, Std, Osc and FirstMinDiff 
was expected, as these variables were correlated. Table 3.6 presented the correlations 
between the examined variables. 140 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Mean risk assessment plotted against the Hurst exponents of the presented graphs. 
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Table 3.5 Correlations and partial correlations between risk assessment and graph variables, 
and the beta values in multiple regression of risk assessment with the seven variables in 
Experiment 2.   
R
2* denotes the R
2 of regression of all variables but the variable in each column. 
Diff R
2 R
2* denotes the difference between R
2 of regression of all variables together (R
2 = 
.31) and R
2*. 
  H  Std  MeanRun  Osc  Diff  AbsDiff  FirstMinDiff 
Correlation 
with risk  
          
        
         
        
          
        
         
        
          
        
         
        
         
        
Partial 
correlation 
with risk, 
with 
respect to 
control 
variables 
          
        
          
         
         
        
         
        
          
        
         
        
          
        
Std, 
MeanRun, 
Osc, 
Diff, 
AbsDiff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
MeanRun, 
Osc, 
Diff, 
AbsDiff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
Std, 
Osc, 
Diff, 
AbsDiff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
Std, 
MeanRun, 
Diff, 
AbsDiff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
Std, 
MeanRun, 
Osc, 
AbsDiff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
Std, 
MeanRun, 
Osc, 
Diff, 
FirstMinDiff 
H, 
Std, 
MeanRun, 
Osc, 
Diff, 
AbsDiff 
Beta values            
        
         
        
        
        
         
        
         
        
        
        
         
        
R
2*  R
2 = .29  R
2 = .31  R
2 = .30  R
2 = .30  R
2 = .27  R
2 = .30  R
2 = 0.30 
Diff R
2 R
2*  0.017  0.001
  0.006  0.006  0.034  0.007  0.01 142 
 
Table 3.6 Correlations between the variables examined in Experiment 2 for the stimuli 
sample. 
  H  Std  MeanRun  Osc  Diff  AbsDiff  FirstMinDiff 
H    r = -
.78*, p 
< .01 
r = .92*,  
p < .01 
r = -
.86*, p 
< .01 
r = -
.08*, 
p = .04 
r = -.32*, 
p < .01 
r = -.63*, 
p < .01 
Std      r = -.67*, 
p < .01 
r = 
.95*, p 
< .01 
r = -
.10*, 
p = .01 
r = .55*, 
p < .01 
r = .73*, 
p < .01 
MeanRun        r = -
.70*, p 
< .01 
r = -
.08*, 
p = .04 
r = -.29*, 
p < .01 
r = -.49*, 
p < .01 
Osc          r = -.03, 
p = .48 
r = .45*, 
p < .01 
r = .75*, 
p < .01 
Diff            r = -.003, 
p = .95 
r = -.60*, 
p < .01 
AbsDiff              r = .33*, 
p < .01 
 
 
 In order to estimate the relative contributions of each of the variables, I calculated the 
correlations again, this time controlling for all other six variables at each calculation. As 
Table 3.5 (second row) shows, controlling for the variables Std, MeanRun, Osc, Diff, 
AbsDiff, and FirstMinDiff, the correlation between risk assessment and the Hurst exponent 
of the graph was                   . This correlation was second only to the correlation of 
risk assessment with Diff. The partial correlation of risk assessment with Std was 
insignificant.  143 
 
A regression of risk assessment with respect to these seven variables yielded           ( F 
(7, 683) = 45.38;        ). The beta values (   corresponding to each of the variables are 
presented in Table 3.5 (third row). The absolute value of the   of the Hurst exponent was the 
highest: 0.67 (p < .01), whereas the   of MeanRun was smaller (  = 0.27; p = .013) and the 
beta value of the std was insignificant. Regressing risk with respect to the variables Hurst 
exponent alone yielded           ( F (1, 683) = 202.64;        ). 
Furthermore, I calculated the difference between the R
2 values of a regression model 
containing all seven variables, and the R
2 values of a regression model containing all seven 
variables apart from each of the seven variables separately (Cooksey, 1996, page 165-166). 
This difference is termed ‘usefulness coefficient’. It is used as a measure for the contribution 
of each variable over the contributions of the other variables. The results are presented in 
Table 3.5 (the last two rows). This difference measures the contribution of each of the seven 
variables beyond the contribution common to of all predictors and is termed ‘usefulness 
index’. I found that the difference between the last and first points of the series had the 
largest independent contribution to risk assessment. However, as before, I found that the 
effect of the Hurst exponent on risk ratings was larger than that of the standard deviation or 
the mean run length. 
I, therefore, conclude that the effect of the Hurst exponent on risk assessment is stronger 
than that of the standard deviation and the mean run-length. The difference between the last 
and first points of the series affects risk assessment, too. I, therefore, accept Hypotheses H2,4 
and H2,5. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 showed that, when price graphs are presented along with price change graphs, 
the Hurst exponent affects risk judgements. More precisely, the lower the Hurst exponent 
was, the higher the perceived risk was. This provides further support for Hypothesis H2,2. 144 
 
The dependence of risk assessment on the Hurst exponent was stronger than on the standard 
deviation of the graphs, a measure used to estimate the historical volatility in normative 
financial models (Hendricks, 1996). That supports Mandelbrot and Hudson’s (2004) views 
about people’s reaction to fractal characteristics of price series and Hypothesis H2,5.  
The standard deviation of the graphs, their oscillation (the difference between its maximum 
and minimum values), and the differences between the first and last presented points also 
had effects on risk assessment, supporting Hypothesis H2,4. 
The results complement those of Duxbury and Summers (2004). In spite of the differences 
between the experimental settings used here and those of Duxbury and Summers, I showed 
that the difference between the first and last elements of the presented series was negatively 
correlated with risk assessments. This difference could be considered as a measure of the 
amount of money which was likely to be lost when investing in an asset. 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that risk perception is affected by mathematical properties of 
the presented data. But are financial decisions affected by it?  
Experiment 3 was designed to address the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H2,6: the standard deviation of an asset’s graph and its mean run length affect 
buy/sell decisions. 
Hypothesis H2,7: the lower the Hurst exponent of an asset’s price series is, the higher 
people’s tendency to sell it is. The higher the Hurst exponent of the price series is, the higher 
people’s tendency to buy it is.  
To examine these hypotheses, I presented participants with pairs of graphs of fBm series 
representing different assets, along with their corresponding fGn graphs in a similar way to 
that used in the fBm&fGn condition in Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 3, I asked 145 
 
participants to decide which of the assets they would have liked to buy or sell. In addition, I 
asked them to rate their confidence level in their decision. 
Method 
Design Participants were randomly allocated to the buy or sell condition. Fifty graphs were 
chosen randomly for each participant. I denote the Hurst exponent difference between 
graphs in each set by   . As in Experiment 1, graph pairs were chosen according to the 
required   . The first stage included 15 graphs with           the second stage included 15 
graphs with            , and the third stage comprised 20 graphs with           . 
These manipulations resulted in a two (buy or sell condition) by three 
(                     design. 
Participants Eighty four people participated in the experiment (24 women, 60 men, average 
age: 45.4 years). They were randomly allocated to two groups: the Buy group and the Sell 
group. The Buy group included 40 participants (13 women and 27 men, average age: 45.2 
years) and the Sell group included 44 people (11 women and 33 men, average age: 45.6 
years). As in the previous experiments, participants represented wide cultural spectrum. 
Participants were recruited through professional groups of financial analysts and economists 
on LinkedIn and through student websites. They were asked whether they work as financial 
analysts. Eleven of them replied positively within the Buy group, and 12 of them replied 
positively within the Sell group.  
Materials Stimulus materials comprised the same graph sets that were used for the fGn 
condition in Experiment 1. For each participant, presented graphs were chosen randomly 
from the six graph sets. They were presented in a random order. 
The task window of Experiment 3 enabled participants to choose the asset they wanted to 
buy and to rate their confidence level in their decision. The task window of Experiment 3 is 
shown in Figure 3.6.146 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The task window of Experiment 3. Upper panel: the buy condition; Lower panel: 
the sell condition. 
 
Procedure Participants in both buy and sell conditions were told that they would be 
presented with a sequence of 50 sets of graphs, each of which would include two graphs 
describing prices of different assets, A and B, versus time, and two corresponding graphs 
describing the daily price changes of the same assets versus time. Participants in the Buy 
condition were asked to imagine that they had £1000 and would like to buy shares of an 
asset for £500. Then, they were asked to decide which of the assets they would like to buy. 
Participants in the Sell condition were asked to imagine that they had £500 worth shares of 147 
 
asset A and £500 worth shares of asset B, and that they wanted to sell one of these assets. 
They were asked to decide which of these assets they would like to sell. Participants in both 
conditions were asked to provide confidence judgments. To do so, they were required to 
assess how sure they were about each of their decisions on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 meant 
"not sure at all", and 5 meant "absolutely sure".  
Results 
The primary dependent variable was the percentage of each participant’s answers, in which 
the asset with the lower Hurst exponent was bought (BuyLowHPerc) or sold 
(SellLowHPerc). A high value of LowHPerc for participants in the buy condition (closer to 
1) indicates that participant chose to buy assets with low Hurst exponent, whereas medium 
values (close to 0.5) indicates that the dependence of buying choices on the Hurst exponent 
is close to chance level. Similar interpretation is applicable for the sell condition.  
Inclusion criteria For each participant, I calculated BuyLowHPerc or SellLowHPerc. 
Participants whose mean score of percentage of low-H choices was two standard deviations 
smaller or larger than those of the average of their group were excluded from the analysis. 
This resulted in the exclusion of two participants, reducing the size of the sample to 82 
participants (39 participants in the Buy group and 43 participants in the Sell group). 
Percentage of choices of assets with low Hurst exponent A two-way repeated measure 
ANOVA was performed on the percentage of low-H choices, using condition (buy or sell) as 
a between-participant variable, and    (        ,          , or           ) as a within-
participant variable. None of the variables violated Mauchly’s test of sphericity. Percentage 
of low-H choices was higher in the buy condition (F (1, 37) = 5.39; p = .03; partial η
2 = .13) 
but there was no effect of    on the percentage of low-H choices. The results are shown in 
Table 3.7. 
These results show that people prefer buying assets with a higher Hurst exponent and selling 
assets with a lower Hurst exponent. I, therefore, accept Hypothesis H2,7. 148 
 
Table 3.7 The percentage of participants’ answers, in which participants chose the asset with 
the lower Hurst exponent in Experiment 3, and the associated confidence ratings. 
Variable  Condition      Mean  Std 
Percentage of low H choices  Buy  0.1   0.44  0.18 
  0.05  0.46  0.15 
  0.025  0.48  0.12 
  Sell  0.1   0.53  0.16 
  0.05  0.50  0.15 
  0.025  0.51  0.12 
Confidence in low H choices  Buy  0.1   5.76  3.08 
    0.05  5.74  3.03 
    0.025  5.58  2.97 
  Sell  0.1   5.28  3.40 
    0.05  5.45  3.34 
    0.025  5.56  3.27 
 
 
Confidence level in choice of the asset with the lower Hurst exponent Using participants’ 
confidence ratings, I constructed a score representing the confidence level of participants’ 
decisions in a choice of the asset with a lower Hurst exponent. The range of the score was 1-
10, where:  149 
 
  1 represented a confident choice of the asset with the lower Hurst exponent, 
corresponding to cases in which participants rated their confidence level as 5 
(“extremely sure”),  
  5 represented an unconfident choice of the asset with the lower Hurst 
exponent, corresponding to cases in which participants rated their confidence level 
as 1 (“extremely unsure”),  
  6 represented an unconfident choice of the asset with the higher Hurst 
exponent, corresponding to cases in which participants rated their confidence level 
as 1 (“extremely unsure”),  
  10 represented a confident choice of the asset with the higher Hurst 
exponent, corresponding to cases in which participants rated their confidence level 
as 5 (“extremely sure”).  
I performed a two-way repeated measure ANOVA for this confidence score, using 
Condition (buy or sell) as a between-participant variable, and    (        ,          , or 
          ) as a within-participant variable. None of the variables violated Mauchly’s test 
of sphericity. Confidence in low-H choices was higher in the buy condition (F (1, 584) = 
8.41; p = .004; partial η
2 = .014).    did not affect the percentage of low-H choices. The 
results are presented in Table 3.7. 
The effect of Std and MeanRun on choices For each participant, I calculated the percentages 
of answers in which participants chose the graph with the smaller value of the variable Std 
and MeanRun. For each of these variables, I performed a two-way repeated measure 
ANOVA using the same variables as before. The analysis failed to show a significant effect 
of Condition or    on the percentages of answers in which participants chose the smaller 
value of Std or MeanRun.  150 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 showed that people prefer buying assets with a high Hurst exponent and 
selling assets with a low Hurst exponent. This result remained statistically significant when 
confidence ratings were taken into account. In contrast, the standard deviation and mean run 
length of the series did not affect trading behaviour. 
Conclusions 
Holton (2004) asserted that “it is impossible to operationally define risk. At best, we can 
operationally define our perception of risk... Perceived risk takes many forms”. This study 
aimed to elucidate the way people perceive risk of assets when their prices are presented 
graphically.  
The experiments supported Mandelbrot and Hudson’s (2004) argument that people are 
sensitive to the fractal characteristics of price graphs. Risk assessments were found to be 
correlated with the Hurst exponent of the presented graphs. This correlation was similar to 
that between risk assessments and the standard deviation of the graphs. However, controlling 
for all other variables, the correlation between risk assessments and the Hurst exponent of 
the graphs was much stronger than that between risk assessments and the standard deviation 
or the mean run length of the graphs. Furthermore, financial buy/sell decisions were 
correlated with the Hurst exponent: participants preferred buying assets with high Hurst 
exponents and selling assets with low Hurst exponents. There is a large body of evidence 
showing that the majority of people exhibits risk aversion through their choices (Simonsohn, 
2009; Mattos, Garcia, and Pennings Joost, 2007). If participants attributed higher risk to 
graphs with lower Hurst exponents, then they should prefer to buy assets with higher Hurst 
exponents. Indeed, participants’ trading choices fitted this model. The analysis failed to find 
significant correlations between financial decisions and the standard deviation of the graphs 
or between those decisions and mean run length of the graphs. 151 
 
The results depended on the task’s characteristics: when price graphs alone were presented, 
most participants did not attribute higher risk to lower Hurst exponents. That was in spite of 
their sensitivity to the Hurst exponent, as exhibited by the correlation between Hurst 
exponents of presented graphs and randomness ratings, obtained with the graphs having the 
same characteristics as they did in the risk assessment task. Sensitivity to the Hurst exponent 
was observed also by Westheimer (1991) and Gilden, Schmuckler and Clayton (1993). On 
the other hand, when price graphs were presented along with their corresponding price 
change graphs, participants’ risk assessments were significantly correlated with the Hurst 
exponent of the graphs. As participants exhibited high levels of sensitivity to the Hurst 
exponent in the condition in which no price change graphs were exhibited, I argue that 
dependence of risk perception on the Hurst exponent cannot be fully explained by a 
perceptual improvement due to the presence of fGn graphs, or by participants’ attempts to 
guess what the experimental manipulation was. I suggest that, rather than providing only 
perceptual information, price change graphs are used also as verification cues: presentation 
of price change graphs validated the meaning of the Hurst exponent, of which participants 
were aware with or without the price change graphs, as a risk measure.  
When price change graphs were not presented, the extent to which participants’ risk 
assessments depended on the Hurst exponent was negatively correlated with participants’ 
emotional stability and positively correlated with their agreeableness. Studies concerned 
with search for meaning in non-financial contexts have revealed that people low in 
emotional stability and high in agreeableness and openness to experience tend to search for 
meaning more than people who have high emotional stability and low agreeableness and 
openness (Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, and Lorentz, 2008). If a search for meaning guided 
participants in the above experiments, I would expect that those with these personality traits 
would try to use observed patterns to explain risk more than others. Indeed, when price 
changes were not explicitly presented, participants whose emotional stability was lower and 152 
 
agreeableness was higher did tend to judge investment risk more in accordance with the 
Hurst exponents of the price graphs.  
Our results do not follow from Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber’s (2005) ‘risk-as-feelings’ 
hypothesis. According to their approach, different communication methods elicit different 
emotions and these, in turn, trigger different assessment of different degrees of risk. For 
instance, they argued that providing participants with company names in addition to other 
data types affects risk assessment through the valence of participants’ emotions towards the 
company. However, here the data indicate that presentation of information can affect risk 
assessment beyond the additional information it provides: it can cater for people’s need of 
validation of the hypothesis they construct about risk. 
To conclude, the results are in line with Mandelbrot’s and Hudson’s view (2004) that people 
use their sensitivity to fractal characteristics of price graphs to assess financial risk. 
However, they appear to need validation of their interpretation of these characteristics. This 
validation can be provided by explicit presentation of price change information. In other 
words, people’s need for meaning has a role in guiding their risk assessments. In particular, 
different communication patterns can emphasise information relevant to people’s 
conjectures about the nature of financial risk, and thus serve as validation cues. 
Limitations 
Online experiments do not allow verification of the identities of participants. Thus, for 
example, I could not ensure that participants who declared that they were financial analysts 
were indeed financial analysts. Though recent studies suggested that due to the Internet, a 
large percentage of traders are lay people (Barber and Odean, 2008; Muradoglu and Harvey, 
2012), it would be important to replicate the results using a larger number of experts. 
Prices in the experiments were not updated in real time; participants were presented with 
static price graphs. Real-life situations, involving a constant stream of prices and news items 153 
 
pose higher cognitive demands on investors and hence might alter their risk perception.  It 
would be useful to study risk perception in dynamical settings. This is what I do in Chapter 
5. Next, I turn to discuss financial forecasts. 154 
 
 
Chapter 4: Judgmental forecasting from fractal time 
series: The effect of task instructions, individual 
differences, and expertise on noise imitation 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the way people make forecasts from fractal time series, and, in 
particular, the effects of task instructions, personality, sense of power, and expertise on noise 
imitation. In particular, I am interested in factors that could reduce noise imitation.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to examine the following hypotheses: 
H3,1: People forecast from fractal series in a way that suggests that they perceive series with 
H < 0.5 as noisier than series with H > 0.5 and that they attempt to imitate this noise in their 
sequence of forecasts in all examined ranges of Hurst exponents.  
H3,2: The amount of added noise, as measured by the local steepness of the forecasts and by 
the number of forecast extremal points, is correlated with the number of points that 
participants choose to forecast. 
H3,3:  Imitation of noise increases with conscientiousness but decrease with extraversion. 
I presented participants with a sequence of nine simulated fractal price graphs and three real 
asset price graphs. They made forecasts from these time series. There were two experimental 
conditions (‘no limit’ and ‘up to 4 points’). In both conditions, the number of forecast points 155 
 
participants were asked to provide was not fixed. However, in the ‘no limit’ condition, 
participants could add as little or as many points as they wanted, whereas in the ‘up to 4 
points’ condition, the number of required points was limited to four. At the end of the 
experiment, participants completed a personality and view questionnaire. The Hurst 
exponent of the graphs was the manipulated variable.  
Method 
Participants In the ‘no limit’ condition there were 37 participants (25 women, 12 men). 
Their average age was 24.7 years. In the ‘up to 4 point’ condition there were 33 participants 
(18 Women, 15 men). Their average age was 24.18 years. All participants were recruited 
through the departmental subject pool. They were paid the standard participation fee (£3). 
Stimulus materials A set of 54 simulated fractal price series, comprising six sets of nine 
graphs with Hurst exponents ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 in 0.1 increments, were generated using 
the spectral method described by Saupe (Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). The data series in all 
presented graphs comprised a single period produced by the generating algorithm. A further 
18 real financial time-series were selected from data available at http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
as described in Chapter 1. These series were also divided into three sets, each comprising six 
series having a low (H < .49), a medium (0.5 < H < 0.56), and a high (0.57 < H < 0.7) Hurst 
exponent. All simulated graphs were normalised to the same interval ([1, 9]).  
Participants completed the TIPI Big Five personality questionnaire (Gosling et al, 2003). To 
assess their views about the morality of the world and the people in it, they also rated on a 
seven-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) their beliefs that the world 
is fair/just, that it is corrupt/cruel, that people are trustworthy/decent, and that they are 
immoral/sinful. Finally, to assess their views about the predictability of the world and the 
people in it, they rated on a seven-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) 
their beliefs that the world is random/arbitrary, that it is organised/deterministic, that people 156 
 
are unreasonable/irrational, and that they are thoughtful/predictable. For all these 
questionnaires, reverse scoring was applied to questions where it was appropriate.  
Design. For each participant, nine artificial graphs from each of six sets of nine artificial 
graphs, and three real-life price graphs from each of the three sets of six real series were 
chosen randomly. The simulated series (presented in random order) were followed by the 
real series (presented in random order). Series were presented graphically. Participants 
added points to the right-hand side of each graph to make their forecasts.  As they did so, 
their forecast points were connected by lines. An additional line connected their first forecast 
point with the last data point. Participants could edit their predictions by changing the 
location of points or deleting them. The interval between which predictions were made was 
bounded by red and green vertical lines. Figure 4.1 shows a typical task window from the 
experiment.  
Procedure The experiment comprised four stages. First, to familiarise participants with the 
forecasting task, they practised making forecasts from three series. Second, they made 
forecasts from the nine simulated series. Third, they made forecasts from the three real 
series. Fourth, they completed the TIPI and world views questionnaires. 
Participants were told that they would be presented with graphs of prices of different 
commodities and then be asked to look at them carefully to predict the prices for the 
required period, and to answer questions about their predictions. They were also told that 
there would be a short list of self-ratings for them to complete at the end of the experiment. 
In the ‘no limit condition’, detailed instructions for forecasting the simulated series then 
continued as follows: “The data in the graph refers to the first 63 days of the given period. 
You are asked to give your predictions for the period from day 63 to day 82.  157 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Prediction program main window. The data are presented on the left of the line at 
t = 63[days], and a participant’s prediction points are on its right. 158 
 
In order to complete your predictions, please add points to the graph in the area between the 
red and green vertical lines. Adding prediction points is done by pressing the left button of 
the mouse at the area between the red and green lines. The last point must be on (or very 
close to) the green line. You can add as many points as you consider appropriate.”  
Instructions for the ‘up to 4 points’ condition were similar. However, participants were 
instructed as follows: “Please forecast from the data series by placing points on the graph in 
the most likely positions in which they would appear. Please add up to 4 points for each 
graph.”  These instructions were printed in font larger than the first lines. 
In both conditions, if participants asked for clarification about how many forecasts to make, 
they were told to add as many or as few as they wished. Instructions for the real series were 
similar except that data series extended over days 1-200 and the interval over which 
forecasts could be made covered days 200-250. 
Results 
In the ‘no limit’ condition, most participants produced small scale-fluctuations in their 
sequences of forecasts, indicating that they were attempting to imitate the ‘noise’ in the data 
series. Examples are shown in Figure 4.2.  There were, however, a few participants who 
appeared not to imitate the ‘noise’. Examples of this type of behaviour are shown in Figure 
4.3.  A qualitative analysis revealed that predictions of 32 participants exhibited noise 
imitation whereas predictions of five participants did not. In the ‘up to 4 point’ condition, 
forecasts similar to those presented in Figure 4.3 were obtained. 
Measuring imitation of ‘noise’ in fractal series If people imitate noise when they make 
forecasts from fractal graphs, then they should produce series with similar Hurst exponents 
to those used to generate the series. However, forecast sequences that people produced were 
too short to allow H to be reliably estimated. Hence, I used proxy measurements to assess 
‘noise’ in forecast sequences. 159 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 A participant’s predictions (dots connected by a line) and data (line) for graphs 
with H =0 .1, 0.5, 0.9. This participant appears to have imitated noise. 
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Figure 4.3 A participant’s predictions (dotted line) and data (line) for graphs with H = 0.1, 
0.5, 0.9. 
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For the primary measurement, I extracted the average absolute value of the local gradient 
between successive forecasts for each series seen by each forecaster. Higher values of this 
measure are associated with forecast sequences that look noisier and are more jagged. The 
same measure was used to assess ‘noise’ level of the given data. 
In both conditions, the number of forecasts that people had to make was left unspecified I 
reasoned that those who wished to imitate the ‘signal’ without the ‘noise’ would need fewer 
forecasts to describe the future trajectory of the series than those who wished to imitate both 
‘signal’ and ‘noise’. Hence, number of forecasts provided a secondary measure of the ‘noise’ 
added to forecasts.  
I also measured the number of maxima and minima (i.e. reversals in direction) in the 
forecast sequence. As Figure 1 shows, there tend to be more reversals as the Hurst 
coefficient decreases (because of increasing negative autocorrelation) and this, according to 
Gilden et al (1993), is interpreted as higher ‘noise’. Hence, number of maxima and minima 
provided another secondary measure of level of noise added to forecasts. 
To measure ‘noise’ imitation, these three measures were correlated with the average absolute 
value of the local gradient of presented data series and with the Hurst exponent. 
Inclusion criteria In the ‘no limit’ condition, the primary measure of noise imitation (the 
correlation between mean absolute value of the gradient in the forecast sequence and the 
Hurst exponent of the data series) yielded two participants whose imitation level differed 
from the average by more than two standard deviations. They were excluded from the 
analysis. Three additional participants were excluded because regression of the above 
correlation on to the five personality variables produced Cook’s distances (Cook, 1977) 
which were more than two standard deviations larger than those of the average for the rest of 
the group. The remaining 32 participants were entered into the analyses reported below. 
In the ‘up to 4 points’ condition, the primary measure of noise imitation yielded one 
participant whose imitation level differed from the average by more than two standard 162 
 
deviations. This participant was excluded from the analysis. The remaining 32 participants 
(288 computer generated graphs and 96 real asset series) were entered into the analyses 
reported below. 
First I discuss the number and quality of forecasts before turning to tests of our three 
hypotheses. 
Number and quality of forecasts In the ‘no limit’ condition, on average, participants added a 
large number of points to each graph in the simulated series (M: 40.79, std: 23.4, min: 4, 
max: 147) and in the real series (M: 33.09, SD: 22.51, min: 5, max: 87). Of these points, 
about half were maxima or minima, both in the simulated series (M: 21.42, SD: 17.02, min: 
1, max: 101) and in the real series (M: 17.57, SD: 14.66, min: 0, max: 60). This proportion 
was sufficiently large to produce locally steep prediction gradients: for simulated series, the 
average of the absolute value of these gradients was 2.43 (SD: 2.19, min: 0.06, max: 12.73) 
and, for real series, it was 2.04 (SD: 2.10, min: 0, max: 9.79).  
In the ‘up to 4 points’ condition, for computer generated graphs, participants added on 
average 3.84 points to each graph in the simulated series (std: 0.53, min: 2, max: 5). As 
Figure 4.4 shows, for most of the graphs (239/288), participants chose to add four forecast 
points. In spite of the instructions, participants added five points to nine graphs. For real 
asset price graphs, participants added, on average, 3.62 points to each graph (std: 0.53, min: 
2, max: 5). As with the computer generated graphs, participants chose to add 4 forecast 
points to most graphs. In spite of the instructions, participants added five points to two 
graphs.  
Of the added points, about a third were maxima or minima (M: 1.28, SD: .77, min: 0, max: 
3) in the case of computer generated graphs, and more than a quarter in the case of real asset 
series (M: 1.01, SD: 0.84, min: 0, max: 2). 163 
 
The average of the absolute value of predictions’ gradients was 0.35 for both graph types 
(for computer generated graphs: SD: 0.28, min: 0.02, max: 2.78. For real asset series: 
SD=0.24, min: 0, max: 1.15).  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Histograms showing the distribution of added points in Experiment 4 for 
computer generated graphs (upper panel) and real asset price series (lower panel). 
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These results suggest that participants had a strong tendency to give detailed forecasts.  
Imitating ‘noise’ when forecasting from fractal series In the ‘no limit’ condition, participants 
clearly attempted to imitate the ‘noise’ in the data series. Table 4.1 reveals that the primary 
measure of this, the correlation between the local gradient in the data series and the local 
gradient in the forecast sequence, was significant for both simulated and real series. Local 
gradient of the forecast sequence also correlated strongly with the Hurst exponent of the data 
series in both types of series. For simulated series, the secondary measures (mean number of 
added points, mean number of maxima and minima) also correlated with local gradients in 
the data series and with Hurst exponents, thereby providing further evidence of ‘noise’ 
imitation.   
The correlation between Hurst exponent of the data series and local steepness of the data 
series was r = -.93 (       ) for simulated series and r = -.82 (       ) for real series and 
therefore only small differences were observed between correlations of prediction variables 
with Hurst exponent and local steepness of data graphs.  
The results showed a significant correlation between the number of added points and the 
local steepness of the forecasts (r = .56; p < .01) and between the number of added points 
and the number of extremal points (r = .85; p < .01). This correlation supports Hypothesis 
H3,2. 
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Table 4.1 Correlation between geometrical characteristics of data and prediction graphs in 
the ‘no limit’ condition (first panel) and in the ‘up to 4 points’ condition (the second panel) 
in Experiment 1. 
 
‘No limit’ condition  Prediction’s parameters 
Data set  Data 
parameters 
Mean number of added 
points 
Mean number of 
extreme points 
Local steepness 
Simulated 
graph set 
 
Hurst exponent  r = -.31 (       )  r = -.39 (       )  r = -.58 (       ) 
Local steepness   r = .30 (       )  r = .36 (       )  r = .61 (       ) 
Real asset 
price graph 
set  
Hurst exponent  Insignificant  Insignificant  r = -.49 (       ) 
Local steepness   Insignificant  Insignificant  r = .63 (       ) 
‘Up to 4 points’ condition  Prediction’s parameters 
Data set  Data 
parameters 
Mean number of added 
points 
Mean number of 
extreme points 
Local steepness 
Computer 
generated 
graph set 
Hurst exponent  Insignificant  r = -.18 (       )  Insignificant 
Local steepness   Insignificant  r = .21 (       )  Tendency to significance 
(r = .11,        ) 
Real asset 
price graph 
set 
Hurst exponent  r = -.25 (       )  Insignificant  Insignificant 
Local steepness   Insignificant  Insignificant  r = 0.28 (       ) 166 
 
A t-test comparing the results of both conditions showed that in the ‘up to 4 points’ 
condition the number of added points was smaller (t (278) = 26.13; p < .01), and as a result, 
the average steepness of forecasts was smaller ( t (278) = 15.72; p < .01), and the number of 
extremal points was smaller (t (278)  = 19.63; p < .01). 
As all three noise measures in the ‘up to 4 points’ condition were much smaller, on average, 
than those obtained in the ‘no limit’ condition, I obtain further support for the Hypothesis 
H3,2. I, therefore accepted Hypothesis H3,2. 
Effects of personality on forecasting In the ‘no limit’ condition, for simulated series, 
extraversion was correlated with the mean number of added points (r = -.40; p < .01) and 
with the mean number of the mean number of maxima and minima in the forecast sequence 
(r = -.36; p < .01).  
Taking the correlation between the mean absolute value of the local gradients in the data 
series and the mean absolute value of the local gradients in the forecast sequence as a 
measure of strength of ‘noise’ imitation, the data indicate that, for Hurst exponents between 
0.4 and 0.6 (the range relevant to asset prices), conscientiousness was correlated with 
strength of noise imitation in simulated series (r = -.41;  p = .02): more conscientious people 
showed more evidence of imitating noise. 
For real series, the same measure revealed that extraversion correlated with strength of noise 
imitation (r = .38; p = .04):  more extraverted participants showed less evidence of imitating 
noise. That might have been due to the smaller number of forecasts produced by people with 
higher extraversion. 
In the ‘up to 4 point’ condition, there was no significant correlation between extraversion or 
conscientiousness and the mean number of added points or with the mean number of 
maxima and minima in the forecast sequence.  Thus there was no evidence that personality 
influenced noise imitation level.  167 
 
I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H3,3. 
Discussion 
There was clear evidence that two of the effects that have been reported for non-fractal 
series also occur with fractal series. First, in line with Gilden et al (1993), participants 
appear to treat differences between successive points as ‘noise’ and attempt to imitate this 
noise when forecasting, supporting H3,1,a. Second, in line with Harvey (1995), forecast noise 
level was negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of the time series. I, therefore, 
accepted Hypothesis H3,1,b. 
In particular, most participants added a few tens of points to each graph (though participants’ 
fees were independent of their performance), and this resulted in high noise levels. In fact, 
even when number of points was limited to four, most participants added four or five points 
to the graphs. This implies that participants felt a need to provide detailed forecasts.  
On the other hand, noise level, as measured by the local steepness of the forecasts and by the 
number of extremal points, was positively correlated with the number of added points, 
supporting Hypothesis H3,2. Eroglu and Croxton (2010) found that biases arising from 
anchoring were higher in more conscientious people but lower in those who are more 
extraverted. I argued that, if biases arising from other heuristics show the same pattern, then 
conscientious people should show greater imitation of ‘noise’ in fractal series and 
extraverted people should show less. I did indeed find that more conscientious people 
imitated noise more – though this result was restricted to real series and simulated series 
having similar characteristics as the real series (i.e. 0.4 < H < 0.6).  Also, extraversion 
decreased the level of noise in forecast sequences though the degree of reduction was 
significantly related to the ‘noise’ in the data series. I accepted Hypothesis H3,3. 168 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to test Hypothesis H3,4: Sense of power affects the degree to 
which forecasters imitate the noise that they perceive in data series. 
Though Hypothesis H3,4 is non-directional, Experiment 1 indicated that more conscientious 
people imitate noise more. This implies that forecasters do perceive noise imitation as the 
appropriate way of making forecasts and that powerful people should imitate forecasts more 
than those who are less powerful. 
Experiment 2 consisted of two main stages: a priming stage, which included a word memory 
test, and a combined memory test and forecasting task. I manipulated the words participants 
were asked to memorise so that in one condition the word list included expressions related to 
situations of high sense of power and, in the other, it included expressions related to 
situations of low sense of power. The purpose of this stage was to prime participants to hold 
one of these dispositions. The combined memory test and forecasting task consisted of nine 
trials. On each trial, participants were first asked to recall a word from a pair that had been 
previously memorised as part of a set of paired associates. Then, they made predictions from 
fractal graphs with different Hurst exponents in the same way as in Experiment 1.  . 
Instructions given to participants were similar to those of the ‘no limit’ condition in 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants Sixty-one participants were recruited and paid in the same way as before. Their 
average age was 24.4 years and they comprised 40 women and 21 men. Twenty-nine 
participants were randomly allocated to the high power condition and the remaining 32 were 
allocated to the low power condition. 
Design and stimulus materials The priming manipulation comprised a memory test. In the 
encoding stage, participants were asked to memorise a set of nine word pairs. Each word 169 
 
pair consisted of one neutral word and one word intended to prime either a sense of power or 
a lack of it. The neutral words were chosen randomly from six sets obtained from an online 
random word generator 
(http://watchout4snakes.com/creativitytools/randomword/randomwordplus.aspx). Words in 
the high-power condition were powerful, strong, influential, authority, commanding, 
dominant, ruling, leading, and control. Those in the low power condition were powerless, 
weak, unimportant, insecure, obeying, subject, helpless, incapable, and small. The order in 
which the powerful/powerless condition words were presented was random, and so was their 
pairing with a neutral word. Participants were asked to spend about two minutes memorising 
the nine word pairs so that they could recall them later in the experiment. They then pressed 
a button to advance to the recall stage. 
The recall stage of the memory task was combined with the forecasting task (Figure 4.5). 
One word of each pair was presented. It was chosen at random as either a neutral word or 
one from the powerful or powerless sets. Participants were asked to retrieve the word it had 
been paired with during encoding from a list box containing nine options. When they were 
wrong, they were required to correct themselves. As they could not proceed before correctly 
recalling the word pair, those who made more mistakes were exposed to the experimental 
manipulation for a longer time.  
After participants had retrieved the correct word, a graphical representation of a fractal price 
series was presented to them in the same way as in Experiment 1. They made their forecasts 
in the same way as before.  After they had done so, they continued to the recall stage for the 
next word pair, and so on. A total of nine words and nine graphs were presented. As before, 
graphs were chosen at random from six sets of nine graphs with H = 0.1, 0.2,..., 0.9, 
produced using Saupe’s spectral algorithm (Peitgen and Saupe, 1988).  
As before, I used the TIPI personality questionnaire to measure the Big Five personality 
traits (Gosling et al, 2003). However, in order to check the effectiveness of the sense of  170 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Prediction and memory test window. The figure shows one word from the neutral 
word list (“Sphere”) and two of the 9 words in the list box (“Insecure”, “Unimportant”) used 
for the low power condition. 171 
 
power manipulation, I added two items referring to it: forceful, strong and powerless, weak. 
They were added to the TIPI as items number six and twelve. 
Procedure Initially, participants were given three graphs from which to make forecasts in 
order to give them some experience to familiarise them with the task. (No memory test was 
combined with the forecasting task at this stage.) Then, once they had spent two minutes 
memorising the nine word pairs, they performed the combined memory recall and 
forecasting task. After that, they were given another test of their recall of the nine word 
pairs. Finally, they completed the personality questionnaire (including the two sense-of-
power items).  Instructions for forecasting were the same as those given in Experiment 1. 
Results 
 
Informal inspection suggested that most participants tended to imitate the data. Typical 
predictions were similar to those shown in Figure 4.2. 
I excluded outlying participants using the same criteria as before.  This resulted in six 
participants being dropped from the analysis, leaving 26 in the high power condition and 29 
in the low power one (a total of 495 graphs). 
I discuss the number and quality of forecasts before turning to tests of our hypotheses. 
Number and quality of forecasts As before, participants tended to make a large number of 
forecasts from each graph (M: 48.25, SD: 27.33, min: 3, max: 148). On average, more than 
half of these points were maxima or minima (M: 27.35, SD: 19.04, min: 0, max: 100). 
Again, this resulted in steep gradients between predictions (M: 4.23, SD: 3.50, min: 0.55, 
max: 12.09).  
Imitating ‘noise’ when forecasting from fractal series  As can be seen from Table 4.2, all 
three of the measures of noise in the forecast sequence correlated significantly with both the 
Hurst exponent and the mean local gradient in the data series. These findings provide 
evidence that participants imitated the ‘noise’ in the series. 172 
 
Table 4.2 Correlation between geometrical characteristics of data and prediction graphs in 
Experiment 2. 
  Prediction’s parameters 
Data set  Data 
parameters 
Mean number of 
added points 
Mean number of 
extremal points 
Local steepness 
Simulated 
graph set 
 
Hurst 
exponent 
r = -.40 (       )  r = -0.48 (       )  r = -.59 (       ) 
Local 
steepness  
r = .33 (       )  r = 0.41 (       )  r = 0.60 (       ) 
 
Effects of personality on forecasting The correlation Hurst exponent of the data series and 
the mean absolute value of the local gradients in the forecast sequence had an average value 
of -0.75 (SD: 0.22), indicating that most participants produced noise in their sequence of 
forecasts similar to the ‘noise’ in the data series.  Using size of this correlation as a measure 
of strength of ‘noise’ imitation, I found that strength of noise imitation increased with 
conscientiousness (r = -.38,        ). This replicates the result that was obtained in 
Experiment 1 for values of the Hurst exponent between 0.4 and 0.6.  (In the present 
experiment, the finding still held when values of the Hurst exponent were restricted to that 
range: r = -.30, p = .03). 
Effects of sense of power on forecasting First, I performed a manipulation check to 
determine whether the priming manipulation had achieved its aims; I compared people’s 
self-assessments on the two items referring to sense of power that  had been added to the 
TIPI questionnaire (i.e. forceful versus powerless, strong versus weak). This showed that the 
mean power rating of participants in the high power condition was 5.37 and that that of those 173 
 
in the low power condition was 4.70 (F (1, 54) = 4.67; p = .04). This indicated that the 
priming manipulation was effective. 
For Hurst exponents between 0.4 and 0.6, strength of noise imitation in the high power 
condition (M: -0.67, SD: 0.53) and in the low power condition (M: -0.52, SD: 0.54) were 
significantly different     (                         ). Participants in the high power 
condition imitated ‘noise’ in the data series more than those in the low power condition. I, 
therefore, accepted Hypothesis H3,4. 
Discussion 
Results from this experiment replicated the main findings obtained in the previous one. First, 
various measures indicated that participants tended to imitate the ‘noise’ that they perceived 
in the data series. Second, the tendency to imitate noise was greater in conscientious people.  
In addition, this experiment showed that participants with a high sense of power imitated the 
‘noise’ they perceived in the data series more than those in a low sense of power. This is to 
be expected on the basis of Galinsky et al’s (2008) analysis if forecasters consider ‘noise’ 
imitation as the correct way of making predictions. Together with the finding that more 
conscientious people imitate ‘noise’ more, these findings concerning the effects of sense of 
power imply that people do indeed consider noise imitation to be appropriate. I accepted 
Hypothesis H3,4. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to test Hypothesis H3,5: Noise imitation occurs in both forecasts 
of professionals in finance and in those of lay people. 
A secondary aim of the experiment was to assess the quality of these forecasts. Therefore, I 
compared forecast errors of expert and non-professional groups. I was interested in the 
question whether financial predictions and probability estimates made by experts (“expert 
group”) are different from those of participants who had no academic background in finance 174 
 
or economics (“non-professional group”). Non-professional participants were recruited 
through the departmental participant pool. Participants from the expert group were recruited 
at a conference on financial modelling. The experiment was coordinated with the organisers 
of the conference.  
Due to constraints resulting from the settings of the expert condition of the experiment, 
Experiment 3 was a pen-and-paper experiment. Participants were given graphs of prices of 
real assets, and were asked to make price predictions (see Figure 4.6). In addition, they were 
asked to assess probabilities of their predictions being correct and to fill in the Ten Item 
Personality Inventory (TIPI questionnaire, Gosling et al, 2003).   
This study involved only a small number of participants in each group (N=13). Therefore, its 
results should be treated merely as an indicator of the tendencies among finance 
professionals and non-professional people.  
Method 
Participants There were 13 participants in the expert group (one woman, 12 men). Their 
average age was 45.5 years. Twelve out of the 13 participants had a PhD in economics, 
finance, or related topics. The thirteenth participant was a final year Finance PhD student. 
Only 11 of the participants completed the TIPI questionnaire. 
There were 13 participants in the non-professional group (9 women, 4 men). Their average 
age was 22.8 years. They were recruited via the local departmental participant pool website. 
They were paid the standard participation fee (£2). 
Stimulus materials I employed the same real financial series as in Experiment 1. Participants 
completed the TIPI Big Five personality questionnaire (Gosling et al, 2003). 
Design Each participant was presented with three graphs, one from each H range. (These 
ranges were the same as those used in Experiment 1.) The graphs were randomly chosen and 
ordered. Each graph contained 2000 points, and was presented on the axes                175 
 
       . The y axis range was chosen to allow participants to make predictions with high 
gradients, as the data were bounded between 50 and 100 (£k). The 2000 data points were 
presented on the range              
Examples for graphs of different H ranges are presented in Figure 4.6. The names of the 
assets were coded. The graphs were presented with fine grids to facilitate accurate extraction 
of points. 
Procedure Participants were given a two minute presentation about the experiment 
instructions, after which they were handed forms containing the experimental materials. 
These forms consisted of three graphs of prices, a probability assessment table, and the TIPI 
questionnaire.  
Participants were informed that they would be presented with three graphs of prices for a 
period of 200 days. They were asked: 
1.  to look at the graphs carefully, and then predict the prices of the commodities at 
days 201-250 by continuing the price curve on each of the graphs, 
2.  to assess the probability that the actual outcome would fall within a range of ±10 
points (£1000) of their forecast for days 215, 230 and 245. These probability 
estimates should be expressed as a number between 0 and 1, where 0 means 
complete uncertainty, and 1 means certainty of 100%, 
3.  to indicate whether the commodity described reminds them of any familiar 
commodity. If yes, participants were asked to specify the name of this commodity 
and the approximate period depicted, 
4.  to complete the TIPI question list. 
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Figure 4.6 Data, predictions and probability estimates made by a participant from the expert 
group in Experiment 3, for graphs with low (first panel), medium (second panel), and high 
(third panel) Hurst exponents. 177 
 
Results 
Most participants in the expert group (10/13) and all participants in the non-professional 
group produced graphs with small fluctuations, suggesting an attempt to imitate the noise of 
the data. However, three participants from the expert group continued the price graphs by 
sketching a constant or a trend line. In the following sections, I denote the subgroup of the 
expert group, consisting of the three participants who sketched a constant or a trend line “the 
E3 group”, and the remaining participants of the expert “the E10 group”. Examples for 
typical predictions of a participant from the E10 group are given in Figure 4.6. 
Quality of forecasts I sampled a point every 0.5 day from each of the 78 resultant graphs 
(2*3*13). This sampling procedure produced 100 points when participants made their 
predictions for the whole required period. However, not all graphs contained forecasts up to 
day 250 (see Figures 4.6). The minimum number of points sampled from a single graph was 
89 points for the expert group, and 94 for the non-professional group. 
On average, participants from the expert group depicted 25.49 extremum (minimum or 
maximum) points (SD: 17.07, min: 0, max: 59), and the non-expert group depicted 43.08 
extremum points (SD: 17.72, min: 10, max: 78). The resultant graphs were locally steep: for 
the expert group, the average of the absolute value of the local gradients between predictions 
was 1.06 (SD: 0.87, min: 0, max: 3.39) and for the non-expert group it was 1.74 (SD: 0.93, 
min: 0.50, max: 4.39). The average number of extremum points of participants from the E10 
group, who did not sketch constant or trend line (N = 10), was 33.13 (std: 19.94, min: 15, 
max: 59), and the average of the absolute value of their prediction gradients was 1.35 (std: 
0.77, min: 0.44, max: 3.39). A t-test failed to find a significant difference between the 
average steepness of this expert sub-group and the non-professional subgroup (t (29) = 1.62; 
p =.115), though a significant difference was found between the number of extremum points 
of the expert group and the non-professional group (t (29) = 2.5; p = .02) . 178 
 
I calculated the root mean squared error scores relative to the actual outcome of the real 
series over the forecast interval for each forecast series and for naive forecasts, consisting of 
the constant value of the last presented data point over all forecast horizons. The averages of 
raw error scores and normalised error scores (raw error divided by the range of prices in the 
data series) for the expert group, the non-professional group, the naive forecasts, and E3 are 
presented in Table 4.3. As can be seen, in general, the average errors are high. Furthermore, 
as expected, a repeated measure ANOVA showed a main significant effect of forecast 
horizon (F (2, 76) = 73.48, p < .001): forecasts became worse as its horizon was larger. 
However, there was no significant effect of the forecaster group variable. 
The averages of the normalized errors of participants from the E3 group were smaller than 
those of the naive forecaster. However, due to the small number of members in this group, 
no further statistical analysis could be made. 
Table 4.3 Average prediction errors for each. prediction horizon in Experiment 3 
 
 
 
Error measure  
Group 
Expert group  Non-professional   Naive forecaster  E10  
Mean  Std. 
deviation 
Mean  Std. 
deviation 
Mean  Std. 
deviation 
Mean 
          5.47  2.26  6.30  1.78  4.17  1.80     5.08 
          8.60  2.97  8.88  2.11  6.87  3.01      6.40 
          10.25  3.39  10.50  2.92  8.93  3.28      6.89 
              0.13  0.05  0.15  0.04  0.11  0.05      0.11 
              0.21  0.07  0.22  0.07  0.18  0.10      0.14 
              0.27  0.10  0.27  0.11  0.24  0.15      0.15 179 
 
Assessed probabilities of forecasts being within £1,000 of the outcome decreased or 
remained constant as forecast horizon increased in 84.6% (33/39) of the series for the expert 
group and in 74.4% (29/39) of the series in the non-professional group. The analysis failed 
to find a significant difference in the percentage of probability estimates which decreased as 
forecast horizon increased between the groups ( χ
2 (1, 78) = 1.26; p = .26). 
‘Noise’ imitation The primary measure for noise imitation was the correlation between the 
absolute values of the local gradient (local steepness) of the data series and the local 
steepness of the forecast sequence.  
Table 4.4 shows that for participants in the E10 and the non-professional groups, these 
correlations were highly significant. The secondary measure for noise imitation was the 
correlation between Hurst exponents of the data graph and the local steepness of the 
forecasts. For the expert, E10 and the non-professional groups, highly significant 
correlations were obtained for the secondary measure as well. These results suggest that 
participants attempted to imitate ‘noise’. I accepted Hypothesis H3,5. 
The correlation between the Hurst exponent and local steepness of the data was r = -.90 
(        ) for graphs presented to the expert group, and r = -.89 (        ) for graphs 
presented to the non-professional group. Therefore, only small differences between the 
groups were observed between correlations of forecast variables with Hurst exponent and 
local steepness of data graphs.  
Effects of personality on forecasting As before, the measures for strength of noise imitation 
were the correlation between Hurst exponent of the local steepness of the data series, and the 
local steepness of the forecast series. As local steepness of forecasts of members of E3 was 
constant, strength of noise imitation could not be calculated for members of the E3 group. 
Therefore this section concerns analysis of the results of E10 and the non-professional 
groups.  180 
 
In spite of the small number of participants in E10, there was a significant negative 
correlation between conscientiousness and the strength of noise imitation, defined as 
correlation of local steepness of the forecasts with the H exponent of the data series (r = -
.71,        ). This negative correlation indicates that experts who were more 
conscientiousness tended to imitate ‘noise’ in the data series more. 
In addition, there were significant positive correlations between agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and emotional stability, and the number of extremum points (r = .58,    
                                         respectively). The more experts were agreeable, 
conscientious, and emotional stable, the more ‘dramatic’ their forecasts appeared. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Correlation between geometrical characteristics of data and prediction graphs in 
Experiment 3 
Group  Data parameters  Correlation between data 
parameter and local steepness of 
forecasts 
Expert group  Hurst exponent  r = -.33 (       ) 
Local steepness   Insignificant 
E10 group  Hurst exponent  r = -.46 (       ) 
Local steepness   r = .50 (        ) 
Non-professional group  Hurst exponent  r = -.55 (       ) 
Local steepness   r = .66 (       ) 
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In the non-professional group, there were significant correlations between emotional 
stability and the local steepness of the forecasts (r = .36,          ), and emotional stability, 
and the number of extremum points (r = .35,         ).  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 showed that noise added to forecasts was correlated with Hurst exponent of 
the presented data series. This finding is in line with that of Gilden et al (1993). However, 
here it was shown that it extends to experts’ forecasts as well. 
Forecasts of professionals and lay people share many features. In particular, most 
participants in both groups imitated the noise in the data series. There were no significant 
differences between forecast errors of lay people, professionals who imitated data’s noise, 
and naive forecasts. I accepted Hypothesis H3,5. 
On the other hand, there were a few differences between forecasts of experts and non-
experts. In general, experts tended to imitate noise less than lay people, and their noise 
imitation level was correlated with self-rating of conscientiousness (unlike that of the non-
expert group). 
Conclusions 
Evidence is accumulating that price series have a fractal structure (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 
2004; Coen and Torluccio, 2012; Onali and Goddard, 2011; Bianchi et al, 2010; Hai-Chin 
and Ming-Chang, 2004). Unlike the series that have previously been studied by those 
interested in judgmental forecasting, fractal series cannot be naturally decomposed into 
signal and noise. Despite this, Gilden et al (1993) have argued from results of their studies 
on the discrimination of fractal contours that people analyse fractals as if they can be 
decomposed in this way: changes in successive prices (related to autocorrelation) are treated 
as if they are noise. This interpretation is consistent with the results reported in Chapter 2. 182 
 
If Gilden et al (1993) are correct, previous findings concerning judgmental forecasting from 
series that can be decomposed into signal and noise components should generalise to fractal 
series. In particular, noise in a sequence of forecasts should increase with the noise in the 
data series (Harvey, 1995; Harvey et al, 1997). All of the experiments reported here 
produced findings that fulfilled these expectations: the mean absolute size of local gradients 
in the forecast sequence increased with the mean absolute size of the local gradients in the 
data series and final forecasts were higher than initial ones even though there was no overall 
trend in data series.  
Recent reports have indicated that personality traits affect traders’ performance (Frijns et al, 
2008; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2011; Robin and Strážnicka, 2012; Fenton-O’Creevy et al, 2012; 
Fenton-O'Creevy et al, 2011). Eroglu and Croxton (2008) attributed effects that they 
obtained to people being more or less susceptible to biases arising from use of anchoring 
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Harvey (1995) argued that noise imitation is a 
bias that arises from use of another of the three heuristics identified by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974): representativeness. Thus, if the effects of personality obtained by Eroglu 
and Croxton (2008) apply not just to biases arising from anchoring but also to biases arising 
from use of other heuristics, noise imitation effects should be more evident in those who are 
conscientious and less evident in those who are extraverted. I did indeed find that sequences 
of forecasts made by more conscientious people showed stronger evidence of imitation of 
‘noise’ in the data series in the experiments reported here. Also, for the real series used in 
Experiment 1, I found that more extraverted people showed weaker evidence of imitation of 
the ‘noise’ in the data series.  
Individual differences in forecasting behaviour may also be produced by differences in 
temporary dispositions. Of these, a sense of power is thought to be particularly important on 
the trading floor (Hassoun, 2005). I used a priming task to induce either a sense of power or 
of powerlessness and found that those who felt more powerful showed a stronger tendency 
to imitate the ‘noise’ in the data series. This finding can be seen as consistent with Galinsky 183 
 
et al’s (2008) analysis of the effects of a sense of power if I assume that forecasters consider 
‘noise’ imitation as the correct way of making predictions. The fact that more conscientious 
people show a greater tendency to imitate ‘noise’ suggests that they do.  
Next, I showed that many of the results obtained for lay people can be generalized to 
experts. The expert sample consisted of 12 people who had a PhD in Finance or Economics, 
and one Finance PhD student. Most experts worked as professors in finance, economy or 
related topics. Nevertheless, when asked to make forecasts from graphs depicting the price 
series of real assets, 10 out 13 of them produced forecasts which included noise. Noise was 
significantly correlated with the Hurst exponent of the given data graphs. Furthermore, the 
average accuracy of the experts’ forecasts, as measured with respect to the historical 
evolution of prices, could not be distinguished from that of participants in the non-expert 
group and it was lower than that of a naive forecaster. Only three experts, whose forecasts 
depicted a straight line showed accuracy that was higher than that of the naive forecaster. 
Generalizing the findings of Experiment 1, Experiment 3 showed that, among experts, 
higher degrees of noise imitation were associated with higher conscientiousness. A large 
percentage of traders use technical analysis techniques, or define themselves as technical 
analysts (Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Taylor and Allen, 1992) and so this could have 
important implications.  
To conclude, the results indicate that people have a tendency to elaborate when performing 
forecasting tasks. Even though participants were not asked to provide a specific number of 
forecasts (and could make a single point forecast had they wanted to), they chose to make 
many of them. This was independent on the experimental design and whether the task was 
computer-based or used pen-and-paper. Noise imitation was found in both lay people and 
experts. In most experiments, it did not increase with agreeableness, suggesting that 
participants were not motivated by the need to comply with the way they might have 
perceived the experimenter’s goals. On the other hand, it increased with participants’ 184 
 
conscientiousness and sense of power. This might indicate that they imitated noise because 
they thought that this was the correct way to make forecasts from the graphs. 
Limitations 
I attempted to avoid encouraging participants to imitate noise through our experiments’ 
instructions. For instance, I asked the expert group “to look at the graphs carefully, and then 
predict the prices of the commodities at days 201-250 by continuing the price curve on each 
of the graphs”. Furthermore, Harvey et at (1997) showed that noise imitation occurred even 
when instructions were very detailed. Nevertheless, it is important to continue to examine 
the wording chosen for the task. For example, it would be interesting to examine how much 
noise imitation can be reduced by informing people about it. 
I used TIPI questionnaire to assess participants’ personality traits. TIPI is a standardised 
questionnaire, but it is short and less accurate than longer personality questionnaires that 
measure the Big Five personality traits. Gosling et al (2003) recommend using these longer 
versions when time permits. The additional power resulting from this approach may reveal 
additional influences of personality on forecasting behaviour. 
The results reported here prompt the question as to whether, apart from imitating the 
perceived noise component of the graphs, people also imitate its perceived signal. However, 
the experiments that I described here were not designed to answer that. In particular, I did 
not investigate factors that determine   the characteristics of any signal that people include in 
their forecast sequence.  However, this issue is touched on in Chapter 6 where I examine the 
size of the averaging window that people consider appropriate to apply to financial series in 
order to make financial forecasts from them. In the next chapter, I study the way people 
make forecasts when news is given in addition to price graphs.  
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Chapter 5: The effects of news valence, price trend 
and individual differences on financial behaviour 
 
“I made my money by selling too soon” (Bernard Baruch, cited in Katsenelson, 2007, page 
252). 
“When good news about the market hits the front page of the New York Times, sell” 
(Bernard Baruch, cited in Hill, Franklin, Clason and Mackay, 2009, page 195). 
 
Remark: The experiments described in this chapter were performed in collaboration with 
Bryan Chan. 
 
In this chapter, I examine the way that people incorporate news items and price graphs in 
order to make financial decisions. In particular, I characterise the conditions in which people 
prefer attributing more weight to news than to price graphs. I study decision times in each of 
these conditions. I also investigate the effects of culture and personality traits on financial 
decisions. Finally, I examine the way people make forecasts from the data and use their 
forecasts to decide whether to buy, sell, or hold assets.   
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 I investigated the following hypotheses: 
H4,1: people choose to base their trading strategy on news more than they do on price graphs. 
H4,2: people track prices more and show more active trading (buying or selling rather than 
holding their assets) in non-conflicting conditions than in conflicting ones. 186 
 
H4,3: people sell more assets when the news is bad than they buy when it is good. 
H4,4: trading latency is shorter when uncertainty is higher, that is, when there is an 
inconsistency between news valence and price trends. 
H4,5: the effect of news on trading latencies is stronger than that of the price trend, and 
trading latency is shorter when news is bad. 
H4,6: people from Western culture react to news more than people from Eastern countries in 
consistent conditions (good news with positive price trend or bad news with negative trend). 
People from Eastern Asian countries react to news more than people from Western countries 
in inconsistent conditions (good news with negative trend or bad news with positive trend) 
H4,7a: people from Eastern culture exhibit longer trading latencies.  
H4,7b: people from Eastern culture have higher degrees of dispersion in their returns.  
H4,8: people more open to experience have shorter trading latencies. 
I presented participants with a sequence of 12 graphs of real asset prices. Participants were 
told that they would be initially endowed with one share of each of the assets and a virtual 
sum of money large enough to buy one additional share of each of those assets. 
Graphs of each asset were updated gradually so that a new point was added to the graphs 
every 0.2 seconds. After each block of 20 points, participants were asked to decide whether 
to buy, sell, or hold their asset. After every block of 40 points, participants were presented 
with a news item. The direction of the trends in the price graphs and valence of news were 
manipulated to form a two (positive versus negative trend) by two (good versus bad news) 
within-participant design.  U-shaped and inverse-U-shaped graphs were added as fillers to 
mask the rationale of the experiment.  
I recorded the number of shares that participants had in each of the experimental conditions 
after deciding to buy another share of each asset, sell their share, or hold their share. I refer 187 
 
to this variable as the final share number. I also recorded the number of points that were 
displayed before decisions to buy or sell were made. I refer to this as decision latency. 
Method 
Participants Sixty people (28 men and 32 women) acted as participants. Their average age 
was 25 years. All participants were recruited through a participant recruitment website at 
University College London. Participants from Western and Eastern cultures were recruited 
separately to ensure that there were equal numbers in the two groups. 
The Western group comprised thirty people (17 men and 13 women) with an average age of 
29 years. The majority of them had an undergraduate degree or above and came from a wide 
range of occupational backgrounds (ranging from students to a retired engineer). 
The Eastern group comprised thirty people (11 men and 19 women) with an average age of 
21 years. Twenty of these participants were from Hong Kong, nine from China and one from 
Singapore. All of them had spent most of their lives in their country of origin. Most of them 
were undergraduate or postgraduate students. 
All participants were paid a fixed fee of £2.00. An additional £2 was available as 
performance-related pay: if the value of a participant’s portfolio at the end of the experiment 
was at least £15 more than its initial value, an additional £1 was paid: if the value of that 
portfolio was at least £30 more than its initial value, an additional £2 was paid. 
Stimulus materials I used the real-life time series documented in Chapter 1, Part III. 
Eighteen price series were downloaded from Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.yahoo.com/). 
Each series consisted of 2500 close prices. To avoid confounding variables, I chose six time 
series with a Hurst exponent that was close to a constant and in the interval [0.50, 0.56]
3. 
The Hurst exponent of time series is correlated with variables such as the series oscillation, 
variance and autocorrelation. I then chose 40 subsets of 220 consecutive elements from the 
                                                           
3 This interval ensured that successive price changes were independent, thereby making series 
consistent with the random walk behaviour expected from the EMH. This allows the results to be 
compared with predictions derived from that approach. 188 
 
original series. Each group of 10 subsets had a positive average trend, a negative average 
trend, a U-shape, or an inverse U-shape. The criterion for selection as a U-shape or inverse 
U-shape subsets was that the first and last points were not different by more than half a 
point. I then reflected subsets with negative and positive average trends about day 110 to 
create 10 more subsets of positive and negative trends, respectively. U-shaped and inverse 
U-shaped subsets were reflected about the time axis. Finally, all 80 resultant series were 
normalized to fit the same price range of [£2, £10]. This procedure for the construction of 
the series ensured that the average trend of the graphs in the positive and negative trend sets 
was the same.  
Presented news items were based on real items, published on BBC 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/) and Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.yahoo.com/). News was of 
two types, good and bad. Each news item was formulated as a single sentence. A total of 30 
news items evaluated as good were downloaded. Bad news was generated from the good 
news by inverting its meaning. For instance, in order to generate a bad news item from the 
good news item “Company awarded $115 Million in Patent-Infringement lawsuit”, I 
transformed it into “Company asked to pay $115 Million in Patent-Infringement lawsuit”.  
Participants’ personality traits were assessed using the Ten Item Personality Inventory 
(TIPI), a standardized personality questionnaire (Gosling et al, 2003). The TIPI measures the 
Big-Five personality traits: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional 
stability, and Openness to experience. 
Design Twelve graphs were chosen at random for each participant, four from the positive 
trend group, four from the negative trend group, two from the U-shaped group, and two from 
the inverse U-shaped group. For each graph, five news items, which were either all good or 
all bad, were chosen and randomly assigned to time points. News items were sampled 
without repetition, so that each news item was viewed by each participant only once.  Two 
of the graphs with the positive trend were assigned to good news sets and two of them to bad 
news sets. Similar choices were made for the graphs with the negative trend, resulting in a 189 
 
two (positive or negative trend) by two (good or bad news valence) design. Every condition 
was tested using two graphs per participant. 
The purpose of the U-shaped series and inverse U-shaped series was to mask the 
manipulations, and so participants’ results in these conditions were not analyzed. However, 
each of them was also paired with either good or bad news group. 
Graphs and news were presented using a graphic user interface program written in Matlab. 
Figure 5.1 shows a typical task window from the experiment.  
Procedure The experiment comprised three stages. First, in a familiarization task, 
participants were asked to make financial decisions with respect to three practice graphs. 
Results of familiarization task were not taken into account in the analysis. Second, they were 
asked to make financial decisions with respect to the randomly chosen 12 experimental 
graphs. Third, they were asked to complete the TIPI questionnaire (Gosling et al, 2003).   
Participants were endowed with a virtual sum of money and one share of each of the 12 
different assets. They were instructed to increase the total value of their portfolio above its 
initial value as much as possible. Participants were also told that they would be presented 
with the price graphs of each of these assets, one at a time. Prices were updated at a rate of 
one point per 0.2 second. The total value of the portfolio and each of the assets was updated 
after every point as well. These values were presented to the participants in a table. 
Additional instructions informed them that, after every 20 points, they would be asked to 
decide whether to 1) buy another share of the asset, resulting in them having another share of 
the stock but less money to buy more stocks, 2) sell their share of the asset, resulting in them 
having no shares in it but more money, or 3) hold their share of the asset. They were 
informed that, if they decided to buy or sell, they would then move on to consider the next 
asset.  However, if they decided to hold, the price graph of the current asset would continue 
to be updated until they were asked to make another decision about it at the next decision 
point or until day 220.  190 
 
 
Figure 5.1 A typical task window from Experiment 1. The figure shows the non-conflicting 
condition with bad news and a negative trend.  191 
 
 
After every 40 price points, participants were presented with a piece of news that was related 
to the current asset, together with a message emphasizing that they should read it carefully. 
Participants were also told that there might be a “Possible additional investment task” and 
that the experimenter may ask them to use their portfolio (money and assets left from the 
second stage of the experiment) for another investment task. The reason for this was that 
performing any action – buying, selling, or holding an asset – did not change the total value 
of the portfolio. The total value of participants’ portfolio changed only as asset prices 
changed. Possible future use of assets chosen to be held or bought endowed these actions 
with financial meaning. 
Participants were informed how their fees depended on their performance. However, they 
were not provided with any trading strategy of the type Andreassen (1990) used to instruct 
his participants.  
At the end of the experiment, participants completed the TIPI questionnaire. 
Results 
Results are shown in Table 5.1. Primary dependent variables were trading latency and final 
share number. Trading latency was measured by the number of data points participants saw 
before making the decision to buy or sell each asset, or the maximum number of presented 
points (220) if participants made their decision to buy, sell, or hold their asset after all point 
series had been presented on the graph. A final share number of zero indicated that 
participants had sold their share, one meant that participants chose to hold their share, and 
two showed that participants had chosen to buy an additional share.  I also analyzed 
participant returns (defined as the difference between the asset price at decision time and at 
the time of initial presentation of the series).  
The effect of news on financial decisions To examine hypothesis H4,1, I carried out a four-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on final share number using culture (Western or    192 
 
Table 5.1 Results of Experiment 1 for the western group (first panel) and the Eastern group 
(second panel).  
 
Western group, 
N=30 
  Trend 
    Positive  Negative 
Trading latency       
  News valence  Good  48.33 
(48.89) 
60.00 
(61.84) 
Bad  45.67 
(38.28) 
36.67 
(24.75) 
Share number         
  News valence  Good  1.35 
(0.92) 
0.83 
(0.96) 
Bad  1.03 
(1.01) 
0.4 
(0.81) 
Returns         
  News valence  Good  3.14 
(2.00) 
-3.31 
(2.22) 
Bad  2.12 
(1.38) 
-2.68 
(1.16) 
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Eastern group, N=30    Trend 
    Positive  Negative 
Trading latency         
  News valence  Good  92.33 
(71.98) 
106.34 
(70.78) 
Bad  66.00 
(55.27) 
73.66 
(61.45) 
Share number         
  News valence  Good  1.13 
(0.96) 
1.15 
(0.917) 
Bad  0.72 
(0.96) 
0.60 
(0.87) 
Returns         
  News valence  Good  4.24 
(2.25) 
-4.35 
(2.25) 
Bad  2.94 
(1.89) 
-3.44 
(2.02) 194 
 
 Eastern) as a between-participant variable and  trend (positive or negative), news valence 
(good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in each condition) as 
within-participant variables. This revealed that final share number was larger when news 
was good (F (1, 29) = 29.35; p < .001; partial η
2 = .50) and when trend was positive (F (1, 
29) = 7.56; p = .01; partial η
2 = .21). The size of effect of news valence was larger than that 
of the trend in the graphs, a finding that is consistent with hypothesis H4,1. There was also an 
interaction between group and trend (F (1, 29) = 5.40; p = .03; partial η
2 = .16). Tests of 
simple effects showed that in Western participants, final share number was higher when the 
trend was positive (F (1, 29) = 11.27; p = .002; partial η
2 = .28). 
To examine hypothesis H4,2, I put participants’ results into two groups: the conflicting 
conditions (good news, negative trend and bad news, positive trend) and the non-conflicting 
conditions (good news, positive trend and bad news, negative trend). For each group, I 
extracted the deviation of the final share number from 1 (the ‘hold’ option). ANOVA failed 
to yield a significant difference in this variable between the conflicting and non-conflicting 
conditions.  Next, following Andreassen (1990), I calculated participants’ price tracking (the 
correlation between the price of an asset at decision time with the final share number) for the 
conflicting and non-conflicting sets of results. An ANOVA showed neither an effect of 
culture nor of conflict between trend type and news type. Hence, I failed to replicate 
Andreassen’s (1990) results: the data are not consistent with hypothesis H4,2. 
To examine hypothesis H4,3, I grouped all participants’ results together, and extracted two 
new variables. The first one was the difference between final share number and one share 
(the result of a ‘hold’ choice) when news was good. The second variable was the difference 
between one share and final share number when news was bad.  These variables indicate the 
signed choice deviation from a ‘hold’ decision. ANOVA revealed that when news was good 
people bought fewer shares (mean: 0.12; std: 0.95) than they sold when news was bad 
(mean: 0.31; std: 0.95). This difference (F (1, 479) = 5.16; p = .02) is consistent with 
hypothesis H4,3. 195 
 
The timing of financial decisions To examine hypothesis H4,4, I performed a t-test to 
compare trading latencies in the conflicting and non-conflicting conditions. No difference 
was found: the data are not consistent with hypothesis H4,4.  
To examine hypothesis H4,5, I carried out a four-way ANOVA on trading latency with 
culture (Western or Eastern) as a between-participant variable and trend (positive or 
negative), news valence (good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in 
each condition) as within-participant variables. This showed that trading latency was longer 
when news was good (F (1, 29) = 29.05; p < .01; partial η
2 =.50) but that the effect of trend 
was insignificant. This pattern of results is consistent with hypothesis H4,5.  
Effects of culture To investigate Hypothesis H4,6, I performed three separate two-way 
ANOVAs on number of shares, trading latency and returns, each with culture (Western or 
Eastern) as a between-participant variable and condition (non-conflicting or conflicting) as a 
within-participant variable. In no case was an interaction effect between culture and 
condition found.  I therefore reject hypothesis H4,6. 
To examine hypothesis H4,7a, I carried out a four-way ANOVA on trading latency with 
culture as a between-participant variable and trend, news valence, and instance as within-
participant variables. This showed that trading latency was shorter for Western participants 
(F (1, 29) = 17.23; p < .01; partial η
2 = .37), a finding that is consistent with hypothesis H4,7a. 
I performed a four-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on returns using the same variables 
as before. As expected, returns were larger when trends were positive (F (1, 29) = 417.32, p 
< .001; partial η
2 = .94). Table 5.1 shows that return variances of participants from the 
Eastern group were higher than those of participants from the Western group. To compare 
these, I defined return dispersion as the absolute value of the difference between the return 
of each asset of each participant and the mean return in participant’s group. A t-test revealed 
that return dispersion in the Eastern group was larger than that of Western group (t (239) = 
5.60; p < .001). These results are consistent with hypothesis H4,7a.  196 
 
I did not match the age or gender of participants in the Western and Eastern groups. 
However, these variables had no significant effects on trading latency or return dispersion 
and so could not provide an alternative account for the differences observed between the two 
groups.  
Effects of personality For each of the participants and for each of the experimental 
conditions (good or bad news, positive or negative trend), I extracted the mean trading 
latency, mean final share number and mean returns. Participants with greater openness to 
experience had lower trading latencies (r = -.28; p = .03 when news was good and the trend 
was positive; r = -.32; p = .01 when news was good and the trend was negative; r = -.37; p = 
.004 when news was bad and the trend was positive; r = -.33; p = .01 when news was bad 
and the trend was negative). They also bought more shares but only when bad news was 
combined with a positive trend in the price data (r = .36; p = .005). Finally, their returns 
were higher when the trend in the price data was negative (r = .34; p = .008 for good news; r 
= .31; p = .02 for bad news) but lower when it was positive and the news was bad (r = -.27; p 
= .04). These results are consistent with hypothesis H8.  Correlations between remaining four 
personality traits and the task variables were not statistically significant.  
Discussion  
Participants made faster decisions (H4,5) and bought fewer shares when news was bad than 
when it was good. They also sold more shares when the news was bad than they bought 
when it was good (H4,3). In addition, they bought more shares when the trend in the price 
data was positive but this effect was weaker than that of the news valence (H4,1). 
Why was the effect of news valence on share number stronger than that of the trend in the 
price graphs?  Though participants were instructed to pay attention to the news items, their 
presentation was no more visually salient than that of the trend in the price series (Figure 
5.1). Furthermore, portfolio values were continuously updated in a manner that matched the 
prices changes in the graph. Participants could, therefore, see that their losses (or gains) 197 
 
corresponded directly to changes in the price series rather than to the news items. Hence, I 
interpret the greater influence of news on trading in light of Tuckett’s (2012) arguments that 
people need to find meaning in their environment. News offers narratives and therefore 
people tend to focus on it. 
None of the hypotheses (H4,2, H4,4, H4,6) based on putative effects of a conflict between news 
and price data were supported. Although share buying was affected both by news and by 
price trend, effects of these variables did not interact in the manner expected on the basis of 
conflict effects. 
Participants in the Eastern group made their trades much later than those in the Western one, 
and, as a result, their return dispersions were larger (H4,7). This finding is consistent with the 
notion that they developed more complex narratives that pulled together the different pieces 
of information they had encountered into a more holistic framework (Nisbett, 2003).  
The finding that participants with greater openness to experience had shorter trading 
latencies is consistent with results obtained by Fiori and Antonakis (2012) in a variety of 
non-financial tasks. However, from a risk taking perspective, it is perhaps surprising. 
Nicholson et al (2005) found that propensity to take risks was greater in extraverts and in 
those who are more open to experience. As shorter trading latencies indicate lower risk 
propensity, their findings would lead me to expect longer rather than shorter decision 
latencies in those with high levels of openness to experience. Hence, it appears unlikely that 
the relation between trading latency and openness to experience was mediated by risk 
propensity. Instead, it is more likely that people open to experience put more cognitive effort 
into their task and thereby made more effective use of the information they received. As a 
result, they were able to produce a satisfactory narrative for it sooner. 
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to test the following hypotheses: 198 
 
H4,9: there is a positive correlation between views about the extent to which an event will 
affect prices and final share number. 
H4,10: the difference between a participant’s forecast and the last data point depends on the 
news valence and the direction of the trend in the price data. 
H4,11: there is a positive correlation between that difference and final share number. 
Experiment 2 also provided an opportunity for confirming the conclusions pertaining to 
hypotheses H4,1- H4,5. 
Method  
In addition to making trading decisions, this experiment required participants to make 
forecasts and to assess how plausible it was that each news event would affect asset prices.  
Participants Thirty people (11 men and 19 women) recruited in the same way as before 
acted as participants. They were all from Western culture and their average age was 25 
years. Twenty eight of them were undergraduate or postgraduate students. They were paid a 
fixed fee of £2.00. Up to an additional £2 was paid according to their performance in the 
same way as in Experiment 1.  
Materials and design These were the same as in Experiment 1.  
Procedure The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except that participants were 
presented with a news item every 40 points starting from point 20 (rather than every 40 
points starting from point 40). This was to ensure that all participants, including those who 
decided to buy or sell their assets after 20 points, saw at least one news item.   
In addition, after every 20 points, participants were asked, before making their decision, to 
make a single forecast for the point that was 20 points ahead of the current one. Forecasts 
were made by clicking the mouse on a vertical line designating the required forecast date. 
Until participants pressed the button “save forecast”, they could edit their forecast by 
clicking the mouse again on the line. Moreover, whenever a news item was presented, they 199 
 
were asked to rate how plausible it was that such a news event would affect asset prices. 
Plausibility ratings were performed using a slider and they ranged between 0 and 100, where 
0 meant “not plausible at all” and 100 meant “extremely plausibly”. Figure 5.2 presents a 
typical task window in Experiment 2.  
Results  
Results are shown in Table 5.2. In addition to analyzing the data as before, I extracted 
participants’ plausibility ratings and forecasts. (One forecast of one of the participants in the 
condition bad news, negative average trend was removed because it was more than four 
standard deviations from the mean of the forecasts in that condition).  
The effect of news on financial decisions A three-way ANOVA, using trend (positive or 
negative), news valence (good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in 
each condition)  as within-participant variables, showed that final share number was higher 
when news was good (F (1, 29) = 11.47; p = .002; partial η
2 = .28 ) and when price graphs 
had a positive trend (F (1, 29) = 4.54; p = .04; partial η
2 = .14). These results are consistent 
with hypothesis H4,1 and replicate those obtained in Experiment 1. 
As before, trials were classified into those in which the news valence and price trend were 
conflicting and non-conflicting.  ANOVAs comparing the final number of shares and the 
deviation of final number of shares from 1 (‘hold’ decision) failed to find any significant 
effect of conflict. Thus, as in Experiment 1, I reject Hypothesis H4,2. 
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Figure 5.2 A typical task window from Experiment 2. The figure shows the conflicting 
condition with bad news and a positive trend.   201 
 
Table 5.2 Results of Experiment 2, including trading latencies, share numbers, plausibility 
ratings (first panel), forecast differences and returns (second panel). 
Western participants, N=30   Trend 
Positive  Negative 
Trading latency         
  News 
valence 
Good  75.00 
(58.87) 
69.00 
(60.78) 
  Bad  67.33 
(55.11) 
45.00 
(38.90) 
Share number       
  News 
valence 
Good  1.15 
(0.97) 
0.85 
(0.95) 
  Bad  0.55 
(0.87) 
0.31 
(0.72) 
Plausibility     
  News 
valence 
Good  0.67 
(0.16) 
0.65 
(0.17) 
  Bad  0.65 
(0.18) 
0.68 
(0.17) 
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Forecasts       
  News valence  Good  0.76 
(0.66) 
0.69 
(1.05) 
  Bad  -0.08 
(0.94) 
-0.49 
(1.07) 
Returns       
  News valence  Good  2.20 
(1.29) 
-2.23 
(1.36) 
  Bad  1.57 
(1.23) 
-1.59 
(0.91) 
 
 
To test hypothesis H4,3, I proceeded in the same way as before. The ANOVA revealed an 
asymmetry in final share number with respect to news and trend (F (1, 119) = 11.62; p = 
.001). Participants sold more shares when news was bad and the trend in the price data 
negative than they bought when news was good and the trend in the price data was positive.  
Similar results were obtained when I compared deviation from ‘hold’ option for good news 
and bad news (F (1, 239) = 24.20; p < .001). As in Experiment 1, the results are consistent 
with hypothesis H4,3. 
The timing of financial decisions An ANOVA comparing differences between trading 
latencies in conflicting and non-conflicting conditions failed to reveal any effects of conflict. 
Thus, as in Experiment 1, the data do not support hypothesis H4,4. 
A three-way ANOVA  using trend, news valence, and instance as within-participant 
variables showed that trading latency was longer when the news was good (F (1, 29) = 8.23; 203 
 
p = .008; partial η
2 = .22). As no main effect of trend was obtained, the results are again 
consistent with hypothesis H4,5. 
There was an interaction between news and trend (F (1, 29) = 5.68; p = .02; partial η
2 = .16). 
Tests of simple effects showed that, when the trend was negative, trading latency was longer 
in the good news condition (F (1, 29) = 14.27; p = .001; partial η
2 = .33) and that, when the 
news was bad, trading latency was longer when the trend was positive (F (1, 29) = 11.44; p = 
.002; partial η
2 = .28). Further analysis showed that trading latency was longer when the 
news was good and the trend positive than when the news was bad and the trend negative (t 
(59) = 3.43; p = .001). 
Plausibility ratings A three-way ANOVA on plausibility estimates using the same three 
variables as before failed to find any significant effects. Thus, the data failed to support for 
Hypothesis H4,9. 
Forecast quality Before examining how forecasts depended on trading information (H4,10) 
and how they influenced trading decisions (H4,11), I examined their quality by extracting two 
variables. The first was the mean absolute difference (MAD), defined as the absolute value 
of the mean of the difference between the forecasts each participant made for each graph at 
time t and the prices at time t. MAD (M = 0.82; SD = 0.51) measures the deviation of 
participants’ forecasts from naive forecasts. The second was the mean absolute error (MAE), 
defined as the absolute value of the mean of the difference between the forecasts each 
participant made for each graph at time t (for time t+20) and the prices at time t+20. MAE 
(M = 0.74; SD = 0.67) measures the deviation of participants’ forecasts for each graph from 
forecasts that would have produced zero error. T-tests showed that both these variables were 
significantly different from zero (for MAD, t (238) = 24.80; p < .001; for MAE, t (238) = 
25.67; p < .001). Thus, in line with Harvey and Reimers (2013), Harvey (1995), and Reimers 
and Harvey (2011) but in contrast to the assumption made by Pfajfar (2013), forecasts were 
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Dependence of forecasts on news valence and trends in price data Participants could 
produce up to 10 forecasts for each asset. For each time, t, at which participants made a 
decision regarding an asset, I extracted the differences between their forecasts for the price 
of the asset at time t+20 and the price of the asset at time t. I then averaged these differences 
for each graph. An ANOVA, using the variables trend (positive or negative), news valence 
(good or bad), and instance (first or second presentation of series in each condition), showed 
that the difference between forecasts and asset prices was higher when news was good (F (1, 
29) = 38.93; p < .001; partial η
2 = .57), and when the trend was positive (F (1, 29) = 14.76; p 
= .001; partial η
2 = .34). These results provide support hypothesis H4,10.  
Correlation between forecasts and financial decisions To examine Hypothesis H4,11, I 
calculated the correlation of the number of shares participants had at the end of each trial 
with the difference between participants’ forecasts at the time of their final trading decisions 
and the value of the last price they saw. A positive correlation between these two variables 
shows that participants tended to buy more shares when they thought that the prices would 
rise. Calculated for each condition separately, I found positive correlations when the trends 
were positive, whether the news items were good (r = .53; p < .001) or bad (r = .48; p < 
.001). No significant correlations were obtained for conditions with negative trends. These 
results suggest that forecasts mediated between the data and trading decisions only when 
prices were rising. Thus, the results partially support hypothesis H4,11. 
Discussion  
Just as in Experiment 1, results were consistent with hypotheses H4,1, H4,3, and H4,5 but not 
with H4,2 and H4,4. Thus the findings here provide confirmation of the conclusions drawn 
from the earlier experiment.  
Experiment 2 supported Andreassen’s (1990) claim that forecasts mediate between data and 
decisions.  Forecasts depended strongly on news valence. Their dependence on the trends in 
the price series was weaker. Yet many experiments have shown that, in the absence of any 
news, forecasts depend strongly on the trends in data series (e.g., Harvey and Reimers, 2013; 205 
 
Lawrence et al, 2006). It appears that the presence of news dominates information relating to 
the trend in the price series: as I argued above, the appeal of the narrative structure of news 
is so strong that people prefer to act on it rather than on the trend cues
4. 
Once forecasts had been made, their influence on trading was affected by the trend in the 
price series. When that trend was positive, forecasts were taken into account when making 
decisions to buy or sell.  
Finally, the results indicate that forecasts were neither naive nor perfect. This finding implies 
that the forecasting assumption underlying Pfajfar’s (2013) behavioral model of markets is 
not realistic. 
Conclusions 
During the past few years, a large body of research on agent-based market models has 
accumulated. A search using the key words “agent”, “model” and “market” of the EconLit 
database between the years 2000 and 2013 yielded 3,946 papers, of which 1,911 were 
published between 2008 and 2013. The cumulative behavior of individuals has become a 
centre of attention within finance; there is now a bridge between the scale of a single person, 
which traditionally has been of interest only within psychology, and the scale of the masses, 
as classically modeled in finance.  
However, many behavioral models of market behavior include assumptions which are not 
based on psychological findings. This study has supplied data relevant to these models and 
cast new light on the way people react to financial data in trading tasks. Specifically, I chose 
to examine three factors that are relevant to EMH and frequently involved in modern 
financial models: the effect of news on financial decisions, trading latency, and individual 
differences between investors. Superficially, these three factors may appear to be diverse and 
                                                           
4 Inclusion of filler series with U-shaped and inverted U-shaped trends may have acted to reduce the 
weight that participants put on price trend data when making their trading decisions.  However, 
inclusion of filler series ensured high external validity of the experiments: clearly, in real-life, not all 
trends are easy to identify. 206 
 
unconnected. However, the effects related to them can all be accommodated within a single 
coherent approach. 
Though results are consistent with previous work on the inadequacy of the EMH (Findlay 
and Williams, 2000 - 2001), they are best understood within a framework for understanding 
and modeling trader behavior that takes into account the natural, human search for meaning. 
First, though participants in the experiments could always see that the value of their portfolio 
changed according to the trend of the presented price graphs, most of them still chose to base 
their decisions on news items rather than on the price series. Trading latencies also depended 
on news rather than on the trend in price series. News provides narratives for those searching 
for meaning more easily than price trends do. In fact, news items may allow people to make 
sense of the price trends by supplying ‘cognitively comforting’ causal interpretations of 
them in the way that Tuckett (2012) suggests. Causal interpretations within a narrative also 
underlie fundamental analysis and so this may also help to explain why many analysts prefer 
it to technical analysis. 
Second, openness to experience is correlated with need for cognition (Sadowski and 
Cogburn, 1997). Cacioppo et al (1983) have shown that those with higher need for cognition 
put more cognitive effort into tasks and, as a result, are better able to focus their attention on 
the most relevant information. This implies that people in our task who were more open to 
experience put more cognitive effort into selectively processing and integrating the 
information they received. As a result, they produced adequate narratives more quickly and 
were able to act on them sooner: they had shorter trading latencies. 
Third, trading latencies of participants from Eastern cultures were much longer than those of 
Western participants. This difference resulted in a significantly higher dispersion of returns 
in the Eastern group. The work of Nisbett and his colleagues (e.g., Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi and Norenzayan, 2001) has shown that those in Eastern cultures think more 
holistically and less analytically than those in Western ones. They make greater attempts to 
pull all available evidence into a single holistic framework. Narratives provide the primary 207 
 
means for bringing evidence into a coherent framework (Pennington and Hastie, 1993). 
Finding more coherent narratives requires additional processing. According to this line of 
reasoning, the Eastern participants had higher trading latencies because they spent more time 
make sensing of the evidence by generating more coherent narratives to explain it.  
Fourth, forecasts may provide some insight into how participants selectively incorporated 
price trend information into their narratives. Forecasts were indeed higher when news was 
good and price trend was positive. Thus, even though forecasts were not optimal, they were 
in the right direction, a finding consistent with previous work (Harvey and Reimers, 2013). 
However, these forecasts influenced trading only when price trends were positive. Even 
though participants had forecast a drop in price when the price trend was down, they tended 
not to sell (c.f. Odean, 1998). One interpretation, derived from one originally proposed by 
Lawrence and Makridakis (1989), is that people had contrasting narratives for up trends and 
down trends. If prices were increasing, no agency would intervene to stop them from 
increasing and hence, trades could be consistent with forecasts. However, if prices were 
forecast to decrease, there would be at least a possibility that some agency (e.g., the 
company owned by the shareholders) would intervene in an attempt to prevent any further 
decrease. As a consequence, it would be sensible not to act on or to delay acting on the 
forecast. 
In summary, the findings reported here are best understood within an approach that sees 
traders as trying to make sense of information by incorporating it within a narrative that 
provides a causal interpretation of events. Given research in other domains (Pennington and 
Hastie, 1993), I suggest that people select between different possible narratives by choosing 
the one that has the greatest degree of coherence. Other approaches, such as the EMH or 
behavioural models that incorporate a number of disconnected cognitive biases, do not 
appear to be capable of providing a satisfactory explanation for our findings.  
 208 
 
Limitations 
The experiments were designed to provide the control needed to test hypotheses while still 
providing participants with a task scenario that captured the essential features of the sort of 
computer-based trading experienced by small investors. However, there were some features 
of real trading that were not incorporated within the paradigm. For example, I presented 
participants with information typical of that likely to be relevant to the trading task. In real 
trading, however, people are likely to actively seek out information. As a result, they will be 
subject to confirmation bias (Hilton, 2001): they will selectively gather information that is 
consistent with the narrative that they have developed while making little effort to obtain 
information inconsistent with it. The paradigm used here did not allow effects of this bias to 
be studied.  
In addition, in our experimental settings, participants could only buy or sell a single share of 
each company. After making a buy or sell decision, participants could no longer see how the 
price of the company evolved. This setting was chosen in order to make the experiment as 
simple as possible. However, this manipulation could have affected participants’ financial 
decisions. Furthermore, informing participants about a possible additional investment task 
could have affected their buy/sell/hold decisions. I consider it important to try to replicate 
the results presented using different trading tasks and incentive mechanisms. An alternative 
design could, for instance, allow participants to buy or sell more than one asset. Participants 
would be able to see price evolution of each asset for the same duration, and continue buying 
or selling shares throughout this period. The incentive mechanism could be based only on 
the value of the portfolio. 
Participants were not professional traders. I was interested in obtaining results from lay 
people: the Internet has greatly facilitated non-professional trading (Barber and Odean, 
2008; Muradoglu and Harvey, 2012). Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that studies 
contrasting the financial behavior of lay people and experts have rarely found differences 
between them (Zaleskiewicz, 2011; Muradoǧlu and Önkal, 1994). Furthermore, the present 209 
 
results coincide with those obtained from studies of professional traders (e.g. Odean, 1998). 
However, it would still be valuable to replicate them on that population.  
I focused on one characteristic of news and price graphs: their valence or sign. However, 
both news and price graphs have other features that could be important (Nelson, Bloomfield, 
Hales and Libby, 2001). For example, the degree of relevance of the news to the asset may 
affect financial decisions and the volatility of price graphs may influence trading latency.  
In both experiments, participants were exposed to both graphical and verbal data. In future 
work, these could be studied separately. This would allow examination of the way that news 
dominates price information more systematically and may throw light on how people 
perform in situations that require ‘pure’ technical or ‘pure’ fundamental analysis. 
Finally, it is important to note that participants were not asked to produce narratives or tell 
us possible narratives. I consider it important to examine the narrative hypothesis further and 
will discuss this issue in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Psychological Mechanisms Supporting 
Preservation of Asset Price Characterisations 
 
“Fractal geometry is not just a chapter of mathematics, but one that helps Everyman to see 
the same old world differently” (Mandelbrot, cited in Aufmann, Lockwood, Nation and 
Clegg, 2010, page 551). 
 
In this chapter, I examine the question of whether the way people perceive financial data 
sequences and make forecasts from them has a role in the stabilisation of market parameters. 
Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003) have shown that future volatility is correlated with 
forecast dispersion. Therefore, a correlation between forecast dispersion and measures of the 
volatility of past data could serve as a part of the mechanism that preserves data properties 
for durations long enough to enable the use of forecasting methods and financial algorithms. 
Experiment 1 
 
The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effects of the Hurst exponents of 
price graphs on financial forecasts and decisions: this is because such effects may be one of 
the mechanisms that directly stabilises properties of price graphs (see the section 
Mechanisms preserving asset price graph structure in Chapter 1). A secondary aim was to 
explore the effects of forecast horizon on the same variables, as these effects could provide 
support for Corsi’s (2009) approach. According to Corsi, prices exhibit fractal behaviour due 
to the heterogeneity of investor forecast horizon (see the section: Models and theories about 
stability of market parameters: the effects of time-scaling). In particular, I tested the 
following hypotheses: 211 
 
H5,1a: People use scaling when making financial forecasts and decisions. In particular, they 
exhibit a large degree of variation in their choice of temporal scaling of fractal graphs 
(consistently with the heterogeneity hypothesis of Müller, Dacorogna, Davé, Pictet, Olsen, 
and Ward, 1993). 
H5,1b: Variation of choices of temporal scaling is greater for more distant  trading horizons.   
H5,2:  There is a positive correlation between forecast horizon and the local steepness and 
oscillation of the time-scaled data graphs. 
H5,3:  Dispersion of forecasts is positively correlated with the required forecast horizon. 
H5,4:  Selected time scaling factors are smaller for graphs that have smaller Hurst exponents: 
people prefer presentation of data corresponding to shorter periods of time when dealing 
with graphs with smaller Hurst exponents.  
H5,5a: The time scales that people choose result in a negative correlation between the local 
steepness and oscillation of the time-scaled graph and the Hurst exponent of the original 
data. 
H5,5b:  The time scales that people choose result in a positive correlation between the local 
steepness and oscillation of the time-scaled graphs and the original graphs. 
H5,6:  The dispersion of forecasts is negatively correlated with the Hurst exponents of the 
original graphs and positively correlated with the local steepness and oscillation of the data 
graphs. 
H5,7: People’s trading behaviour depends on their forecasts. 
I presented participants with a sequence of fractal time series representing price graphs. At 
the beginning of each trial, each graph was presented on the time interval of t = [100, 200] 
days. Participants could control the time interval of the presented graph by using a slider. 
Possible time intervals ranged between [0, 200] days at the maximal zoom-out limit of the 212 
 
slider, and [196, 200] days at the maximal zoom-in limit of the slider. Participants were 
asked to choose the time interval they considered the most appropriate for making financial 
forecasts and decisions, and then to make forecasts and decisions based on the time-scaled 
graph. I manipulated two variables: the Hurst exponent of the original data graphs (and thus 
also their local steepness and oscillation), and the required forecast horizon. Figure 6.1 
depicts the task window of Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants Thirty-four people (15 men and 19 women) with an average age of 23.29 years 
acted as participants. They were paid a flat fee of £3.00 and a further £1.00 if their financial 
decisions were more than 65% correct. Correctness was determined by participants’ 
performance with respect to the generated graphs. For instance, if prices at the forecast 
horizon were higher than the price on day 200 by more than 5%, a ‘buy’ decision was 
considered correct and both ‘sell’ and ‘hold’ decisions were considered wrong.  
Stimulus materials Stimulus graphs comprised five sets of three time series with Hurst 
exponents H = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. Time series were produced using the Spectral method 
described by Saupe (Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). All series included 62831 (~2000 ) points. 
They were presented to the participants as asset price graphs. A constant was added to them 
to ensure that they were positive. To increase measurement precision, they were also 
multiplied by 100 to encourage participants to make forecasts using more than one 
significant digit. 
Stimulus presentation and control Stimulus graphs were presented using a Matlab 
programme that enabled participants to scale the data along the time axis, to make forecasts 
for a specified horizon, and to express their financial decisions. 
Time scaling was accomplished using a slider. At the beginning of each trial, each graph was 
presented on the time interval [100, 200]. The scaling slider’s range varied from a time 
interval of four days at the maximal zoom-in side of the slider (presentation of price data  213 
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from days 196 to 200) to 200 days at the maximal zoom-out side of the slider (presentation 
of price data from days 0 to 200). Thus they could scale the graphs by a factor of 50 (i.e. 
200/4).  
Participants made single point forecasts by entering a number into a text box. Forecast 
horizon was set to 2, 15, or 100 days, making the factor by which horizons varied (i.e. 100 / 
2) identical to that by which scaling could vary (i.e. 200 / 4).  
Participants then made a financial decision to buy another share of the presented asset, to 
sell their share, or to do neither of these. 
On each trial, they could change the time interval shown on the graph until they clicked the 
button “When you are ready, please press OK”. They could edit their forecasts until they 
clicked the button “Save forecast”.  
Design Participants were presented with 48 graphs: three familiarisation graphs and 45 
experimental graphs. Only experimental graphs were included in the analysis. Each graph 
required three responses: the first was choice of time interval; the second was to forecast the 
asset’s future price; the third was to make a financial decision.  
Each participant saw all 15 graphs. Each one was presented three times in different contexts 
that varied according to the required forecast horizon (2, 15, and 100 days). The order of the 
graphs and the required forecast horizons were randomly chosen. This combination 
produced a three (forecast horizons) by three (Hurst exponent values) by five (instances of 
time series with the same Hurst exponent values) within-participants design. 
Procedure Participants were instructed to assume that the experiment day was day 200 and 
asked to read the following instructions: 
“In the following experiment, you are asked to imagine that you are a financial analyst. You 
have 45 clients. Each of your clients has one share of a single asset. Clients differ in their 215 
 
trading frequency: some clients trade every two days, some trade every 15 days, and some 
every 100 days. Your aim should be to increase the total value of their portfolios as your 
fees will depend on your performance. 
In order to make your decisions, you will be presented with the price graphs of each of these 
assets. You will be able to control the time range of each graph by changing its zoom.  
For each asset you will be asked to:  
1.  Notice the trading frequency of your client and the day you will be asked to make 
financial forecast for. Look at the price graph of the asset carefully. 
2.  Choose for each graph a time range which you consider the most appropriate for the 
purpose of making a financial forecast. 
3.  Write your forecast for the price of the asset on the required day. 
4.  Advise to your client whether to buy another share of the asset, sell their share, or 
hold it.” 
Participants could choose the time range of the data graphs by dragging a slider.  
Forecasts were made by entering a number to a text box. Participants could advise their 
clients whether to buy, sell, or hold their shares by clicking one of three buttons. 
All tasks had to be completed before participants could continue to the next graph. 
Results 
I excluded from the analysis participants whose means of choices of time scaling factor were 
more than three standard deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the group 
and those whose forecasts were different from the mean of the group by more than two 
standard deviations. This reduced the size of the sample from 34 to 30 participants, leaving a 
total of 1350 graphs for the analysis. Variables of primary interest were the chosen time 216 
 
scaling factor, the local steepness and oscillation of the scaled graphs, the dispersion of 
participants’ forecasts, and the resultant share number. 
Choice of time-scaling factor I refer to the location on the scaling-slider which participants 
chose for each graph as the time-scaling factor. This measurement could vary between 0, 
corresponding to four days and 1, corresponding to 200 days (the transformation used to 
translate time-scaling factors to the actual day number presented on the graphs was: day 
number = 196 * (time-scaling factor) + 4. The mean time-scaling participants chose was 
0.40, and the standard deviation was 0.37. A t-test performed on participants’ choices of 
smoothness levels showed that the mean value was significantly different from 0.5 (the 
initial setting): t (1349) = 9.74, p < .001, from 0.0 (maximal zoom-in):  t (1349) = 40.05, p < 
.001, and from 1.0 (using information from the maximum time-interval that was available): t 
(1349) = 59.53, p < .001. As the standard deviation was quite large (0.37 – close to the mean 
and larger than a third of the possible range), I accept Hypothesis H5,1a (people use scaling to 
make financial forecasts and decisions, and they exhibit a large degree of variation in their 
choice of temporal scaling of fractal graphs). This result supports also the heterogeneity 
hypothesis of Müller, Dacorogna, Davé, Pictet, Olsen, and Ward (1993). 
To examine Hypotheses H5,1b, and H5,4, I carried out a three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
on the chosen time scale using the forecast horizon, Hurst exponent, and graph instance as 
within-participant variables. Mauchly’s sphericity assumption was violated for the horizon 
variable but not for the other variables. Here and everywhere else, I report the results of the 
Huynh-Feldt test whenever Mauchly’s sphericity assumption is violated. The results showed 
that the chosen scaling factor was larger when forecast horizons were longer (F (1.52, 42.44) 
= 148.97; p < .001; partial η
2 = .84). That means that when forecast horizons were longer, 
participants chose to present data from longer periods of time. However, the effect of 
forecast horizon on chosen scaling factor was quadratic (F (1, 28) = 27.31; p < .001; partial 
η
2 = .49). The latter had a significant linear component as well (F (1, 28) = 221.22; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .89).  217 
 
The correlation between chosen time-scaling factor and forecast horizon was r = .77 (p < 
.001).  I accepted Hypothesis H5,1b (variation of choices of temporal scaling is greater for 
more distant  trading horizons).  
The ANOVA reported above showed also that the chosen scaling factor was smaller when H 
was smaller (F (2, 56) = 5.76; p = .005; partial η
2 = .17). This means that participants 
zoomed-in more when H was smaller; they viewed data relating to shorted time periods 
when the Hurst exponents of the graphs were smaller. I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H5,4 
(people prefer presentation of data corresponding to shorter periods of time when dealing 
with graphs with smaller Hurst exponents). The effect of the Hurst exponent on chosen 
scaling factor was linear: F (1, 28) = 9.97; p = .004; partial η
2 = .26. Figure 6.2 depicts the 
mean selected scaling factor against the Hurst exponent of the graphs for the different 
experimental conditions. 
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Participants’ selections of scaling factors affected the geometric properties of the graphs 
participants based their forecasts and decisions on. How did the resultant, scaled graphs 
look? 
Properties of scaled graphs To measure the perceived local steepness of a scaled time series, 
I extracted the average of the absolute value of the gradient at each series point. I then 
multiplied this value by the ratio of the observed time interval and the number of pixels 
along the time axes of the graph (600). I calculated local steepness measures for the original 
data series and for the data series after participants’ scaling. 
To examine Hypotheses H5,2 and H5,5 with respect to the graphs’ local steepness, I carried 
out a four-way repeated measures ANOVA on the local steepness of the data graphs, using 
the variables state (before/after scaling), the forecast horizon, the Hurst exponent, and the 
instance of the graphs as within-participant variables. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
assumption was violated for all variables except for instance. As expected, scaling reduced 
the local steepness of the graphs:  the state variable was significant (F (1, 29) = 29.66; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .51). Local steepness was larger when forecast horizon was longer (F (1.50, 
43.47) = 159.79; p < .001; partial η
2 = .85) and when the Hurst exponent was smaller (F 
(1.07, 31.15) = 2307.99; p < .001; partial η
2 = .99). A small effect of instance was also found 
(F (4, 116) = 2.54; p = .04; partial η
2 = .08). That means that scaling depended on the 
specific realisation of graphs used for the experiment. However, this effect was smaller than 
the other effects.  
There were significant interactions between all variables. Tests of simple effects yielded 
results which were in line with all our hypotheses or did not contradict them. I report the 
results of the interactions and of the corresponding simple tests in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
The local steepness values of the original and of the scaled graphs were significantly 
correlated (r = .58; p < .01). Both steepness variables were correlated with the Hurst 
exponents of the original graphs (r = -.95; p < .01, r = -.55; p < .01, respectively). These 219 
 
results support Hypotheses H5,2 and H5,5 with respect to the graphs’ local steepness (that is, 
there is a positive correlation between forecast horizon and the local steepness of the time-
scaled data graphs, and there is a negative correlation between the local steepness of the 
time-scaled graphs and the Hurst exponent of the original data). 
To examine Hypotheses H5,2 and H5,5 with respect to the graphs’ oscillation (the difference 
between the minimum and the maximum of each graph), I carried out a four-way repeated 
measures ANOVA on the oscillation of the data graphs, using the same variables as before. 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity assumption was violated only for the variable instance.  
The results showed that oscillation was smaller in the scaled graphs (F (1, 29) = 98.49; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .77). The analysis also revealed that oscillation was larger when forecast 
horizon was longer (F (2, 58) = 204.46; p < .001; partial η
2 = .88), and when the Hurst 
exponent was smaller (F (2, 58) = 6106.67; p < .001; partial η
2 = .99). There was also a 
significant effect of graph’s instance on oscillation (F (4, 116) = 547.22; p < .01; partial η
2 = 
.95).  
All possible interactions of these variables were significant as well, with F > 10.27 (p < .001; 
partial η
2 > .26).   I report the results of the interactions and of the corresponding simple tests 
in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
Like with the local steepness, the oscillation of the original graphs and the oscillation of the 
scaled graphs were significantly correlated (r = .58; p < .01). Both oscillation variables were 
correlated with the Hurst exponents of the original graphs, though not as strongly as the 
local steepness (r = -.50; p < .01, r = -.72; p < .01, respectively). These results support 
Hypotheses H5,2 and H5,5  with respect to the graphs’ oscillation (that is, there is a positive 
correlation between forecast horizon and the oscillation of the time-scaled data graphs, and 
there is a negative correlation between the oscillation of the time-scaled graphs and the 
Hurst exponent of the original data). 220 
 
The mean values of local steepness and oscillation of the scaled graphs are presented in 
Table 6.1. Figure 6.3 depicts the mean local steepness and oscillation of the time-scaled 
graphs for the different conditions of the Hurst exponent and the forecast horizon.  
To conclude, I accepted Hypotheses H5,2 and H5,5. 
Forecast dispersion Forecast dispersion measures can indicate how unstable the market is. I 
extracted three dispersion measures:  
1.  FD1 - forecast dispersion with respect to the mean forecast of participants in each of 
the conditions of the experiment (the standard deviation of the absolute value of the 
difference between the forecast of each participant in a certain condition and the 
mean of all participants’ forecasts in the same condition). FD1 provides information 
about forecast dispersion over the group. 
2.  FD2 - forecast dispersion with respect to the last data point in each of the conditions 
of the experiment (the standard deviation of the absolute value of the difference 
between the forecast of each participant in a certain condition and the value of the 
time series on day 200). FD2 provides information about dispersion with respect to 
the present price of each asset. 
3.  FError - forecast dispersion with respect to price of the time series on the required 
forecast day (the standard deviation of the absolute value of the difference between 
the forecast of each participant in a certain condition and the value of the time series 
on the forecast date). FError indicates participants’ forecast error with respect to the 
produced time series. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the reference points used for the calculation of each of these error 
measures. 
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Figure 6.3  Mean steepness (upper panel) and oscillation (lower panel) of time-scaled graphs 
in Experiment 1. 
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Table 6.1 The mean local steepness (first panel) and oscillation (second panel) of time-
scaled graphs in Experiment 1. 
 
Mean local 
steepness 
 Hurst exponent 
0.3  0.5  0.7  Mean 
Forecast 
horizon 
(days) 
2  4.71    
(8.12)  
1.46 
(2.51)   
0.55 
(0.86)    
2.24 
(5.24) 
15  11.68 
(8.85)    
3.49     
(2.50) 
1.17     
(0.77) 
5.45 
(6.97) 
100  33.29   
(10.06) 
9.12   
(2.88) 
2.76 
(0.86)     
15.06 
(14.49) 
Mean    16.56 
(15.16) 
4.69 
(4.18) 
1.49 
(1.25) 
7.58 
(11.17) 
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Mean oscillation   Hurst exponent 
0.3  0.5  0.7  Mean 
Forecast 
horizon 
(days) 
2  187.43   
(101.74)  
94.62 
(67.46)   
65.46 
(80.33)    
115.84 
(98.98) 
15  298.05 
(89.45)    
160.95    
(55.99) 
133.98     
(94.02) 
197.66 
(108.64) 
100  457.74   
(67.54) 
257.74  
(223.41) 
223.41 
(112.75)     
312.97 
(134.15) 
Mean    314.40 
(141.23) 
171.11 
(92.79) 
140.95 
(116.13) 
208.82 
(140.44) 
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Figure 6.4  An illustration of the reference points used for the calculation of FD1, FD2, and 
FError when forecast horizon of 100 days: price graph against time (solid line: the data 
which was presented to the participant, dashed line: the continuation of the series which was 
not presented to the participant), participants forecasts (stars), the last data point which was 
presented to the participants (square), price at the required forecast date (circle), and the 
mean of participants’ forecasts (triangle).  
FD1 was calculated using the differences between participants’ forecasts and the mean of 
participants’ forecasts (triangle), FD2 was calculated using the differences between 
participants’ forecasts and the last data point (square), and FError was calculated using the 
differences between participants’ forecasts and the price at the required forecast date (circle). 
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The mean values of the three dispersion measures are presented in Table 6.2. Figure 6.5 
depicts the means of the dispersion measures for the different experimental conditions. 
 
Table 6.2 The mean forecast dispersions FD1 (first panel), FD2 (second panel), FError (third 
panel). 
 
Forecast 
dispersion FD1 
 Hurst exponent 
0.3  0.5  0.7  Mean 
Forecast 
horizon 
(days) 
2  26.82    
(26.97)  
23.81 
(35.64)   
19.05 
(34.67)    
23.23 
(32.74) 
15  49.07 
(42.78)    
36.34     
(27.31) 
28.26     
(23.38) 
37.88 
(33.31) 
100  99.61    
(88.12) 
65.20     
(52.24) 
84.76 
(99.42)     
83.19 
(83.43) 
Mean    58.50 
(65.99) 
41.78 
(43.31) 
44.02 
(68.60) 
48.10 
(60.79) 
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Forecast 
dispersion FD2 
 Hurst exponent 
0.3  0.5  0.7  Mean 
Forecast 
horizon 
(days) 
2  28.61    
(26.81)  
23.35 
(37.31)   
20.75 
(35.08)    
24.24 
(33.46) 
15  50.98  
(45.02)    
36.81     
(27.18) 
30.25     
(23.00) 
39.35 
(34.18) 
100  106.90    
(89.15) 
66.50     
(51.46) 
86.67 
(99.13)     
86.69 
(83.96) 
Mean    62.16 
(68.08) 
42.22 
(43.72) 
45.89 
(68.51) 
50.09 
(65.22) 
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Forecast error 
FError 
 Hurst exponent 
0.3  0.5  0.7  Mean 
Forecast 
horizon 
(days) 
2  50.74  
(45.48)  
27.89 
(35.03)   
29.03 
(33.39)    
35.88 
(39.68) 
15  114.16  
(110.39)    
41.50     
(28.94) 
61.12    
(33.37) 
72.26 
(75.07) 
100  174.23    
(149.10) 
167.10     
(114.93) 
134.38 
(105.49)     
158.57 
(125.51) 
Mean    113.04 
(121.06) 
78.83 
(94.89) 
74.84 
(79.88) 
88.91 
(101.45) 
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Figure 6.5 Forecast dispersion measures in Experiment 1. Upper panel: FD1. Central panel: 
FD2. Lower panel: FError. 
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To examine Hypotheses H5,3 and H5,6, I carried out for each of the dispersion measures a 
three-way repeated measures ANOVA using the variables Horizon, Hurst exponent, and 
Instance as within-participant variables. I report here the results of the ANOVA of FD1. The 
results of the ANOVAs of FD2 and FError were similar. I report them in Table B.2 in 
Appendix B. 
For FD1, sphercity assumption was violated for all variables apart from the Hurst exponent 
and the instance. The analysis revealed that FD1 was larger when the Hurst exponent was 
smaller (F (2, 58) = 10.32; p < .001; partial η
2 = .26) and when forecast horizon was longer 
(F (1.39, 40.42) = 84.67; p < .001; partial η
2 = .75). There was also a significant effect of 
instance on forecast dispersion, indicating that participants reacted to graph characteristics 
other than the Hurst exponent as well (F (4, 116) = 16.91; p < .001; partial η
2 = .37).  
All possible interactions between these variables were significant, with F > 5.44 (p ≤ .002; 
partial η
2 > 0.16).   I report the results of the interactions and of the corresponding simple 
tests in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
The correlations between forecast dispersion measures and local steepness or oscillation of 
the scaled graphs were higher than those with the same properties of the original graphs. 
Significant correlations were obtained also between forecast dispersion measures and 
forecast horizon. The correlations are summarised in Table 6.3. These results support 
Hypotheses H5,3 and H5,6 (dispersion of forecasts is positively correlated with the required 
forecast horizon, and the dispersion of forecasts is negatively correlated with the Hurst 
exponents of the original graphs and positively correlated with the local steepness and 
oscillation of the data graphs). 
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Table 6.3 Correlations between forecast dispersion measures, local steepness of graphs, 
oscillation, and forecast horizon. 
 
  Original graphs  Time-scaled graphs  Forecast 
horizon 
Forecast 
dispersion 
measure 
Hurst 
exponent 
Local 
steepness 
Oscillation  Local 
steepness 
Oscillation 
FD1  r = -.10 
p < .01 
r = .12  
p < .01 
r = .22  
p < .01 
r = .29  
p < .01 
r = .44  
p < .01 
r = .42  
p < .01 
FD2  r = -.11 
p< .01 
r = .13  
p < .01 
r = .23  
p < .001 
r = .31  
p < .01 
r = .45  
p < .01 
r = .43  
p < .01 
FError  r = -.15  
p < .01 
r = .17  
p < .01 
r = .15   
p < .01 
r = .34  
p < .01 
r = .46  
p < .01 
r = .50  
p < .01 
 
Decision parameters To examine Hypotheses H5,7, I extracted the resultant share number. 
For each asset, resultant share number was defined to be 0 if participant chose the option 
‘sell’, 1 if participant chose the option ‘hold’, and 2 if participant chose the option ‘buy’. I 
carried out a three-way repeated measures ANOVA using the same variables used before as 
within-participant variables. The analysis failed to find a significant effect of forecast 
horizon and the Hurst exponent on the resultant share number. I found a significant effect of 
graph instance on the resultant share number (F (2.25, 62.92) = 7.02; p < .001; partial η
2 = 231 
 
.2) and a weak but significant interaction between graph instance and the Hurst exponent  (F 
(2.89, 80.93) = 2.88; p = .04; partial η
2 = .09). Tests of simple effects showed that the effect 
of instance was significant only for low and high Hurst exponents (for H = 0.3, F (4, 25) = 
2.99; p = .04; partial η
2 = .32, for H = 0.7, F (4, 25) = 2.92; p = .03; partial η
2 = .32). 
I expected resultant share number to depend on participants’ forecasts. The analysis revealed 
that resultant share number was significantly and positively correlated with the difference 
between the participant’s forecast and the last data point (r = .53; p < .01). This establishes a 
connection between participants’ expectations and actions: the higher the difference between 
the forecast and the price at present was, the larger was participants’ tendency to advise 
buying more shares. When participants thought that the prices would decrease, they tended 
to advise that shares be sold. This provides support for Hypothesis H5,7 (people’s trading 
behaviour depends on their forecasts). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 was performed to analyse the effects of the Hurst exponent and forecast 
horizon on financial forecasts and decisions. Participants were asked to imagine that they 
were financial analysts and that they had clients with different trading frequencies. 
Participants were presented with a set of 45 graphs, each representing the price series of each 
of their client’s assets. On each trial, participants were informed that they would have to 
make a forecast for a certain date and were asked to scale the graph in the way that they 
considered most appropriate for that purpose. Afterwards, they were asked to make the 
forecast and to advise their clients whether to buy, sell, or hold their assets. I manipulated 
the Hurst exponent of the data graphs and the forecast horizons.  
The results indicated that, when asked to make financial forecasts, participants chose to scale 
the graphs rather than leave them with the initially presented time interval. Their choices had 
a relatively large variance. I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H5,1a, supporting the 
Heterogeneous Market approach of Peters (1995) and Müller et al. (1993). 232 
 
In line with Corsi’s argument (2009), I found that participants chose to scale the graphs in a 
way that was correlated with the required forecast horizon and that, when forecast horizons 
were larger, scaled graphs had higher local steepness and oscillation than the originals.  
These results supported Hypotheses H5,1b and H5,2. In addition, the results indicate that 
longer forecast horizons result in larger forecast dispersions, and so support Hypothesis H5,3. 
The results indicate that the geometric properties of the data graphs affect people’s scaling 
and decisions as well. People’s chosen time-scale depended on the Hurst exponents of the 
graphs. In particular, they tended to “zoom-in” more when Hurst exponents were smaller. 
That is, when the Hurst exponent was small, people chose to look at a smaller time-period. I, 
therefore, accept Hypothesis H5,4. 
The local steepness and oscillation of the scaled graphs were positively correlated with the 
local steepness and oscillation of the original graphs, and negatively correlated with the 
Hurst exponents of the original graphs. Therefore, I accept Hypothesis H5, which suggests 
that the way that participants choose to see the market preserves geometric properties of the 
data. 
As a result, forecast dispersion measures were negatively correlated with the Hurst 
exponents of the data graphs. Thus, I accepted Hypothesis H5,6.  According to Athanassakos 
and Kalimipalli (2003), there is a strong correlation between analysts' forecast dispersion 
and future return volatility. Therefore, the way people choose to see price series serves as 
one of the mechanisms that preserve their structure.  
Finally, there was a significant correlation between participants’ forecasts and final share 
number. I accepted Hypothesis H5,7. 
Experiment 2 
 
The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to examine the effect of the Hurst exponent of a time 
series on the size of a chosen moving average filter and on financial forecasts from fractal 233 
 
graphs. I hypothesised that the way that people perceive fractal graphs has a role in 
stabilising the market. More precisely, I hypothesised that people select moving average 
filters which preserve the geometric properties of the price graphs. The secondary aim of the 
experiment was to examine the effect of the density of the required forecasts on the chosen 
sizes of a moving average filter. I hypothesised that chosen smoothing factors are smaller 
when required forecast densities are larger 
I tested the following hypotheses: 
H5,8a: People use smoothing when making financial forecasts and decisions. In particular, the 
variance of the choices of averaging windows is substantial with respect to the mean, that is, 
at least 50% of the mean 
H5,8b: Chosen smoothing factors are smaller when Hurst exponents are smaller. That is, 
people zoom-in more and present shorter time intervals when graphs with lower Hurst 
exponents are presented. 
H5,9a: There is a negative correlation between the Hurst exponent of the original data and the 
local steepness and oscillation of the smoothed graphs. 
H5,9b: There is a positive correlation between the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothed data graphs and the original ones. 
H5,10: The local steepness and oscillation of forecast sequences made from fractal graphs are 
positively correlated with the local steepness and oscillation of the smoothened graphs, 
respectively, and negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of the data graphs. 
H5,11: Chosen smoothing factors are smaller when required forecast densities are larger 
(people zoom-in more when forecast densities are high). 
H5,12: There is a positive correlation between the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothed data graphs and the required density of forecasts. 234 
 
H5,13:  Local steepness and oscillation of the forecasts is positively correlated with the 
required density of the forecast. 
I presented participants with a sequence of time series. Each one was presented on a separate 
trial. At the beginning of each trial, two identical copies of the same time series were 
presented on the same axes. Both copies remained visible during the whole duration of each 
trial. However, the task window enabled participants to smooth one of the graphs. The other 
graph remained fixed. That made it possible for the participants to smooth each price data 
graph while seeing the original data. Participants were asked to choose the smoothness level 
they considered the most appropriate for making financial decisions from it, and then to 
make a forecast series based on the smoothened graph. I manipulated two main variables: 
the Hurst exponent of the original data graphs (and thus also their local steepness and 
oscillation), and the number of required forecast points, or, equivalently, the forecast 
density. Figure 6.6 depicts the task window of Experiment 2. It shows a graph of the original 
data and the corresponding smoothed graph (on the same axis).  
Method 
Participants Thirty-four people (15 men and 19 women) with an average age of 26.4 years 
acted as participants. They were paid a flat fee of £3.00.  
Stimulus materials Stimulus graphs included six sets of five time series with Hurst 
exponents H = 0.3, 0.4 , 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7. The time series were produced using the Spectral 
method described by Saupe (Peitgen and Saupe, 1988). All of the time series included 3600 
points and were presented to participants as asset price graphs. 
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Figure 6.6  The task window of Experiment 2: a price graph (the jagged lined) and a 
corresponding smoothed graph (the smoother line). 
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Experimental programme Stimulus graphs were presented using a Matlab programme. The 
experimental programme enabled participants to apply an averaging filter to the price 
graphs, while viewing the original price graphs and to make forecasts on pre-specified dates.  
Application of the averaging filter was done using a slider. The filter’s range was from an 
averaging window of size 2 (averaging over every two adjacent elements of the series) to 
averaging over the whole series, the latter resulting in a constant line. To enable participants 
to both express fine details at the lower end of the scale and reach the maximum averaging, 
the slider was exponentially calibrated.  
The experimental programme required participants to make forecasts on dates designated by 
vertical lines. There were 6, 12, 24, or 36 lines. In each task, participants could change 
smoothing level until they clicked the button “Completed choice of smoothing level?”. They 
could edit their forecasts by clicking the mouse again on any bar, until they clicked the 
button “Completed your forecast?” (Figure 6.6).  
Design Participants were presented with 23 graphs: three familiarisation graphs and 20 
experimental graphs. Only experimental graphs were taken into account during the analysis 
stage. Each graph required two responses. The first response was a choice of smoothing 
level. The second response was to forecast the asset’s future prices.  
 For each participant, four graphs with each value of Hurst exponent (H=0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 
0.7) were randomly chosen from the stimulus sets. For each value of Hurst exponent, the 
density of the required forecast was manipulated, and was set to a value of 6, 12, 24, or 36 
forecasts within a three-year period. That gave rise to a five (Hurst exponent) by four 
(forecast density) design. Ordering of trials with different Hurst exponents and forecast 
densities was random. 
Procedure Participants were asked to read the following instructions: 237 
 
“In the following task, you are asked to imagine that you are a financial analyst working at 
an investment company. Your clients ask you to give them a three year forecast. Each client 
asks for a forecast of a different resolution: some clients need a monthly forecast (a total of 
36 points), some require a forecast point every 6 months (a total of 6 points), and some are 
interested in an intermediate number of forecast points (a total of 12 points or 24 points). 
You will be presented with a series of 3 practice graphs and 20 experiment graphs 
representing prices of different assets. The programme will enable you to set the smoothness 
level of the data graphs. You are asked: 
1.  to look at the graphs carefully,  
2.  for each of the graphs, to determine the smoothness level you consider the most 
appropriate for making financial decisions from it, 
3.  to predict the prices on a series of time points based on the smoothened graph. The 
number of forecasts will be 6, 12, 24, or 36 points according to the request obtained 
from each of your clients.” 
Participants chose a smoothness level of data graphs by dragging a slider. The smoothed 
graph was presented in red. The original graph was presented in blue.  
Forecasts were made by clicking a mouse at specific dates, designated by vertical lines. 
Participants had to complete the forecasts on all vertical lines (dates) before they could 
continue to the next graph. 
Results 
Participants whose means of smoothing level choices were more than two standard 
deviations greater than that of the average for the rest of the group were excluded from the 
analysis. This reduced the size of the sample from 34 to 32 participants. Three additional 
extreme measurements (out of the original 20 * 34 = 680 measurements), in which 238 
 
participants chose smoothing levels more than four standard deviation greater than that of 
the mean of the experimental condition were removed as well. Therefore, I used 637 graphs 
for the analysis. 
The variables of primary interest were chosen the smoothing factors, the local steepness and 
oscillation of smoothed data graphs and participants’ forecasts. Chosen smoothing factors 
indicate the resolution at which participants preferred to perceive the market. Local 
steepness and the oscillation of graphs can be used to measure similarity between forecasts 
and the original and smoothened data. Such correlations may suggest perception as a 
mechanism of preservation of parameters of asset graphs. The results are presented in Table 
6.5.  
Choice of smoothness level The mean smoothness level participants chose was 59.09. The 
standard deviation was larger than the mean: 82.61. A t-test performed on participants 
choices of smoothness levels showed that it was significantly larger than 1 (a trivial filter): t 
(636) = 17.76 (p < .01). These results support Hypothesis H5,8a (The variance of the choices 
of averaging windows is substantial with respect to the mean). 
To examine Hypotheses H5,8b and  H11, I carried out a two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
on chosen smoothness level using the Hurst exponent and the forecast density as within-
participant variables. Here, and everywhere else, when Mauchly’s sphericity assumption is 
violated, I report results of the Huynh-Feldt test. Mauchly’s sphericity assumption was 
violated for both the Hurst exponent and the required number of points. The Huynh-Feldt 
test showed that Hurst exponent had a significant effect on the chosen smoothing factor (F 
(4, 65.93) = 3.12; p = .045; partial η
2 = .10). However, this effect was quadratic and not 
linear (F (1, 29) = 9.54; p = .04; partial η
2 = .25). The chosen smoothing factor was larger for 
H > 0.5 and H < 0.5 than for H = 0.5. That means that participants applied larger smoothing 
factors on graphs that did not satisfy the assumptions of the random walk model than on 
those that did satisfy those assumptions. These results support Hypothesis H5,8b (people 239 
 
zoom-in more and present shorter time intervals when graphs with lower Hurst exponents 
are presented) only for H values smaller than or equal to 0.5. The chosen smoothing factor 
was larger when forecast density was smaller (F (3, 53.12) = 6.54; p = .004; partial η
2 = .18). 
This was a linear effect (F (1, 29) = 10.17; p = .003; partial η
2 = .26) and supports 
Hypothesis H11 (people zoom-in more when forecast densities are high). Figure 6.7 depicts 
the mean chosen smoothing factors against the Hurst exponent of the graphs and the 
required forecast density.   
 
 
Figure 6.7 Mean of chosen smoothness levels against the Hurst exponent of the given graphs 
(upper panel) and forecast density, measured by the number of required forecast points in the 
forecasting period (lower panel). Standard error is indicated with the bars. 
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Table 6.4. The mean chosen smoothness levels (first panel), local steepness of forecasts 
(second panel), and oscillation of participants’ forecasts (third panel) in Experiment 2. 
 
The mean chosen 
smoothness levels 
Hurst exponent   
0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  Mean 
Required 
number 
of  
forecast  
points 
6  65.68    
(74.25)  
86.21 
(99.93)   
54.31 
(53.52)    
73.35 
(63.09) 
116.62     
(150.47) 
79.5 
(96.56) 
12  57.05  
(54.19)    
43.59     
(49.41) 
59.80     
(57.20) 
70.00     
(99.12) 
44.94    
(37.93) 
55.07 
(63.09) 
24  61.25     
(95.47) 
36.04     
(33.86) 
34.50 
(36.66)     
41.73    
(33.90) 
66.40     
(76.50) 
48.00 
(61.71) 
36  41.61     
(41.79) 
40.30     
(43.07) 
32.90 
(31.16) 
40.00     
(46.31) 
59.09 
(61.28) 
42.78 
(46.022) 
Mean    56.32 
(69.21) 
51.54 
(64.63) 
45.31 
(46.89) 
56.12 
(66.45) 
71.76 
(94.67) 
56.21 
(82.61) 
 
   241 
 
 
The mean local 
steepness of 
forecasts 
Hurst exponent   
0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  Mean 
Required 
number 
of  
forecast  
points 
6  0.41    
(0.23)  
0.28 
(0.14)   
0.22 
(0.10)    
0.21 
(0.11) 
0.18     
(0.07) 
0.26 
(0.16) 
12  0.58  
(0.25)    
0.40     
(0.17) 
0.30     
(0.11) 
0.28     
(0.13) 
0.20     
(0.09) 
0.35 
(0.20) 
24  0.77     
(0.33) 
0.60     
(0.33) 
0.48 
(0.20)     
0.39     
(0.24) 
0.29     
(0.14) 
0.51 
(0.31) 
36  0.82     
(0.45) 
0.67     
(0.32) 
0.56 
(0.31) 
0.58     
(0.65) 
0.39 
(0.21) 
0.60 
(0.43) 
Mean    0.65 
(0.37) 
0.49 
(0.30) 
0.39 
(0.24) 
0.37 
(0.38) 
0.26 
(0.16) 
0.43 
(0.31) 
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Forecasts’ 
oscillation  
Hurst exponent   
0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  Mean 
Required 
number 
of  
forecast  
points 
6  1.69    
(0.84)  
1.48 
(0.90)   
1.17 
(0.57)    
1.01 
(0.48) 
1.01     
(0.43) 
1.27 
(0.72) 
12  2.19 
(0.85)    
1.60     
(0.93) 
1.22     
(0.61) 
1.18     
(0.35) 
1.00     
(0.47) 
1.45 
(0.83) 
24  2.01     
(0.75) 
1.79     
(0.88) 
1.48 
(0.54)     
1.21     
(0.65) 
1.19     
(0.71) 
1.54 
(0.78) 
36  1.91     
(0.83) 
1.82     
(0.71) 
1.57 
(0.69) 
1.49     
(0.98) 
1.34 
(0.517) 
1.63 
(0.78) 
Mean    1.95 
(0.83) 
1.67 
(0.86) 
1.36 
(0.62) 
1.22 
(0.67) 
1.14 
(0.55) 
1.47 
(0.72) 
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Application of similar smoothing filters on graphs with high and low Hurst exponents may 
result in different local gradients and oscillation. What were the local steepness and 
oscillation of the resultant, smoothened graphs and how did they correlate with the Hurst 
exponent of the data? 
Properties of smoothed data graphs To examine Hypotheses H5,9 and H5,12, I extracted the 
local steepness and oscillation  of the original data graphs and of the smoothed graphs. The 
measure for local steepness of a time series was the average of the absolute value of the 
gradient at each series point. The oscillation of each series was defined as the difference 
between its maximum and minimum values.  
To assess the effect of the smoothing task on the data, I carried out a three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA on the local steepness of the data graphs, using state (before/after 
smoothing), the Hurst exponent and forecast density as within-participant variables. 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity assumption was violated for the Hurst exponent and forecast 
density. The local steepness of graphs was smaller after smoothing (F (1, 29) = 346.9; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .92) and when Hurst exponent was larger (F (4, 37.06) = 825.60; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .97). No other significant effects were found. I report results about the 
interaction obtained in Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
The correlation between the Hurst exponent and the local steepness of the smoothened 
graphs was r = -.51; p < .01 (the correlation between Hurst exponent and local steepness of 
the original data graphs was r = -.94; p < .01). The correlation between the local steepness of 
the original and smoothed data graphs was r = .52; p < .01.  
To assess the effect of the task variables on the oscillation of the data, I carried out a three-
way repeated measures ANOVA on the oscillation of the data graphs, using the same 
variables as before. Mauchley’s sphericity assumption was violated for the Hurst exponent 
and number of required forecast points. The analysis revealed that oscillation was larger in 
the original data (F (1, 29) = 163.82; p < .001; partial η
2 = .85) and when Hurst exponent 244 
 
was smaller (F (2.5, 72.49) = 188.91; p < .001; partial η
2 = .87). ). There was a significant 
interaction between state and the Hurst exponent (F (1.71, 49.55) = 129.45; p < .001; partial 
η
2 = 0.82). In addition, there were small interaction effects between forecast density and 
state (F (2.36, 68.29) = 3.46; p = .03; partial η
2 = .11) and between forecast density and the 
Hurst exponent (F (5.12, 148.45) = 5.38; p = .03; partial η
2 = .16). I report the relevant tests 
of simple effects in Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
The correlation between Hurst exponent and the oscillation of the smoothened data graphs 
was r = -.61; p < .01. (The correlation between Hurst exponent and the oscillation of the 
original data graphs was r = -.80; p < .01). The correlation between the oscillations of the 
smoothened and original data graphs was r = .88; p < .01. 
Figure 6.8 depicts the local steepness and mean oscillation of the smoothed data graph for 
the different values of the Hurst exponent and the different numbers of required forecast 
points. These results support Hypotheses H5,9a and H5,9b (there is a negative correlation 
between the Hurst exponent of the original data and the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothed graphs). However, due to the lack of main effects of forecast density on properties 
of the smoothed graphs, I reject Hypothesis H5,12 (about the correlation between the local 
steepness and oscillation of the smoothed data graphs and the required density of forecasts).  
Properties of participants’ forecasts To examine Hypotheses H5,10 and H5,13, I extracted local 
steepness and oscillation of the forecast series and compared them to those of the data and 
the smoothened data. 
To analyse local steepness of the forecasts, I carried out a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA on the steepness of participants’ forecasts using the Hurst exponent and forecast 
density as within-participant variables. Huynh-Feldt test showed that local steepness of 
forecasts was larger when Hurst exponent of the data graphs was smaller (F (3.05, 88.54) = 
41.15; p < .01; partial η
2 = .59) and when the forecast density was larger (F (1.78, 51.65) = 
30.94; p < .01; partial η
2 = .52). 245 
 
The correlation between the local steepness of the forecasts and the Hurst exponent of the 
smoothed graphs was r = -0.39 (p < .01). Similar (positive) correlations were found between 
the steepness of the forecasts and the local steepness of the data before or after the 
smoothing (r = 0.39; p < .01, and r = .33; p < .01 respectively).  
 
Figure 6.8 The mean local steepness (upper panel) and oscillation (lower panel) of smoothed 
data graphs for each of the experimental conditions 246 
 
Controlling for the Hurst exponent (and local steepness) of the data graphs, the correlation 
between the steepness of the forecasts and the steepness in the smoothed data was significant 
(r = .16; p < .01). However, controlling for the Hurst exponent of the data graphs and the 
local steepness in the smoothed data, the correlation between the steepness in the forecasts 
and the steepness in the original data graphs was insignificant (p = .13). That suggests that 
participants did indeed to make their forecasts according to the smoothed graphs, as the 
instructions required them to do. 
The correlation between forecast density and the local steepness of the forecasts was r = 0.41 
(p < .01).  
To analyse the oscillation of the forecasts, I carried out a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA using the same variables. Mauchley’s sphericity assumption was violated for the 
Hurst exponent, but not for the number of required forecast points. Huynh-Feldt test showed 
that the oscillation of the forecasts was larger when the Hurst exponent of the data was 
smaller (F (3.42, 99.08) = 37.02; p < .01; partial η
2 = .56). In addition, the oscillation of the 
forecasts was larger when the required forecast density was larger (F (3, 87) = 8.80; p < .01; 
partial η
2 = .23). 
The correlation between the oscillation of the forecasts and the Hurst exponent of the 
smoothed graphs was r = -.38 (p < .01). Similar (positive) correlations were found between 
the oscillation in the forecasts and the oscillation in the data both before and after smoothing 
(r = .43; p < .01, and r = .40; p < .01 respectively). Controlling for the Hurst exponent of the 
data graphs and the data oscillation, the correlation between the oscillation of the forecasts 
and smoothed data was small but significant (r = .08; p = .04). However, controlling for the 
Hurst exponent of the data graphs and the oscillation of the smoothed data, the correlation 
between the steepness of the forecasts and original data graphs was insignificant (p = .08). 
As with the case of the local steepness, these results support the hypothesis that participants 247 
 
indeed made their forecasts according to the smoothed graphs, as the instructions required 
them to.  
The correlation between the number of required forecast points and the oscillation in the 
forecast sequence was r = .16 (p < .01). 
These results support Hypotheses H5,10 and H5,13.(That is, the local steepness and oscillation 
of forecast sequences are positively correlated with the local steepness and oscillation of the 
smoothened graphs, negatively correlated with the Hurst exponent of the data graphs, and 
positively correlated with the required density of the forecast). 
Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10 presents the mean values of the local steepness and oscillation in 
the forecasts against the Hurst exponent of the data and the number of required forecast 
points.  
Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 aimed to elucidate the way that people perceive financial graphs and make 
financial forecasts from them. Participants were presented with a set of 20 graphs, and were 
asked to look at each one to determine the smoothness level they considered the most 
appropriate for making financial decisions. They were then asked “to predict the prices on a 
series of time points based on the smoothed graph”. I manipulated both the Hurst exponent 
of the data graphs, and the density of required forecast points.  
The results showed clearly that participants considered graphs smoothed with a non-trivial 
averaging filter more appropriate for making financial decisions than the raw data. Chosen 
window sizes had a large variance, thereby supporting hypothesis H5,8a.  
In spite of the large variance of chosen smoothness factors, participants’ choices of 
smoothness levels were far from random: they depended linearly on forecast density, and 
exhibited a U-shape dependence on the Hurst exponents of the given graphs. I, therefore 
accepted Hypothesis H5,8b for H values smaller or equal to 0.5 and Hypothesis H5,11. 248 
 
However, the most important aspect of the smoothing process was not the size of the chosen 
filter, but rather the visible properties it produced in the resulting smoothed graphs. The 
analysis revealed that the local steepness and oscillation of the smoothened graphs were 
significantly different than those in the original data. Furthermore, they were correlated with 
the Hurst exponent, local steepness and oscillation of the data graphs. This supports both 
parts of hypotheses H5,9. 
 
Figure 6.9  The mean steepness of forecasts plotted against the Hurst exponent of the graphs 
(upper panel) and plotted against the number of required forecast points in the forecasting 
period (lower panel).  Bars show standard error measures.   249 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.10 The mean steepness (upper panels) and oscillation (lower panels) of forecasts 
plotted against the Hurst exponent of the graphs (left panels) and plotted against the number 
of required forecast points in the forecasting period (right panels).  Bars show standard error 
measures. 250 
 
On the other hand, the analysis failed to show a significant effect of the number of required 
forecasts on the local steepness of the smoothed graphs or their oscillation. That means that 
the way people perceived the graphs did not depend on the density of the required forecasts. 
I, therefore, rejected Hypothesis H5,12. 
Nevertheless, both manipulated variables – the Hurst exponent of the data graphs and 
forecast density – affected properties of participants’ forecasts. Their average steepness and 
oscillation were positively correlated with those in the data, and negatively correlated with 
the Hurst exponents of the original graphs. I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H5,10. As with 
scaling, the way people used moving window averaging and then made forecasts preserved 
the geometric properties of the data. 
Local steepness and oscillation of forecasts were positively correlated with forecast density. 
I, therefore, accepted Hypothesis H5,13. However, as Hypothesis H5,12 was rejected, I 
interpret the dependence of forecasts on forecast density as a bias resulting from the task 
rather than from the way participants perceived the data: a larger number of required 
forecasts encouraged participants to produce steeper forecasts with larger amplitudes. This 
result is in line with the correlation that I found between forecast noise and the number of 
forecast points in Chapter 4. 
Conclusions 
In the book “An Engine, Not a Camera, How Financial Models Shape Markets”, MacKenzie 
(2006, page 12) wrote: “Financial economics, I argue, did more than analyze markets; it 
altered them. It was an “engine” [...]: an active force transforming its environment, not a 
camera passively recording it”. MacKenzie analyses the way financial theories developed 
and affected the markets. However, I argue that not only theories affect markets. Rather, I 
suggest that the way people perceive and react to financial data can affect price series. In 
particular, this behaviour stabilises markets enough to make financial theories and forecast 
methods feasible. 251 
 
This research has dealt with the way that people use highly popular financial data 
presentation techniques – scaling and moving window averaging.  Both techniques have 
been related via financial models to the formation of fractal or fat-tail price series (Peters, 
1995; Müller et al. 1993; Corsi, 2009; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005). Scaling was 
discussed in the context of trading horizons. I showed here that, apart from the trading 
horizon, scaling and moving window averaging depend on geometrical properties of the 
perceived data graphs. Indeed, the effect of the perception of volatility in price series on the 
market has been shown to be important by Manzan and Westerhoff (2005). However, they 
studied this effect in the context of over- and under-reaction. My results indicate that, though 
there is a large variability among participants in choice of scaling and moving window 
averaging parameters, there is still a correlation between the local steepness and oscillation 
of the transformed data graphs, and the local steepness, oscillation, and the Hurst exponents 
of the original price graphs. This emphasises that the way that people perceive the market is 
not as passive as a camera – yet, it does preserve important qualities of the data.  
However, people are more than data preservation machines; they are the engine of the 
market. These experiments reveal that the way people make forecasts from data presented 
according to their own choice, corresponds to properties of the data as well. Three different 
forecast dispersion measures (Experiment 1) and noise measures (Experiment 2) were 
positively correlated with the local steepness and oscillation of the data graphs. However, 
forecast dispersion is correlated with volatility of returns (Athanassakos and Kalimipalli, 
2003). I, therefore, conclude that the way people perceive data stabilises its properties and 
suggest that this process could have a role in making forecasting methods and investment 
algorithms possible. 
 Scaling has been examined in the financial literature in the context of forecast horizon 
(Peters, 1995; Müller et al. 1993; Corsi, 2009). However, the assumptions of these models 
had not been previously tested. I accepted the hypothesis about the connection between 
trading horizons and scaling and, hence, support these models. 252 
 
In addition, I examined the effect of forecast density on the size of the moving average 
window that people select. Although such an effect was present, the analysis failed to show a 
correlation between properties of the perceived graphs and forecast density. 
Correlations were significantly less than one. This suggests that the market’s constants are 
not accurately preserved, and can provide a reason for the lack of improvement in 
forecasting accuracy despite advances in computational power over the past few decades 
(Armstrong, Green, and Graefe, 2014). Forecasting accuracy depends on, among other 
variables, the validity of its assumptions: if these assumptions do not hold accurately, its 
success is not guaranteed. 
Limitations 
The results of these experiments are consistent with findings in finance literature. For 
instance, in line with Corsi’s hypothesis (2009), when participants had to make short-term 
decisions, they used information from longer periods of time than a linear model would have 
predicted. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that participants were not instructed to use any 
specific trading strategy, they recommended that more shares be bought when they thought 
that prices would increase and that more be sold when they thought that prices would 
decrease. Indeed, research comparing financial forecasts of lay people and practitioners has 
typically found only small differences between the two groups (Zaleskiewicz, 2011; 
Muradoǧlu and Önkal, 1994). Moreover, during the last years, the internet has made trading 
easier for lay people (Muradoglu and Harvey, 2012) and inexperienced investors (Barber 
and Odean, 2001). Nevertheless, study of the effects of expertise on performance in the tasks 
employed here could be worthwhile. 
In Experiment 1, trading horizon and the Hurst exponents of the graphs were treated as 
independent variables. However, Vácha and Vošvrda (2005) have shown that presence of 
traders with different trading forecast horizons in a model can result in price series with 
different Hurst exponents. Vácha and Vošvrda (2005) showed that larger percentages of 253 
 
short-term traders were associated with lower Hurst exponents. Given  the different 
paradigm, these results do not contradict those reported here but it would still be interesting 
to develop a psychological account of them.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
Summary 
 
Using the notions that MacKenzie termed in his book “An Engine, Not a Camera, How 
Financial Models Shape Markets” (2006), this thesis has explored a wide spectrum of human 
financial behaviour, ranging from the ‘camera’ aspect – people’s perception of financial 
stimuli, to the ‘engine’ aspect - the characterisation of people as the driving force of the 
markets. 
The ‘market’ was predominantly represented in the experiments by graphically visualised 
fractional Brownian motions (fBm) or real asset price time series (Chapters 2-6). These 
designs represented settings corresponding to pure technical analysis. It is known that a large 
percentage of traders use technical analysis techniques to make financial decisions 
(Batchelor, 2013; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Taylor and Allen, 1992). However, when 
examining the effects of the market on people, I also referred to verbal descriptions relevant 
to the market, formulated as news items (Chapter 5). Incorporating verbal news in the 
experiments helped me understand the way people trade beyond technical analysis 
considerations. Though financial models usually do not take into account differences in 
human reaction to verbal news and price graphs, I conjectured that, in fact, this difference 
may affect financial decisions. The media has been shown to have a significant effect on 
investment patterns (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011). 
People’s perception of the market can be examined in different levels. The most 
fundamental level is that of sensory perception. In Chapter 2 I studied the way people see 
fBm series: whether they were sensitive to the Hurst exponent of the series, what cues they 
used when assessing them, and whether they could learn to identify them. The results 
showed that people are highly sensitive to the Hurst exponent of fractal graphs. To 
discriminate between the Hurst exponents of different graphs, people used cues such as the 255 
 
perceived ‘width’ and ‘overall darkness’ of the graphs, as well as estimates of their local 
steepness. Participants learnt to identify the Hurst exponent of fractal graphs from feedback 
alone. 
At the end of Chapter 2 and though Chapter 3 I report studies involving a higher level of 
analysis: the meaning that people attributed to fractal graphs, and in particular, the risk that 
they perceive in them. I found that, under certain conditions, people assess the risk of 
investing in an asset in line with the Hurst exponent of the corresponding price series. 
Furthermore, dependence of risk perception on the Hurst exponent was stronger than it was 
on other potentially relevant measures, such as the standard deviation of the graphs (their 
historical volatility) and their mean run-length.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I investigated the effects of people’s perception of the market on price 
series through two inseparable “engines”: financial forecasts and buy/sell decisions. I 
assumed that buy/sell decisions affected the market directly; financial forecasts affected the 
market indirectly, through the buy/sell decisions they implied. I showed that, when making 
forecasts, people attempt to imitate the noise component of the graphs that they were given. 
Participants’ forecasts were neither optimal nor naïve. When making financial decisions, 
they were influenced by properties of both news items and price series. However, they relied 
more on the former. They bought more shares when they forecast that prices would rise but 
failed to sell more when they forecast that prices would fall.  
Finally, in chapter 6 I studied the interaction between the ‘camera’ and the ‘engine’ - 
perception of graphical data, forecasts, and buy/sell decisions. Participants in the 
experiments were presented with sequences of fractal graphs. They could subject them to 
scaling and smoothing transformations, in a manner similar to the way that financial data 
providers enable the users of their programmes to select the graph presentation parameters. I 
found that both scaling and smoothing resulted in graphs, in which local steepness and 
oscillation were correlated with those of the original graphs. Forecast dispersion was also 256 
 
correlated with geometric properties of the data graphs. As forecast dispersion was found to 
be correlated with future price volatility (Athanassakos and Kalimipalli, 2003), I concluded 
that people’s perceptions and actions had a role in the preservation of the parameters of price 
graphs.   
 
Implications 
 
The results have potential applications in risk communication, forecasting, financial 
modelling, psychology, and medicine. 
Risk communication in finance 
The experiments performed in Chapter 3 are consistent with previous findings (Stone, Yates, 
Parker and Andrew, 1997) concerning the fragile nature of human risk perception: when 
price graphs were presented without additional cues, risk assessment did not depend on the 
Hurst exponents of the presented graphs but, when price change graphs were presented with 
price graphs, risk assessment did depend on them. At present, there is no standard for the 
presentation of price graphs. Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber (2005) have suggested that it 
could be useful to formulate such a standard for the presentation of graphs. In addition, I 
suggest that an emphasis on data analysis techniques may also alter perceived risk. 
Furthermore, I showed that thickness and darkness of line in graphs affects perception of the 
Hurst exponent (see Chapter 2): this could, in turn, distort risk perception and so maybe the 
format in which line price graphs are presented (line width and colour) should be 
standardised as well. 
Forecasting 
 The experiments showed that, when people make forecasts from fractal graphs, they imitate 
the noise that they perceive in the data (see Chapter 4). It might be sensible to warn 
professionals about their tendency to imitate noise, as was established by Harvey (1995). 257 
 
The analyses failed to find important differences between forecasts of experts in finance and 
lay people. This is in line with the results of Zaleskiewicz (2011) and Muradoǧlu and Önkal 
(1994) and it emphasises the importance of using algorithmic forecasting methods rather 
than judgmental forecasts.  
Financial models and simulation 
I showed that assumptions which are commonly used in financial models and simulations 
are inaccurate. Financial models should include realistic assumptions on the way people 
incorporate data of different types when making financial decisions, allow variability in 
trading latencies, and take into account individual differences (see Chapter 5). In addition, 
the analyses depicted participants as people who try to find the meaning of the data they 
perceive. Financial models and simulations should attempt to exploit this interpretation of 
traders’ performance rather than focussing exclusively on the cognitive bias approach. 
Psychological research on judgmental forecasting 
Research on judgmental forecasting has tended to focus on relatively short and simple series.  
Typically, participants have been required to make forecasts from series with a relatively 
small number of elements (Reimers and Harvey, 2011). However, in many modern contexts 
such as finance, people have to deal with complex time series containing many elements.  
Results reported here suggest that people can deal with series consisting of thousands of 
elements; they can learn their statistical properties and remember them. In fact, the longer 
the series is, the better people understand its properties. I hope that this thesis will encourage 
researchers to perform studies with a high degree of external validity and to use, in 
appropriate contexts, realistic experimental stimuli.  
Medicine 
I have shown that people are highly sensitive to fractal graphs. This sensitivity may have 
applications in fields other than finance. For instance, many medical signals which 258 
 
physicians see on a daily basis, such as heart rate and EEG patterns, have been shown to 
have fractal properties (see e.g. Goldberger, Amaral, Hausdorff, Ivanov, Peng, and Stanley, 
2002). People’s ability to learn to identify the Hurst exponent of fractal series could help 
practitioners with diagnosis of certain medical conditions. 
 
Limitations 
 
As noted before, participants in most of the experiments were mainly lay people. Although 
results were generally in line with those obtained in studies using experts, it remains 
important to replicate them on finance practitioners and in real trading environments. An 
exemplary study which achieved a high level of external validity is that of Fenton-O'Creevy, 
Soane, Nicholson and Willman (2011).  They worked with traders in banks in The City of 
London, where risk perception and reaction to news are integral to the tasks that are 
performed.   
 
Directions for future research 
 
Throughout this thesis, two human needs were found to affect financial behaviour: the need 
for validation, or reassurance, and the search for meaning. The need for reassurance was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3: I showed that people are sensitive to the Hurst exponent of price 
series but that they used the Hurst exponent as a risk measure only if cues validating its 
relevance as a risk measure were provided. The search for meaning was used to explain 
participants’ preference of news to price graphs in Chapter 5.  
In the experiments, information to (partially) satisfy these needs was given to the 
participants: in Experiments 2-4 in Chapter 3, I presented participants with price change 
graphs in addition to the price graphs. In Chapter 5, I let participants read one news item at a 259 
 
time. All news items related to a single asset were either positive or negative. However, in 
real life situations, information is rich, abundant, and often includes internal contradictions. 
How do people try to satisfy these needs in real-life situations? How do people react when 
there are conflicts between them? How do social factors affect people’s search for meaning 
and need for validation? What part do price graphs have in satisfying these needs? 
Academic background 
The search for meaning Tuckett (2011) performed a sequence of interviews with investors 
and managers. He found that they tried to give meaning to their environment through the 
creation of narratives: “fund managers build conviction by telling stories and [..] these 
stories contain specific repetitive elements so that we can think of them as following a 
predetermined script. Such scripts establish conviction both that something exceptional is 
available and it’s safe to invest in it” (page 105). Tarim (2013) analysed narratives present in 
conversations of investors in the headquarters of three brokerage firms in Istanbul. 
Investment advisors worked with computers which presented continuously news and other 
types of data, including prices. Tarim used a stream categorisation system based on that of 
Boje (2001), consisting of four types: ‘cause–effect’, ‘correlation’, ‘randomness’ and ‘proto-
story’. The latter was used in cases where a narrative could not be categorised into one of the 
first three categories for lack of logical compatibility because events were not connected in a 
meaningful way. Tarim found that most narratives could be classified as ‘cause-effect’ or 
‘proto-story’, whereas only a small percentage of them could be categorised as referring to 
correlations or randomness. Finally, a large percentage of the stories involved not only the 
past and the present, but also the present and the future, implying that the traders used 
forecasts in their narratives. Goodhart (2013) suggested that situations which raise emotional 
reactions, such as the financial crisis of 2008, produce narratives that are inaccurate and 
create a misleading picture of the market.  260 
 
Tuckett’s (2011), Tarim’s (2013), and Goodhart’s (2013) studies describe the meaning 
people attribute to market events. However, they do not predict what narratives people 
would create in different situations, and how these narratives are related to news, price 
graphs, and the Hurst exponent of the graphs. I do not know of any study that characterises 
the narratives people create using these terms. 
The need for reassurance Apart from meaning, Tuckett (2011) suggested that investors 
search for validation of their decisions in the form of non-contradicting pieces of 
information: “Hypotheses supported by different methods, and particularly those supported 
by unobtrusive measures, have a stronger claim” (page 105). Tuckett emphasised the 
psychological discomfort investors felt when the need for reassurance was not met. For 
instance, one of the investors he interviewed said (about a controversial decision he had 
made) that: “It was not easy going against consensus sentiment” (page 35). In a different 
situation, the investor “was not able to develop confidence in his thesis when the stock price 
kept falling” (page 37). 
The way people combine different data items has been studied by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) and by Andreassen (1990). De Bondt and Thaler (1985) hypothesised that people 
over-react to news when making financial decisions. Andreassen (1990) studied the effect of 
contradiction between news items and stock price trends.  He showed that people tend to use 
news items more in their decisions when they contradict price trends. Oberlechner and 
Hocking (2004) found that contradicting news was considered more important than non-
contradicting news and that information received at times of high volatility is more 
important than information obtained after a long period of stability. Recently, Goodwin 
(2014) investigated forecast adjustments that participants make when news items with 
different valances are presented simultaneously. He found that people treat news in a 
compensatory manner, so that good and bad news tend to cancel each other out.  261 
 
From the perspective of reassurance, Andreassen (1990) and Oberlechner and Hocking 
(2004) seem to imply that data that does not offer reassurance is considered more important 
than data that does. However, I did not succeed in replicating Andreassen’s (1990) and 
Oberlechner and Hocking’s (2004) findings within the paradigm used here (Chapter 5).  
Individual differences have been found to affect reassurance seeking and its consequences. 
For instance, it has been shown that reassurance seeking predicted stress in women but not 
in men (Shih and Auerbach, 2010). 
I know of no study that examines the conditions in which the need for reassurance dominates 
people’s behaviour in the financial context, or the interaction between the need for 
reassurance and the market’s volatility. Neither am I aware of any study examining the 
effects of individual differences on reassurance-seeking behaviour among traders. 
Interactions between the search for meaning and the need for validation Gonzalez, Lerch 
and Lebiere (2003) studied the way that people make decisions in ever-changing complex, 
dynamic environments. They argued that decision makers used their past knowledge and 
heuristics and that they adapted them to fit the given situation. Then they refined their 
strategies according to the feedback they received. 
The financial world is an example of such an environment. The search for meaning can be 
viewed as the motivation that drives people to use the sort of cognitive strategies that 
Gonzales et al (2003) describe. Need for validation can be related to people’s anticipation of 
feedback that they receive. However, the financial world is an especially illusory one: the 
feedback that is received can be the result of a nearly random price movement and, hence, 
misleading, and the information that is obtained can be inaccurate or wrong. Therefore, in 
certain cases, the need for validation can be in conflict with the need for meaning. What 
would a trader do when different news items contradict each other? How do traders choose 
information items? These are general issues for future work. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: question list for Experiment 5 in Chapter 2 
Question list  
1.  List three features that distinguished high M graphs from low M graphs: 
a.  ____________________ 
b.  ____________________ 
c.  ____________________ 
 
2.  How would you describe graphs with M<50? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
3.  How would you describe graphs with M>50? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
4.  Was it easier for you to assess the “M” value of graphs with M<50, or of graphs with 
M>50? (please circle a or b) 
a.  Easier to assess M value for M<50 
b.  Easier to assess M value for M>50 
5.  What, do you think, was your average error at the test stages?  
_____________________ 
6.  What is the likelihood (0-100) that your mean error in the test stages was less than .05? 
____ 288 
 
7.  Would you prefer investing money in assets whose price graphs have a relatively high 
“M” value (higher than 50) or a low “M” value (lower than 50)?(please circle a or b) 
a.  I would prefer investing money in assets with M<50. 
b.  I would prefer investing money in assets with M>50. 
Why? 
Reason:____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
8.  Which graphs, do you think, represent prices of assets which are riskier to invest in, 
graphs with M<50 or graphs with M>50? (please circle a or b) 
a.  Graphs with M<50 represents riskier assets. 
b.  Graphs with M>50 represents riskier assets. 
Thank you for your participation  
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Appendix B: Interactions and tests of simple effects in Experiments in chapter 
6. 
 
Table B.1 Interaction and simple tests of simple effects in Experiment 1 in Chapter 6. DV 
denotes dependent variables, and IV – independent variables. 
Repeated measures 
ANOVA 
Interaction  Results of tests of simple effects 
DV  IV 
local 
steepness 
of the data 
graphs 
State,  
forecast 
horizon,  
the Hurst 
exponent,  
instance  
State and 
horizon  
(F (2, 58) = 
159.79;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.85) 
For each horizon level, steepness of the data was smaller 
after scaling than before it (for horizon of 2 days, F (1, 29) 
= 247.16; p < .001; partial η
2 = .90, for horizon of 15 days, 
F (1, 29) = 60.95; p < .001; partial η
2 = .68, and for horizon 
of 100 days, F (1, 29) = 68.80; p < .001; partial η
2 = .70).  
After scaling, longer forecast horizons resulted in graphs 
with higher local steepness (F (2, 28) = 127.51; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .90).  
    State and the 
Hurst 
exponent  
(F (2, 58) = 
36.40;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.56) 
At each Hurst exponent value, scaling reduced the local 
steepness of the graphs (for H = 0.3, F (1, 29) = 34.44; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .54, for H = 0.5, F (1, 29) = 18.27; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .39, and for H = 0.7, F (1, 29) = 5.23; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .15).  
After scaling, local steepness of graphs with higher Hurst 
exponents was still lower (F (2, 28) = 222.37; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .94). (Before the scaling, local steepness of 
graphs with higher Hurst exponents was lower, as expected 
from the definition of H). 
    Forecast  For each horizon, the steepness of the graphs was larger 290 
 
horizon and 
the Hurst 
exponent  
(F (4, 116) = 
136.69;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.83) 
when H was smaller (in both the data and the scaled 
graphs). This effect increased as Hurst exponent increased 
(for forecast horizon of 2 days, F (2, 28) = 331.41; p < 
.001; partial η 
2= .96, for forecast horizon of 15 days, F (2, 
28) = 374.30; p < .001; partial η
2 = .96, for forecast horizon 
of 100 days, F (2, 28) = 628.40; p < .001; partial η
2 = .98).  
For each value of the Hurst exponent, the local steepness 
of the graphs increased with the horizon (for H=0.3, F (2, 
28) = 124.71; p < .001; partial η
2 = .90, for H=0.5, F (2, 
28) = 108.94; p < .001; partial η
2 = .87, and for H=0.3, F 
(2, 28) = 95.86; p < .001; partial η
2 = .87). 
Oscillation 
of the data 
graphs 
State,  
forecast 
horizon,  
the Hurst 
exponent,  
instance  
State and 
horizon  
(F (2, 58) = 
204.46;  
p < .001; 
partial η
2 = 
.88). 
For horizon of two days, oscillation was smaller in the 
scaled graphs than in the original graphs (F (1, 29) = 
239.69; p < .001; partial η
2 = .89). The same phenomenon 
occurred for forecast horizon of 15 days (F (1, 29) = 70.04; 
p < .001; partial η
2 = .71). However, for the long time 
horizon (100 days), oscillation was larger in the scaled 
graphs than in the original graphs (F (1, 29) = 55.81; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .66).  
In the scaled graphs, the oscillation was higher when 
horizon was longer (F (2, 28) = 161.63; p < 0.001; partial 
η
2 = 0.92). (In unscaled data graphs oscillation was the 
same whether forecast horizon was large or small). 
    State and the 
Hurst 
exponent  
(F (2, 58) = 
For each H value, oscillation was larger in the original data 
than in the scaled graphs (for H = 0.3, F (1, 29) = 188.85; p 
< .001; partial η
2 = .87, for H = 0.5, F (1, 29) = 30.70; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .51, and for H = 0.7, F (1, 29) = 54.63; p 291 
 
181.29;  
p < .001; 
partial η
2 = 
.86). 
< .001; partial η
2 = .65).  
In the scaled graphs, when the Hurst exponent was smaller, 
the oscillation was larger (F (2, 28) = 890.57; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .99). 
(In the data graphs, when the Hurst exponent was smaller, 
the oscillation was larger). 
    Hurst 
exponent and 
forecast 
horizon  
(F (4, 116) = 
43.89;  
p < .001; 
partial η
2 = 
.60) 
At each of the forecast horizons, oscillation was larger 
when H was smaller (for the horizon of two days, F (2, 28) 
= 1404.68; p < .001; partial η
2 = .99, for the horizon of 15 
days, F (2, 28) = 1175.87; p < .001; partial η
2 = .99, and for 
the forecast horizon of 100 days, F (2, 28) = 3569.82; p < 
.001; partial η
2 =0.99).  
For each Hurst exponent values, oscillation was higher 
when horizon was longer (for H = 0.3, F (2, 28) = 169.40; 
p < .001; partial η
2 = .92, for H = 0.5, F (2, 28) = 115.43; p 
< .001; partial η
2 = .89, and for H = 0.7, F (2, 28) = 108.00; 
p < .001; partial η
2 = .89). 
FD1  Horizon, 
Hurst 
exponent, 
and 
instance 
Hurst 
exponent and 
horizon  
(F (3.09, 
89.73) = 
5.44;  
p = .002;  
partial η
2 = 
.16) 
For each H value, FD1 was larger when forecast horizon 
was larger (for H = 0.3, F (2, 28) = 33.00; p < .001; partial 
η
2 = .70, for H = 0.5, F (2, 28) = 24.68; p< .001; partial η
2 
= .64, and for H = 0.7, F (2, 28) = 31.75; p < .001; partial 
η
2 = .69).  
For forecast horizons of 15 and 100 days, FD1 was larger 
when Hurst exponent was smaller (for forecast horizon of 
15 days F (2, 28) = 11.16; p < .001; partial η
2 = .44, for 
forecast horizon of 100 days F (2, 28) = 6.68; p = .004; 
partial η
2 = .32). 292 
 
    Hurst 
exponent and 
Instance  
(F (6.79, 
196.97) = 
7.67; 
 p = .002;  
partial η
2 = 
.21), 
For small and medium H values, the effects of instance on 
FD1 were smaller than those obtained for large H values 
(for H = 0.3, F (4, 26) = 5.41; p = .003; partial η
2 = .45, and 
for H = 0.5, F (4, 26) = 5.73; p = .002; partial η
2 = .47, for 
H = 0.7, F (4, 26) = 12.55; p < .001; partial η
2 = .66).  
 
    Horizon and 
Instance  
(F 
(4.41,127.89) 
= 18.28;  
p = .002;  
partial η
2 = 
.39) 
For small and medium forecast horizon, the effect of 
instance on FD1 was insignificant. However, for forecast 
horizon of 100 days, a strong effect of instance on FD1 
was obtained (F (4, 26) = 14.93; p < .001; partial η
2 = .70).  
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Table B.2 The results of a three-way repeated measures ANOVA on FD2 and FError. First 
panel: main effects. Second panel: interaction and tests of simple effects in Experiment 1 in 
Chapter 6. DV denotes dependent variables, and IV – independent variables. 
 
Repeated measures 
ANOVA 
Results: main effects 
DV  IV 
FD2  Horizon, 
Hurst 
exponent, 
and 
instance 
FD2 was larger when the forecast horizon was larger (F (1.37, 39.64) = 
86.38; p < .001; partial η
2 = .75) and when the Hurst exponent was smaller 
(F (2, 59) = 13.58; p < .001; partial η
2 = .32).  
Graph instance had a significant effect on FD2 (F (3.70, 107.42) = 15.55; p 
< .001; partial η
2 = .35). All interactions were significant. I report the 
results of the interactions and the corresponding simple tests velow. 
 
FError  Horizon, 
Hurst 
exponent, 
and 
instance 
FError was larger when the Hurst exponent was smaller (F (2, 58) = 57.15; 
p < .001; partial η
2 = .66) and when the forecast horizon was larger (F (1.2, 
34.81) = 246.25; p < .001; partial η
2 = .90).  
Instance had a significant effect on FError (F (4, 116) = 35.45; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .55). As before, all interactions were significant. I report the 
results of these interactions and the corresponding simple tests below. 
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Repeated measures 
ANOVA 
Interaction  Results of tests of simple effects 
DV  IV 
       
FD2  Horizon, 
Hurst 
exponent, 
and 
instance 
Hurst 
exponent and 
horizon 
(F (3.05, 
88.39) = 
6.49;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.18) 
For each Hurst exponent, FD2 was larger when forecast 
horizon was larger (for H = 0.3, F (2, 28) = 34.17; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .71, for H = 0.5, F (2, 28) = 26.32; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .65, and for H = 0.7, F (2, 28) = 34.20; p 
< .001; partial η
2 = .71).  
For forecast horizon of 15 days FD2 was larger when 
Hurst exponent was smaller (F (2, 28) = 9.29; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .40).  
    Hurst 
exponent and 
instance 
(F (6.042, 
175.21) = 
9.54;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.25) 
The effects of instance on FD2 increased with H (for H = 
0.3, F (4, 26) = 5.88; p = .002; partial η
2 = .48, for H = 0.5, 
F (4, 26) = 6.92; p = .001; partial η
2 = .52, and for H = 0.7, 
F (4, 26) = 9.64; p < .001; partial η
2 = .60). 
    Horizon and 
instance 
(F (4.73, 
137.05) = 
For medium and large forecast horizons, I obtained 
significant simple effects of instance on FD2 (for forecast 
horizon of 15 days, F (4, 26) = 4.39; p = .008; partial η
2 = 
.40, and for forecast horizon of 100 days, F (4, 26) = 295 
 
15.61;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.35) 
11.18; p = .008; partial η
2 = .63).  
FError  Horizon, 
Hurst 
exponent, 
and 
instance 
Hurst 
exponent and 
horizon 
(F (3.4, 
98.60) = 
16.68;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 
.37) 
For each Hurst exponent value, FError was larger when 
forecast horizon was longer (for H = 0.3, F (2, 28) = 
145.07; p < .001; partial η
2 = .91, for H = 0.5, F (2, 28) = 
201.41; p < .001; partial η
2 = .94, and for H = 0.7, F (2, 28) 
= 54.67; p < .001; partial η
2 = .80).  
For medium forecast horizons, the effect of H on FError 
was larger than for small and large forecast horizons (for 
forecast horizon of 2 days, F (2, 28) = 17.61; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .56, for forecast horizon of 15 days, F (2, 28) = 
59.92; p < .001; partial η
2 = .81, for forecast horizon of 100 
days, F (2, 28) = 10.24; p < .001; partial η
2 = .42). 
    Hurst 
exponent and 
instance 
(F (7, 202) = 
19.82;  
p < .001; 
partial η
2 = 
.41). 
The effect of graph instance on FError was the largest for 
H = 0.5 (for H = 0.3, F (4, 26) = 38.45; p < .001; partial η
2 
= .86, for H = 0.5, F (4, 26) = 75.21; p < .001; partial η
2 = 
.92, and for H = 0.7, F (4, 26) = 22.82; p < .001; partial η
2 
= .78). 
 
    Horizon and 
instance 
(F (3.42, 
99.13) = 
The effect of instance increased with forecast horizon (for 
forecast horizon of 2 days, F (4, 26) = 19.68; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .75, for forecast horizon of 15 days, F (4, 26) = 
39.65; p < .001; partial η
2 = .86, for forecast horizon of 100 296 
 
41.64;  
p < .001; 
partial η
2 
=.59). 
days, F (4, 26) = 59.17; p < .001; partial η
2 = .90). 
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Table B.3 Interactions and tests of simple effects in Experiment 2 in Chapter 6. 
Repeated measures 
ANOVA 
Interaction  Results of tests of simple effects 
DV  IV 
local 
steepness 
State, the 
Hurst 
exponent 
and the 
forecast 
density 
state and the Hurst 
exponent  
(F (4, 37.06) = 
308.98;  
p <.001;  
partial η
2 = 0.91). 
For all H values, local steepness was significantly 
smaller when H was larger (for H = 0.3, F (1, 29) = 
364.29; p < .001; partial η
2 = .93, for H = 0.4, F (1, 
29) = 230.19 ; p < .001; partial η
2 = .89, for H=0.5, 
F (1, 29) = 291; p < .001; partial η
2 = .91, for H=0.6, 
F (1, 29) = 348.08 ; p < .001; partial η
2 = .92, for 
H=0.7, F (1, 29) = 225.09 ; p < .001; partial η
2 = 
.89).  
In the original graphs, local steepness was larger 
when H was smaller (F (4, 26) = 563525; p < 0.001; 
partial η
2 = 1). The same relation was preserved 
after participants smoothed the data graphs (F (4, 
26) = 13.71; p < .001; partial η
2 = .68). 
Oscillation  State, the 
Hurst 
exponent 
and the 
forecast 
density 
state and the Hurst 
exponent  
(F (1.71, 49.55) = 
129.45 ;  
p < .001;  
partial η
2 = 0.82). 
For all H values, the oscillation of the data was 
larger before the smoothing than after smoothing 
(for H = 0.3, F (1, 29) = 181.40; p < .001; partial η
2 
= .86, for H = 0.4, F (1, 29) = 115.73; p < .001; 
partial η
2 = .80, for H = 0.5, F (1, 29) = 116.15; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .80, for H = 0.6, F (1, 29) = 
133.64;  p < .001; partial η
2 = .82, for H=0.7, F (1, 
29) = 75.35;  p < .001; partial η
2 = .72).  
Before the smoothing, oscillation of graphs was 298 
 
larger when H was smaller (F (4, 26) = 304.79; p < 
.001; partial η
2 = .98). The same relation was 
observed after smoothing data graphs (F (4, 26) = 
79.93; p < .001; partial η
2 = .92). 
  
 
 
 
 